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Abstract  
Following 15 years of high policy attention to curbing corruption in developing 
countries, this thesis concerns the effects of polices induced by the international donor 
community on curbing corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. I approach this question by 
assessing, in three stand-alone empirical chapters, the effects increased political 
competition, economic liberalisation, and the use of judicial punishment for 
corruption-related crimes have had on curbing corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
In the first empirical chapter, I assess the effect on corruption from increased political 
competition following the third wave of democratisation. While popular theories 
propose that political competition helps curb corruption by inducing political 
accountability, I find instead, in the sub-Saharan African context that in times of tense 
political competition the incumbent ensures his victory by buying the loyalty of the 
elite through distributing state resources for private means. This prebendal politics is, 
in turn, associated with higher levels of corruption. In the second empirical chapter, 
which concerns economic liberalisation and its effect on corruption, I ask what 
happens to corruption as the formal institutions governing the market change. Using 
insights from a case study on Rwanda, I find that corruption transforms rather than 
disappears in the advent of economic liberalisation. The third empirical chapter 
concerns the use of punishment for corruption-related crimes. By using politically 
contextualised information on prosecutions, I find that such anti-corruption 
interventions risk being used for political ends instead of curbing high level impunity.   
 
The overarching conclusion from this research endeavour is that corruption in the sub-
Saharan African context has a political function which makes the reforms prescribed 
by the donor community difficult, or illogical, to fully comply with. The political 
functionality of corruption must therefore constitute the analytical cornerstone when 
developing anti-corruption policies in order to set realistic expectations and avoid 
unintended consequences.  
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1. An International Donor Community at War with 
Corruption  
 
“And let’s not mince words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption.” (James 
Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank Group, 1996).
1
  
 
This quote represents the beginnings of the international donor community’s anti-
corruption agenda: a policy agenda that has grown considerably over the past 15 
years, and which rests on the conviction that corruption, most commonly defined as 
the abuse of public office for private gain, is “among the greatest obstacles to 
economic and social development.”2 This conviction is, in turn, supported by the 
plethora of recent academic research that empirically assesses the consequences of 
corruption. Corruption is found to impede economic development by reducing 
economic growth (Erlich and Lui, 1999; Poirson, 1998; Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005). It 
does so via different mechanisms, such as acting as a tax for firms and thereby 
decreases private investment (Mauro, 1995; Svensson, 2003; Fisman and Svensson, 
2007). Corruption is also found to obstruct a country’s economic growth via the 
misallocation of public resources (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Lastly, Gupta et al. 
(2002) find in their cross-country analysis that a higher level of corruption is 
associated with a higher rate of poverty and a higher degree of economic inequality. 
In sum, high levels of corruption are found to have negative effects on just about 
every development-related indicator.  
 
The core of this thesis consists of three stand-alone empirical research chapters. In 
each of these three chapters, I empirically assess, from the political context of sub-
Saharan African countries, the theoretical underpinnings of one conventional policy 
intended to curb corruption. In chapter 3, titled ‘Winning Elections with Grand 
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa’, I empirically assess the effect on corruption from 
an increase in political competition induced by multi-party democratisation. In 
chapter 4, titled ‘Coffee and Corruption: Economic Liberalisation and the 
Transformation of Political Corruption in Rwanda’, I assess the effect on corruption 
from a decrease in state intervention in the economy induced by economic 
liberalisation. Both political liberalisation and economic liberalisation constitute 
                                                 
1 
Address to the Board of Governors (1 October 1996).
 
2
 http://go.worldbank.org/JF938Z5CU0 (Website last accessed on 6 April, 2011).  
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cornerstones in the international donor community’s fight against corruption. Finally, 
in chapter 5, titled ‘Catching the ‘Big Fish’: The (Ab)Use of Corruption-Related 
Prosecutions across Sub-Saharan Africa’, I assess the effect of fighting corruption 
through the use of judicial punishment. While each of the three thesis chapters has its 
own narrow research question, theoretical discussion, testable hypotheses, and applied 
research methods, what links the different chapters in this thesis at the broadest level 
is the exclusive focus on corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The overarching research question in this thesis concerns the effects of the anti-
corruption policies induced by the international donor community. Simply put: do 
they help curb corruption in the sub-Saharan African political context or not? A 
related research question that is implicitly addressed in each of the empirical chapters 
concerns the validity of the largely apolitical policy approach used by the 
international donor community to curb corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. More 
broadly, this question concerns the relevance of theories originating from the 
experiences of Western liberal democracies in the fight against corruption in the sub-
Saharan African political context.  
 
At large, my theoretical contribution to the academic literature on corruption comes 
from the serious attention I give to the political functionality of corruption in the 
context of sub-Saharan Africa. By focusing on the political raison d’être of 
corruption, and how it is connected to the way in which politics is conducted in sub-
Saharan Africa, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of why African 
leaders may not want to fully comply with the international donor community’s anti-
corruption policies in the first place, and when they do, this may have unintended 
consequences. I also contribute to the empirical literature on corruption by using 
original research methods, non-conventional data on corruption, and by bridging 
disciplinary divides in the corruption literature. Lastly, since the thesis is linked 
together by the international donor community’s anti-corruption agenda, it makes the 
research project timely and relevant to a non-academic audience of development 
policy-makers and practitioners. 
 
I start the thesis introduction by presenting the international donor community’s anti-
corruption agenda and provide examples of how this agenda has played out in the 
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African context. In section 1.2, I provide a discussion about the apolitical and neo-
liberal assumptions and policy parameters of the international anti-corruption agenda. 
Finally, in section 1.3, I provide a justification for my explicit focus on the sub-
Saharan African regions and present a theoretical framework of how to view 
corruption in the region from a political perspective. This theoretical framework, 
being heavily influenced by the literature on African neopatrimonialism, stands in 
stark contrast to the previously presented anti-corruption focus by the international 
donor community and exemplifies the theoretical debates that I address in the 
subsequent empirical chapters.  
 
1.1 A heightened attention to corruption  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the international development discourse became 
increasingly preoccupied with the quality of political and economic governance 
systems in developing countries. This coincided with the end of the Cold War, which 
brought to light a new political reality where international aid was no longer required 
to prop up dictators for political reasons to the same extent as before. “There was no 
longer a geopolitical counterweight in the East to Western demands for economic 
liberalisation and political democratisation.” (Weiss, 2000:799). For the World Bank, 
the new focus on governance became a way to re-invent itself with a human face after 
the apparent failure of structural adjustment’s narrow focus on the market and 
minimalist attention to the role of governments (Marquette, 2003:53-54). The ‘good 
governance agenda’ is, in turn, the predecessor and umbrella under which the anti-
corruption agenda sits.  
 
Curbing corruption emerged as a priority issue in development policy in the mid-
1990s on top of the good governance agenda. The then President of the World Bank 
officially started the anti-corruption crusade in 1996 by stating, in a speech, the 
Bank’s need to tackle the ‘cancer of corruption’ (Wolfensohn, 1996). In 1997 the 
Bank published its first report of corruption titled ‘Helping Countries Combat 
Corruption: The Role of the World Bank’. From the preface of this report, 
Wolfensohn reiterated his strong message about the new focus on corruption by 
writing: “The international community simply must deal with the cancer of 
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corruption, because it is a major barrier to sustainable and equitable development… 
The time for action is now.” 
 
Burnside and Dollar’s (1997) controversial research finding, which implied that only 
countries with good quality of governance are able to reap the benefits of 
development aid, increased the determination of the international donor community to 
work on promoting good governance. The World Development Report from 1997, for 
example, states that “only in a good policy environment will foreign aid have an 
impact on growth.” (World Bank, 1997:140). The new anti-corruption agenda was 
therefore quickly transferred to the rest of the international community, and in the 
1990s and early 2000s several international and regional conventions against 
corruption entered into force.  
Note: Figure 1.1 shows the percentage per year of World Bank publications in English that respond to 
the search keyword ‘corrupt*’. Author’s calculation. Source: World Bank online publications database.  
 
A simple search of the World Bank’s online publications database clearly shows this 
heightened focus on corruption. Figure 1.1 above shows the percentage of all World 
Bank publications per year in English that come up when using ‘corrupt*’ as the 
search keyword. The figure shows how corruption entered into focus in the mid-1990s 
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Figure 1.1: Corruption - from taboo to top priority
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and that 22 percent of all World Bank publications in English published in 2008 
contained some form of the word ‘corruption’.   
 
The greater international attention to corruption can also be seen in terms of media 
coverage of the issue. Figure 1.2 below shows the hits per year of a search in The 
New York Times’ archive using the search keywords ‘corrupt* and Africa’ and 
‘corrupt* and Asia’. While corruption was reported on prior to the mid-1990s, recent 
years have seen a large increase in the articles mentioning corruption. In addition, the 
number of hits for the African region has increased more than the hits for Asia in 
recent years.   
 
Note: Figure 1.2 shows the number of news articles per year responding to the search keyword 
‘corrupt* and Africa’ and ‘corrupt* and Asia’, author’s calculation. Source: The New York Times’ 
online news archive.  
A common reaction I get when I tell people that I am studying corruption in Africa is 
that such research will keep me busy, implying how notorious corruption is in the 
region. This is not a surprising reaction since corruption is one of the negative aspects 
often portrayed in media reports on African countries. This is expressed in the 
following words by an article on democratisation in Africa. “Imperfectly, reluctantly, 
tentatively, democracy is inching across a continent better known for wars, disease, 
corruption and repression.” (The New York Times, 2002, retrieved on 6 April 2011). 
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That fighting corruption is high on the policy agenda, as well as commonly associated 
with Africa, can also be seen from the discourse of Western politicians. The following 
quote provides an example of such a speech conducted during a visit to Africa. 
“Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton sent a message of tough 
love to Nigeria on Wednesday, praising the country’s strong 
military and showing public appreciation for its huge oil industry, 
but also harshly criticising the government for being corrupt… But 
when it came to corruption – and Nigeria is notoriously corrupt, 
from top ministers in the government to plump police officers on the 
street – Mrs Clinton took a decidedly different tone. She told a 
crowd of civic leaders that the reason so many millions of Nigerians 
were desperately poor, despite the nation’s having so much oil, was 
“a failure of government at the federal, state and local level.” (The 
New York Times, 2009, retrieved on 6 April 2011).  
The international donor community’s focus on corruption has not only changed the 
development discourse of Western donors but has also affected donor-recipient 
relations. The good governance and anti-corruption agendas have resulted in the 
freezing and suspending of aid projects; attachment of anti-corruption and 
governance-focused conditionalities to aid packages; and the consideration of 
corruption indicators in the selection of eligible recipient countries. The most extreme 
case of using corruption in the aid selection process is the American donor agency, 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, which only gives aid to countries that score above 
median in the Control of Corruption Index, which is a cross-country corruption index 
annually published by the World Bank as part of its Governance Indicators (Herrling 
and Rose, 2007).  
 
The anti-corruption agenda has been widely applied across sub-Saharan Africa. 
Corruption in Africa was, in fact, central to the initiation of the anti-corruption agenda 
as the continent’s lack of development, despite structural adjustment, prompted the 
search for a new development paradigm (Polzer, 2001:2). By now, anti-corruption 
projects represent a large and increasing share of aid to the sub-continent (Bryane, 
2004; Harrison, 2004:241). For example, of those seven Western bilateral donors that 
are part of the U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre and whose anti-corruption 
projects are reported on the U4 website, 154 out of a total 317 reported projects had 
been undertaken in Africa (U4 project database online, last accessed on 6 April 2011).  
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This heightened attention to corruption from the international community is mirrored 
in the rhetoric of African leaders. From analysing publicly available presidential 
speeches from across sub-Saharan Africa, I find clear evidence that these leaders have 
responded to the fact that corruption is high on the international development policy 
agenda. Firstly, to mention corruption is far from taboo and various leaders often 
include references to corruption and their fight against it, for different audiences, and 
in different contexts. Fighting corruption is clearly something these leaders need to be 
seen doing. The rhetoric with regard to corruption has certain commonalities. The 
political leaders are generous in their use of strong language, such as ‘war against 
corruption’; ‘crusade against corruption’, and ‘zero tolerance against corruption’. 
Another rhetorical commonality is for the presidents to highlight that they themselves, 
and their governments, are committed to the fight and, while their societies were 
burdened by extensive corruption during previous governments, their governments 
have been able to show progress in the war against corruption. The quote below from 
a speech by Tanzania’s President, Jakaya Kikwete, provides a good example of these 
rhetorical commonalities.  
“With regards to the fight against corruption, I must admit it is a 
complicated and challenging one. Nonetheless, we are making 
steady progress and registering some success as we proceed. We are 
determined to stay the course. We are succeeding in building 
institutional capacity of our Anti-Corruption Bureau. Sensitisation 
of people to join and assist this noble crusade seems to be working 
and paying dividend. We have, now, sixteen cases of grand 
corruption in the courts of law which underscores our determination 
in this fight and how far we have come. Our efforts are being 
acknowledged globally. The recent report of Transparency 
International puts Tanzania ahead in the Eastern African region in 
the fight against corruption and so does the Mo Ibrahim Index on 
Governance.” (Kikwete, 2009, my italics). 
While evidence of progress in the fight against corruption in this case was supported 
by international comparisons, evidence of progress can also be supported by 
denigrating former governments once a new leader has come to power. This rhetorical 
technique was used by Nigeria’s President, Olusegun Obasanjo, after he came to 
power in 1999 as shown in the following quote found in an early presidential speech.  
“And to cap it all, there was Corruption! Corruption! And 
Corruption! Everywhere and all the time! Corruption was not only 
rife, it had eaten so deeply into the marrow of our existence that 
looters and fraudsters had become our heroes and it seemed we 
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could no longer place any faith in honesty and decency and hard 
work.” (Obasanjo, 2000). 
That the fight against corruption is high on the political agenda and a priority area for 
citizens can be seen from the following quote from a speech by Kenya’s President, 
Mwai Kibaki, made close to the national elections in 2007.  
“Mr Speaker, when we took over the leadership of this country, we 
identified corruption as one of the most serious obstacles to 
development. We therefore embarked on major legislative and 
administrative reforms to create a system that fights corruption in a 
sustainable way. In the last three years, we have made significant 
gains in the fight against graft.” (Kibaki, 2006). 
Lastly, many African leaders have used speeches to assure the public about their 
commitment to fighting corruption, both their personal commitment and that of their 
governments. The quote below from a speech by Olusegun Obasanjo stresses this 
determination to fight and win the war against corruption.  
“We need to renew our resolve to fight corruption to a standstill. My 
commitment here is total. And I repeat for all those who still have 
not got the message that it cannot be business as usual. Some of 
them have been reported to believe that my fight against corruption 
would run out of steam while I get exhausted. As long as God gives 
me strength, anyone waiting for Obasanjo to get tired will be 
waiting in vain – until he breathes his last breath.” (Obasanjo, 
2000). 
These quotes from presidential speeches all highlight the fact that the internationally 
heightened attention to corruption has had an impact on policy agendas in sub-
Saharan African countries.  
 
1.2 An apolitical and neoliberal international anti-corruption agenda  
In each of the three stand-alone empirical research chapters in this thesis, I assess the 
theoretical underpinnings of one conventional strategy to curb corruption: through 
democratisation; economic liberalisation; and judicial punishment for corruption-
related crimes. However, in order to understand where these strategies come from, 
certain features of the anti-corruption agenda need to be further discussed. First, 
because the anti-corruption agenda originated from the World Bank it needed to be 
apolitical. Second, the timing and birthplace of the agenda meant that the agenda had, 
and continues to have, a strong linkage to neo-liberal ideology, and third, the 
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empirical evidence base underpinning the policy agenda is predominantly made up of 
quantitative analyses that assume world-wide homogeneity.  
 
Previous academic attention to corruption, especially in the 1960s, had seen the 
phenomenon of corruption in the light of societal power structures and thus based the 
understanding of the concept in the realm of politics (Leff, 1964; Nye, 1967; 
Huntington, 1968; Scott, 1969). In the 1990s, such political understanding of the 
corruption needed to be adapted to fit the World Bank’s mandate of engaging in 
member states’ economic considerations but not their political ones.3 In accordance 
with the World Bank’s apolitical charter, corruption therefore became understood, not 
as a political feature, but as a social and economic concept that could be dealt with 
through institutional strengthening (Marquette, 2003). The need for this conceptual 
transformation can be seen from the following quote which is taken from a speech 
given by the World Bank’s President, James Wolfensohn, before a group of NGOs in 
2000 where he explained how the Bank became interested in tackling corruption:  
“When I got to the Bank, the General Council called me in to give 
me my briefing on what I could do and what I could not do as 
President of the Bank. And he said the one thing you cannot do is to 
talk about the ‘c’ word. And I said what is the ‘c’ word? He said the 
‘c’ word is corruption. And under the Charter of the Bank you are 
not allowed to talk about politics and corruption is politics.” 
(Ibid:11).  
The role played by President Wolfensohn appears to have been crucial, not only for 
bringing corruption to the highest attention at the World Bank, but also for 
transforming the concept of corruption and thereby set the parameters for the new 
international anti-corruption agenda. As the following quote from Wolfensohn states: 
“I visited a number of countries… and I decided that I would redefine the ‘c’ word not 
as a political issue but as something social and economic” (Krastev, 2004:21). 
Thereby, corruption was not about politics anymore. Instead, the Bank’s apolitical 
anti-corruption agenda came to identify corruption as “a symptom of dysfunctional 
public sector institutions” (World Bank, 2000:21). Although being initiated in the 
                                                 
3
 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article IV, Section 10 states that: “The Bank and its officers shall not 
interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the 
political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the 
purposes stated in Article I.”   
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World Bank, the anti-corruption agenda in its apolitical form spread to the entire 
international community. For example, in 2007 the governments of the OECD, 
represented by the ministers responsible for development aid, stated the importance of 
the idea that “corruption is a symptom of weak governance” (OECD, 2007:3). The de-
politicised conceptualisation of corruption meant that corruption could be seen as a 
technical problem which, in turn, could be solved through donor-supplied technical 
assistance. As a consequence of this apolitical conceptualisation, donors’ anti-
corruption policies came to rest on the assumption that “politics is positive-sum: all 
agents can gain from governance reform.” (Harrison, 2005:247).  
 
That the international donor community’s anti-corruption agenda rests on the 
assumption that all agents can gain from governance reform – that if reform brings 
about aggregate benefits, there is no need to be preoccupied with how the benefits are 
distributed – is perhaps the single most flawed assumption underpinning this policy 
agenda, especially seen in light of sub-Saharan African reform efforts. It avoids 
paying attention to reform winners and losers, or politics in general, and pushes the 
issues of corruption and anti-corruption into the technical realm.    
 
In terms of ideological orientation, because the international anti-corruption agenda 
was born at the economics-focused World Bank in the era of neo-liberalism, it was 
naturally tainted by Washington consensus-type policy prescriptions (Harriss-White 
and White, 1996). Although the anti-corruption agenda had been ostensibly de-
politicised, Harrison (2004:242) writes that the World Bank was in fact ideologically 
driven and “acted politically under the guise of governance doctrine, consolidating a 
neo-liberal grip and prosecuting the construction of liberal political processes within 
indebted African states.” According to Riley (1998:129) “In the mid-1990s an 
international consensus in development discourse has emerged: democratisation, 
public sector down-sizing, and economic deregulation are desirable goals in 
themselves, but they also reduce the extensive corruption in monopolistic state 
agencies.” In this neo-liberal and government-sceptical era, the causes of corruption 
became conventionally seen as economic and political monopoly structures as well as 
the lack of accountability, or as Klitgaard’s (1988) highly influential equation stated 
‘corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability’. Curbing corruption on an 
aggregate country level thus involves political and economic liberalisation and 
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competition; and as a form of increasing accountability, judicial punishment for 
corruption-related crimes. These institutional changes have constituted the foundation 
for micro-level anti-corruption interventions as well as for policy conditionalities and 
political pressure from the donor community on a macro-level.    
 
Lastly, in terms of validating the neo-liberal approach, the quantification of 
corruption, particularly by the Corruption Perceptions Index initiated by Transparency 
International in 1994, enabled the new policy agenda to be driven by statistical 
evidence. The Bank became the hub for research on corruption: a research that is 
“…economics-led and avoids, for the most part, directly addressing overtly political 
issues…” (Marquette, 2003:10). It also makes great use of cross-country regression 
analysis and assumes homogenous effects across the world. Thus, during the last 15 
years a sea of empirical literature on what causes corruption to vary across countries 
has emerged and it is almost exclusively quantitative. The most seminal quantitative 
study among those that treat corruption as a dependent variable is Treisman’s (2000) 
‘The Causes of Corruption: a Cross-National Study’ which assesses 14 hypotheses on 
what correlates with levels of corruption across countries. According to Google 
Scholar, this work has been cited 1424 times (by 6 April 2011) and has greatly shaped 
both the corruption literature and what accounts for conventional wisdom about how 
corruption can be curbed. 
 
In sum, the international donor community’s anti-corruption agenda can be roughly 
summarised in the following way: it is apolitical and rests on the assumption that all 
agents can gain from governance reform. It furthers neoliberal policy prescriptions 
regardless of the context in which policies are applied, and its policy evidence base is 
largely made up of an empirical literature that is highly quantitative and rich in 
correlations but poor in the understanding of processes and political motivations 
behind corruption. In the next section, after justifying why I focus this thesis 
explicitly on sub-Saharan Africa, I will present a theoretical framework that explains 
how I believe corruption works in the sub-Saharan African political context, which is 
in stark contrast to how the phenomenon is understood in the international donor 
community’s anti-corruption agenda.  
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1.3 A focus on corruption in sub-Saharan Africa  
This research project specifically concerns corruption in sub-Saharan Africa, thus a 
justification for focusing on this region is appropriate. To start with, the sub-Saharan 
African region has the highest levels of perceived corruption on average of all world 
regions according to data from cross-country corruption indices. A 2002 report by the 
African Union claims that sub-Saharan Africa loses an estimated $148 billion 
annually to corrupt practices, a figure that represents 25 percent of the region’s gross 
domestic product (BBC News, 2002, retrieved 6 April 2011). Another number-
crunching exercise by the Washington-based institute, Global Financial Integrity, sets 
the bill from illicit financial flows leaving sub-Saharan Africa to $358 billion for the 
period 2000-2008 (Global Financial Integrity, 2010).  
 
While different types of corruption have arguably different repercussions for 
development, several authors argue that the types and scale of corruption found in 
Africa have particularly severe consequences for development compared to other 
world regions (Sindzingre, 2002; Riley, 1998). In addition, domestic dissent about 
corruption has been, and continues to be, used to justify political changes, for example 
through coup d’états, and thus contributes to the instability that plagues the region 
(Oliver de Sardan, 1999). Médard (2002:382) argues that it is the scope and scale of 
corruption in sub-Saharan African that is incompatible with those in richer countries. 
“To say that corruption [in Africa] is all together systemic, generalised and that its 
price is high enables us to distinguish it from the corruption observable in most 
industrialised societies. In Africa, corruption encompasses the government 
administration and the political levels, grand and petty corruption, corruption for 
survival and corruption for enrichment. The entire state apparatus is affected.” While 
numerous domestically driven efforts (rhetorical and populist or not) to curb 
corruption took place in several African countries long before the international donors 
increased their concern for the issue, few of these efforts appear to have had positive 
and sustainable effects (Williams, 1987; Riley, 1998). The scale and continuation of 
corruption in Africa, together with the international community’s focus on curbing 
corruption in the region, underpins my interest in studying corruption in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
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In terms of research methodology, however, my choice to focus on one region rather 
than one or a few African countries has to do with wanting to make use of cross-
section quantitative analysis as a research method. In turn, a focus on sub-Saharan 
Africa as opposed to a larger set of countries or the entire world enables me to make 
use of the ‘most similar system’ logic by holding certain institutional features 
constant. While the vast majority of the large number of quantitative analyses on 
corruption that have been published in the past 15 years base their statistical analysis 
on as large a country sample as possible and thereby assume homogenous effects 
across often very different countries, I do not subscribe to this approach. Instead, I 
believe that the phenomenon of corruption cannot be divorced from the institutional 
and political structures in which it is generated and that these structures look too 
different across the world to be ‘controlled away’ using the proxies for institutional 
structures that data allow. In other words, assuming world-wide inference becomes 
problematic as I believe that the societal structures that allow corruption to exist in 
Zambia and Zimbabwe are different from those that exist in Sweden and Switzerland. 
I will discuss these institutional structures below. First, however, I will make use of 
some statistics to justify focusing on Africa in isolation.  
 
1.3.1 Inference from large N analysis  
In this section, I test the assumption of homogenous behaviour of corruption across 
different types of countries. I do so by comparing the causes of corruption on a ‘whole 
world’ sample with a sample of African countries. The example used here is how a 
country’s level of income (proxied by log GDP per capita PPP) is expected to affect 
its level of corruption. I chose this variable because Treisman (2000:430) in his 
seminal cross-country study on the causes of corruption, found income to be the best 
predictor of levels of corruption across countries among a set of 14 explanatory 
variables. According to that study, income can by itself explain at least 73 percent of 
all cross-country variation in levels of corruption. Figure 1.3 below shows a scatter 
plot with correlates of corruption measured by the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption Index, and income measured by log GDP per capita PPP. What is 
interesting with this graph is that it shows a curvilinear relationship between the 
income and corruption variables. Before a country reaches about log 4 to log 4.5 
(approximately the income level of Argentina) changes in levels of corruption do not 
correspond very much to changes in income levels, while at the upper end of the 
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income scale, changes in income are highly correlated with changes in corruption 
levels.  
 
Note: Figure 1.3 shows the correlation between national income, measured by GDP per capita PPP, and 
levels of corruption, proxied by the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index. Sources: World Bank 
Governance Indicators and World Development Indicators online. 
 
The same correlation between income and corruption looks very different when 
applied to African countries as shown in figure 1.4 below. While countries like Gabon 
and Botswana have similar wealth per capita, they score very differently in terms of 
perceived levels of corruption. It is therefore difficult to predict whether a country like 
Burundi, if substantial economic growth occurs, will end up looking more like Gabon 
or more like Botswana in terms of corruption.   
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Note: Figure 1.4 shows the correlation between national income, measured by GDP per capita PPP, and 
levels of corruption, proxied by the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index on an exclusively sub-
Saharan African country sample. Sources: World Bank Governance Indicators and World Development 
Indicators online. 
 
Table 1.1: Statistical justification for taking a regional approach  
 
Dependent variable: Control of Corruption Index, 
data from 2010 
 
(1) ‘Whole world’ 
sample 
 
 
(2) Sub-Saharan 
African sample 
Log GDP per capita PPP  
 
1.24***    
(0.10) 
0.42***   
(0.18) 
Constant  -4.81***    
(0.39) 
-1.91*** 
(0.61) 
R-square 0.47 0.11 
 
Number of countries  
165 44 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index from 2010. Data for log 
GDP per capita PPP is from 2010 and taken from World Development Indicators online. The 
parentheses contain robust standard errors. *** significant at 1%.  
 
Table 1.1 above shows the results from regressions run with a ‘whole world’ sample 
(165 countries) and a sample including only Sub-Saharan African countries (44 
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countries). While income is a statistically significant predictor of corruption in both 
regressions, the magnitude of the coefficient as well as the value of the R-square are 
much greater when the whole world in incorporated as opposed to when only African 
(largely very poor) countries are included in the sample. This simple test shows that a 
‘whole world’ sample does a poor job at predicting the trajectory of African countries. 
 
Treisman (2000) does, to a certain degree, touch upon variation in levels of corruption 
across world regions and uses a set of dummies to control for such variations. 
However, this addition merely gives each region a different intercept but does not 
touch upon the fact that each region may also benefit from different slope coefficients 
as the outcome from the regressions in table 1.1 shows. Such heterogeneity across the 
world provides one justification for taking a regional focus. Next, I will take a more 
theoretical approach and discuss further justifications for exclusively focusing this 
study on corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
1.3.2 Different types of corruption in different types of countries 
Because much of the corruption literature is quantitative and most of the quantitative 
analyses take a homogenous view of corruption across countries, relatively little can 
be found in the corruption literature on qualitative differences in corruption across 
countries. Rose-Ackerman’s model from 1999 is an exception. The variable on which 
the author distinguishes the nature and extent of corruption in different societies is the 
relative power between political and economic actors. “Corruption describes a 
relationship between the state and the private sector. Sometimes state officials are the 
dominant actors; in other cases the private actors are the most powerful forces. The 
relative bargaining power of these groups determines both the overall impact of 
corruption on society and the distribution of the gains between bribers and bribees.” 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999:113).  
 
Where the state is the stronger of the parties, the ‘kleptocrat’ will make sure policies 
help transfer the maximum amount of resources into his pockets and will oppose 
redistributive policies that benefit large parts of society. A powerful kleptocrat facing 
weak private actors organises the state in a way that creates rents for him. However, if 
the kleptocrat is weak, he will have to share some of the extracted resources with the 
broader elite. Examples of extreme cases of kleptocracy include Zaire under Mobutu 
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Sese Seko and Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier where large parts of the countries’ 
economic resources were in effect treated as the leaders’ private property.  
 
On the other hand, in cases where societal actors are comparatively powerful, such as 
relatively mobile multinational enterprises that are invested in the country or domestic 
mafia groups, bribes, according to Rose-Ackerman’s theory, will be lower and the 
benefits divided between the political and economic actors. The Philippines since 
independence is given as an example of a weak state dealing with powerful business 
interests. Societal strength in this context comes from an oligarchic elite, comprised of 
large and powerful families that have exerted control over the Philippine state 
(Caouette, 2012). In coherence with this theory, the quantitative study by Hellman et 
al (2000) on transitional economies found that, by paying bribes to state officials, 
some firms were powerful enough to shape the rules of the game to their advantage 
and in that sense capture the much weaker state.  
 
How can sub-Saharan African corruption be understood in relation to this theoretical 
framework? What is often mentioned in the African literature is the lack of 
autonomous capitalists and a power structure that is heavily tilted in favour of a 
political class. Sandbrook (1993), for example, recognises that power struggles in 
many African countries have not yielded a class hegemony shaping the state’s long-
term interests, such as the interest of the market. “The temptation, therefore, is for the 
state’s executives to exercise its considerable autonomy from classes in defence of the 
interests of parasitical coterie of political insiders.” (Ibid:23). Médard (2002:384) 
similarly notes that “to simplify to the extreme, one might say that in Africa, politics 
dominate the economy, to the extent that private economy lacks autonomy to 
develop.” In other words the African state is pictured as being able to over-ride 
weakly organised societal interests. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the 
typical African state is strong, for example in terms of being able to enforce laws and 
implement policy (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Instead, the way to think about the state 
is better understood as the subordination of the state by the political elite. From this 
brief review I can conclude that, as a generalisation, sub-Saharan African countries 
can be characterised as being dominated by a political elite as opposed to being 
dominated by private market interests. As such, according to Rose-Ackerman’s 
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(1999) framework, the predominant type of corruption found in sub-Saharan African 
countries is that belonging to the kleptocratic logic.  
 
This theoretical reasoning, and its focus on who will benefit from corruption in 
different countries, clearly goes some way in terms of differentiating the types and 
effects of corruption in different contexts. Nonetheless, it has one serious shortcoming 
in terms of providing an understanding of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa and in 
what ways it may differ from corruption found elsewhere. The theory provides but 
one motivation to why kleptocrats engage in corruption and that is personal profit 
maximisation. If this is indeed the only reason given in the literature on corruption for 
why political leaders engage in corruption, we run the risk of equating the existence 
of corruption with bad personal morality of leaders rather than seeing the wider set of 
incentives facing these leaders. To better understand these incentives, it is preferable 
to step away from the literature on corruption and borrow some insights from the 
literature on African clientelism and neopatrimonialism.  
 
What distinguishes corruption in sub-Saharan Africa from corruption found elsewhere 
is, according to Nicolas van de Walle, the form of clientelism found in the region, 
which is turn, is linked to regime type and economic structure. While clientelism
4,
 or a 
country’s political reward system, is likely to exist in all modern states in one form or 
another, its manifestations vary to a great deal among countries. According to van de 
Walle, countries can be divided into those using mass clientelism and those using elite 
clientelism. Mass clientelism requires more resources than elite clientelism and is 
therefore likely to take place in richer countries, also in mature democracies. It relies 
on the practice of using state resources to provide jobs and services for mass 
clienteles, and usually involves party organisations and electoral politics. For poorer 
                                                 
4
 Stoke (2007:605) defines clientelism as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral 
support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support 
me?” The concept of patronage is linked to clientelism and often used synonymously. However, in the 
stricter sense, it refers to the material goods being made up of public resources, such as employment 
(ibid:605). The concept of clientelism is usually used to describe direct payments to citizen voters at 
election times, particularly in Latin America. The way in which theories of clientelism is normally used 
in the African context does not refer to ordinary citizens and voting behaviour. Instead, theories refer to 
the way in which, at the top, elite support is bought by a country’s president or other ‘Big Men’, and 
how this behaviour continues down the political hierarchy with local ‘Big Men’ buying support from 
local people. An exception to this is Wantchekon (2003) who looks at direct vote buying from citizens 
at election times in Benin. 
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countries, on the other hand, where mass clientelism is not afforded, clientelism is 
more likely to be limited to a narrower clientele through the distribution of elite 
offices.  
 
The type of clientelism that takes place in sub-Saharan African countries is, according 
to van de Walle, characterised by elite clientelism which is being enjoyed by the 
hundred or maybe thousands of people who constitute a country’s top political elite.5 
Booth (2012:9) adds that clientelism in Africa is characterised by a fragmented elite 
(along economic, regional, ethnic, religious and other lines) who compete with each 
other and ensure winning coalitions by allocating private benefits to those groups on 
whose support they rely.  
 
This elite clientelism found in African countries is, in turn, closely linked to 
corruption. According to van de Walle (2012:113), the characteristic of elite 
clientelism in Africa is prebendalism, or the strategic political allocation of public 
offices to key elites, granting personal access over state resources.
6
 By being granted 
access to these offices for political reasons, the political elite can subsequently subvert 
the rule of law for personal gain. It can almost be seen as a given when being granted 
a political office that benefits other than the official salary are at the disposal of the 
office holder. The scale of these personal gains can be large. In Benin, for example, it 
was found that the average customs agent had daily ‘parallel income’ equivalent to 
two and a half times the monthly salary of a college professor (Bako-Arifari, 2001:41, 
referenced in van de Walle, 2007:56). Being able to hand out good positions in the 
customs administrations could thereby be politically highly valuable. As such, it can 
be argued that the type of corruption found in sub-Saharan Africa is linked to a certain 
type of clientelism, or reward system, in which slices of the state, or the spoils of the 
state, is given to a narrow political elite.  
 
                                                 
5
 According to Hadjor (1987:141), African political elite encompasses all those who through their 
access to the state are able to control political life, i.e. ruling politicians, government officials, and top 
civil servants including the judiciary, military and police. 
6 
Prebendalism as a term was first used in the African context by Joseph (1983:30) where he refers it to 
“patterns of political behaviour which reflect as their justifying principle that the offices of the existing 
state may be competed for and then utilised for the personal benefit of office-holders as well as that of 
their reference or support group.”  
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Having determined that the political elite are the main beneficiaries of resource 
distribution linked to corruption in Africa, as opposed to societal actors such as big 
business, landowners or mafia, and thereby distinguished some characteristics of 
corruption found in this region from corruption found elsewhere; I can now provide a 
more in-depth discussion about the political logic of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This can favourably be done from the perspective of Africa’s ‘Big Men’ and the 
consequent theoretical lens of neopatrimonialism.   
 
1.3.3 ‘Big Man’ rule, winner-takes-all politics, and the logic of corruption 
Neopatrimonialism is a mixed system of the two polar systems referred to by Max 
Weber as patrimonialism and rational-legal systems. Neopatrimonialism refers to an 
institutional setup in which a country’s informal institutions function according to 
patron-client relations while, at the same time, its formal institutions are constructed 
along rational-legal lines. In other words, it refers to African countries having adopted 
the same types of institutions found in Western democracies, e.g. democracy, property 
rights etc., whilst, on top of this, the real politics is conducted through informal 
institutions, such as the type of clientelism described above. According to Médard 
(1991:330, referenced in Bach, 2012), “neopatrimonialism provides the common 
denominator for a range of practices that are highly characteristic of politics in Africa, 
namely nepotism, clannish behaviour, so-called ‘tribalism’, regionalism, patronage, 
‘cronyism’, ‘prebendalism’, corruption, predation, factionalism etc.” Added to this list 
is also ‘big man politics’ and ‘personal rule’ (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; van de 
Walle, 2012), which refers to power across Africa being disproportionately in the 
hands of the executive branch of government. The handling of this power is of 
particular relevance to how corruption, including through elite clientelism, plays out 
in the region.  
 
African countries are characterised by the centralisation of power around the ‘Big 
Men’, usually the countries’ presidents. According to these countries’ formal 
institutions, checks and balances should be imposed by legislators etc. However, 
according to the much more powerful informal institutions, a ‘Big Man’ is “literally 
above the law, controls in many cases a large proportion of state finance with little 
accountability, and delegates remarkably little of his authority on important matters... 
Only the apex of the executive really matters” (van de Walle, 2003:310). Médard’s 
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(2012) portrait of a Kenyan political entrepreneur does a good job at depicting the 
political game played by the top political elite in order to claim the presidential post. 
It highlights the impunity of political heavyweights as they manipulate politics and 
institutions without consideration of legal boundaries. Because economic resources 
are largely under the control of the ‘Big Man’ and his entourage, “political power is 
the origin of wealth and the state is the pie that everyone greedily wants to eat.” 
(Médard, 1982:182). Such powerful positions are naturally accompanied by much 
drama about the control over the presidency with stakes a great deal higher than in 
Western democracies. According to Hyden (2006:99), these political games tend to be 
zero-sum which accentuates the insecurity faced by the political actors being part of 
the political game. In the words of Bayart (2009:239), “it is a truism that it is easier to 
get rich from a position of power than from a position of dependency and penury, but 
it is a truism that in Africa one may not easily survive.”  
 
The type of prebendal elite clientelism and consequent corruption discussed above is a 
direct response to this high-staked battle over the presidency. This stems from the 
need of the ‘Big Man’ to ensure loyal followers and thereby safeguard himself against 
political competition and ‘Big Men’ in waiting. Such political battles are won through 
buying the loyalty of the elite. The broader the support base the more powerful the 
ruler and the more stable the political system (Hyden, 2006:104). “Political stability in 
Africa has often been constructed by using state resources to forge alliances across 
different social elites, often in the form of overt power-sharing arrangements.” (van de 
Walle, 2003:312). Such political battles are also won by using political muscle to 
crack down on opposition. According to Cammack et al (2007), “the ‘Big Man’ 
personally uses the power of the state to protect his cronies, eliminate his rivals and to 
buy support, for example by handling out cabinet posts and providing opportunities 
for rent.” Van de Walle (2007:66) offers an example of how this clientelist reward 
and punishment system works in practice. “A community which did not deliver the 
vote is punished by seeing its three ministerial positions cut down to one in the post-
election cabinet. Another community which did join the presidential majority is 
rewarded when one of its leading light is named ambassador to Paris.” 
 
To become a ‘Big Man’ as well as to sustain the elite clientelist loyalty networks 
require the personal generation and distribution of a considerable amount of 
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resources. While in Western democracies leaders may want to downplay their own 
personal wealth to win popularity among ordinary citizens, Bayart (2009:242) argues 
that in the African context, material prosperity is one of the chief political virtues, and 
that a man of power who is able to amass and distribute wealth becomes a ‘man of 
honour’. This wealth legitimises the leader’s hold on power as it signals that he is able 
to uphold a large elite network and thereby ensure political stability. The list is long of 
African ‘Big Men’ and their cronies who have become excessively rich during, and 
because of, their stay in political office. Corruption in this sense can of course be seen 
as personal greed but what should not be forgotten is that it also plays a political role 
in the zero-sum political culture symbolic of sub-Saharan Africa. Médard (2002:383) 
describes this logic in the following way:  
“In Africa, it is in the politician’s interest, politically speaking, to 
redistribute part of the stolen money to keep their political clientele. 
The mechanics of patronage and therefore stability are at the heart 
of a leader’s political stability. The art of governing is not only the 
art of extracting resources, but also of redistribution: it is the only 
way of legitimising power, in the absence of ideological 
legitimacy.”  
 
In this light, van de Walle’s (1994:149) statement that “although corruption and rent-
seeking exist outside of Africa, they are rarely as central to state processes” makes 
perfect sense. In short, corruption in Africa is associated with perfectly rational 
governance strategies used to uphold the political system and create political stability 
and continued incumbency by the ‘Big Man’ and his political elite.  
 
This theoretical framework has provided a justification for looking at corruption in 
Africa separately from corruption found, for example in western democracies or in 
developing countries where different institutional structures prevail. It has also 
provided a basis on which to start thinking about the international donor community’s 
anti-corruption agenda and what outcomes can be expected from this policy 
endeavour. While the empirical analyses in chapters 3, 4 and 5 will offer their specific 
narratives, the theoretical discussion in this section can offer some general ideas about 
the ways in which African ‘Big Men’ and their elite networks are likely to react when 
being offered to prescribe to donors’ anti-corruption medicine. As I mentioned 
previously, donors’ anti-corruption policies have largely rested on the assumption that 
politics is positive-sum, i.e. that all agents can gain from governance reform. In 
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contrast, the message to take home from the discussion in this section is that, since 
corruption is part of conducting rational politics by African leaders, governance 
reforms to curb corruption by these same leaders may be far from rational to 
undertake. We can thereby predict that leaders will not conduct serious anti-
corruption reforms if these reforms hamper their possibility of ensuring continued 
political power. Therefore, as long as corruption fills an important political function, 
external powers are unlikely to be able to create a serious dent in corruption. 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters. The core consists of three empirical chapters 
which are stand-alone chapters written in the form of journal articles. Chapter 2 
precedes this empirical research and deals with the issue of how to empirically study 
corruption. As such, the chapter can be read as a mixture between a literature review 
and a methods chapter. Chapter 3 constitutes the first empirical chapter. In this 
chapter, I use panel regression analysis of survey-based data on corruption across sub-
Saharan Africa to assess the validity of popular theories proclaiming that political 
liberalisation will curb corruption. Chapter 4 constitutes a country case study on 
Rwanda in which I focus on explaining what happens to corruption in the aftermath of 
wide-scale economic liberalisation. In chapter 5, I use a mixture of descriptive and 
inferential statistics, and media analysis to assess the effects of fighting high-level 
corruption through judiciary means in the political context of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Lastly, in chapter 6, I provide a synthesised conclusion of the thesis. I emphasise, on 
the one hand, my theoretical and methodological contributions and, on the other hand, 
I discuss broader issues relevant to anti-corruption policy.  
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2. The Pursuit of Empirically Studying Corruption 
The heightened focus on corruption in developing countries from the international 
donor community has gone hand in hand with an increased academic attention to the 
issue. What causes corruption and what are its societal consequences are questions at 
the heart of an empirical literature that has grown considerably in the last 15 years. 
Yet, the task of empirically studying corruption is far from straight forward. To start 
with, while the word ‘corruption’ is tainted with a negative connotation, corruption is 
oftentimes not as black and white as other types of crimes. Different cultures and 
ways of viewing the private versus the public sphere, and community versus 
individual, add to the difficulty of pin-pointing with certainty when corruption is 
taking place. One author, when discussing the difficulty of studying corruption, went 
as far as to state “like pornography, corruption is difficult to quantify, but you know it 
when you see it.” (Wei, 1999:4). According to Chabal and Daloz (1999:98), the many 
attempts to provide coherent and overarching definitions of such a broad concept 
merely result in large-scale analytical confusion. In addition, with the many acts and 
behaviours that fall within the definition of corruption, there is “always a danger that 
several people may engage in a discussion about corruption while each is talking 
about a different thing completely.” (Elijah, 2007:3).  
 
The breadth of its definition and its hidden characteristics together with the realisation 
that it may have large consequences for development has resulted in many creative 
ways in which the concept of corruption has been measured and studied. This 
empirical literature spans the social sciences although it is fair to say that economists 
have favoured using quantitative methods and anthropologists have favoured 
qualitative ones. Political scientists are found in both methodological camps.  
 
In this chapter, I will navigate the empirical corruption literature, the purpose being 
on the one hand to discuss issues for which there is no room in the three empirical 
chapters, such as definitions and data reliability, and on the other hand, to discuss and 
justify choices made in the empirical thesis chapters. These choices have to do with 
measurement and empirical strategy, and likely trade-offs between different types of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. In this sense, this chapter is a mixture 
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between a literature review and a methods chapter and should be read as a problem 
solving discussion in relation to the empirical thesis chapters.    
 
This chapter starts with a discussion about definitions, including how corruption is 
conceptualised in the literature on sub-Saharan Africa. In section 2.2, I discuss 
different ways to empirically study corruption and what the pros and cons are of using 
various research methods. In section 2.3, I take a closer look at one popular way of 
measuring corruption: through perception-based indices. I focus the analysis on 
concerns about conceptual clarity and test the reliability of the data on a set of sub-
Saharan African countries. Section 2.4 forms a conclusion. 
 
2.1  Defining corruption   
The concept of corruption constitutes a wonderful rhetorical tool. Phrases such as 
‘war against corruption’ or ‘zero tolerance against corruption’ are frequently used by 
international donors, advocacy groups, and developing country leaders alike. 
However, the complexity of the concept of corruption makes it a tricky phenomenon 
to study empirically. The purpose of this section is to present various definitions of 
corruption and to provide a discussion about what corruption entails with specific 
focus on sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The rhetorical strength of the word ‘corruption’ can be gauged from the definition of 
the word. Collins English Dictionary (1994) defines the adjective ‘corrupt’ as lacking 
of integrity and open to or involving bribery or other dishonest practises. It adds to 
this definition the words ‘morally depraved’, and ‘putrid’ or ‘rotten’. In turn, the word 
‘corruption’ is defined as moral perversion, depravity, and decay. The negative 
connotation of the word ‘corruption’ makes it a popular word for expressing distrust 
in the political sphere. Gerring and Thacker (2004: 300), for example, note that 
“corruption is frequently employed as a generic label for any sort of failure on the part 
of politics or politicians.” 
 
Besides the simple definition of the word, various forms of corruption constitute legal 
offences which have given rise to legal definitions of the concept. The legal definition 
has, in turn, become homogenised to a certain extent across countries following recent 
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advances in international law in the form of international conventions against 
corruption.
7
 In Fox’s (2003) Dictionary of International and Comparative Law, 
corruption is defined as the “illegal conduct on the part of officials of a government, 
particularly regarding the abuse of their office, such as taking bribes.” The illegal 
nature of corruption specified in the largest international convention, the United 
Nation Convention against Corruption (articles 15 to 23), are further broken down to 
the following components:  
Acts of bribery of national public officials; bribery of foreign public 
officials and officials of public international organizations; 
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a 
public official; trading in influence; abuse of functions; illicit 
enrichment; bribery in the private sector; embezzlement of property 
in the private sector; and laundering of proceeds of crime. 
The political science literature on corruption expands on the legal definition to also 
include certain immoral behaviour, such as nepotism and patronage. The classical 
definition of corruption used in this literature comes from Nye (1967: 419) and 
includes:  
“Behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of 
certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such 
behaviour as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgement of a 
person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by 
reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for 
private-regarding uses).” 
Thirty years later, much of Nye’s definition of corruption lives on in the definition 
used by the World Bank (1997:8): 
“Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain; public 
office is abused when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. 
It is also abused when private agents give or offer bribes to 
circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage 
and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even 
                                                 
7
 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption from 1996 (33 signatories); OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions from 1997 
(adopted by the OECD members and five non-member countries); United Nations Convention against 
Corruption from 2003 (148 signatories) African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption from 2003 (40 signatories).  
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if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of 
state assets, or the diversion of state revenues.” 
Two aspects of these definitions are worth elaborating on, starting with the motivation 
behind corruption. Since Nye’s time of writing, the literature on corruption has further 
elaborated on what types of gains constitute corruption: purely private benefits or 
gains that fill a larger political function. Philip (2002:42), for example, breaks up the 
functionality of corruption by distinguishing between institutional corruption and 
private corruption. While private corruption produces gains purely on an individual 
basis, institutional corruption yields gains for a politician within the political process 
and is ultimately about using the public office and state resources to remain in power. 
The popular distinction between petty corruption (also known as bureaucratic 
corruption) and grand corruption (also known as political corruption) in the literature 
similarly touches upon a difference in motivation behind the choice of engaging in 
corrupt activities. As the name indicates, petty corruption is comparatively small in 
scale and conducted at the bureaucratic level, at the implementation stage of policies. 
The reason behind this type of corruption is often, although far from always, 
motivated by necessity as a result of low wages, and the benefits are usually 
internalised on an individual basis. Grand corruption, on the other hand, concern 
larger amounts of money and often has a political function beyond merely being a 
source of extrajudicial income to the perpetrator. “Political corruption is when 
political decision-makers use the political power they are armed with, to sustain their 
power, status and wealth.” (Amundsen, 1999:3).   
  
Second, the fact that corruption is defined as the deviations from formal duties of a 
public role requires that those duties are agreed upon, and that is where the notion of 
different cultures and their views on public versus private spheres comes into the 
discussion. Fisman and Miguel (2007) recently published a quantitative analysis on 
the differences in cultures across countries with regard to corruption, using data on the 
behaviour of United Nations officials in Manhattan. By assuming the number of 
parking violations to be a good measure for revealed preferences of corruption, the 
authors measure a country’s culture of corruption by the extent to which the country’s 
diplomats commit parking violations. Using data on parking violations by diplomats 
from 149 countries, the authors found that “home country corruption norms are an 
important predictor of propensity to behave corruptly among diplomats: those from 
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low-corruption countries (e.g., Norway) behave remarkably well…whereas those 
from high-corruption countries (e.g., Nigeria) commit many violations.” (Ibid:1022).  
 
Using an anthropological research lens, Africanist scholars have found that certain 
practises that in the Western world would be denounced as corruption are considered 
quite acceptable in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Chabal and Daloz (1999:100) 
write that in Africa there is “very little serious censure of corruption so long as its 
fruits are deemed to have been suitably and vigorously redistributed according to the 
logic of patronage. Condemnation is reserved for those individuals or groups … who 
are seen to appropriate ‘public’ resources purely out of greed and with little regard for 
those who would count on benefiting from such graft.”  
 
Smith (2007:222) in his analysis of the culture of corruption in Nigeria argues that 
certain forms of everyday corruption are acceptable among Nigerians. “Actions to 
assist family, friends, clients, and community are often undertaken out of a sense of 
social obligation that trumps a notion of civic duty tied to the state or national polity.” 
Similar to the Chabal and Daloz’s argument above, Smith argues in the context of 
Nigeria that “a politician who steals government money is not accused of [corruption] 
if he uses a substantial portion of the money to help his village.” (Ibid:223). The same 
conclusion was reached by Gaspar and Platteau (2005) from their case study analysis 
of a West African village. A Western NGO discovered that the leader of the village 
association had financially abused his position. The NGO put the crimes committed to 
the attention of the local committee of the village association, but to the surprise of 
the NGO, no punishment was given to the leader, and he was even re-elected as leader 
of the village association. That the leader had taken a big chunk of the funding to 
benefit himself was considered legitimate to the village constituency. The authors 
argue: “If the intervention of the elite results in an improvement of the predicament of 
the poor, however small is the improvement, the latter tend to be thankful to their 
leader(s): the new outcome represents a Pareto improvement over the previous 
situation and this is what matters after all.” (Ibid:6). In short, this research finds that 
corruption is to an extent culturally acceptable if money trickles down and is 
beneficial to kith and kin. 
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The high prevalence of corruption in many African countries is a recurrent theme in 
the literature on Africa. Several authors stress corruption’s institutionalised role in the 
African social fabric. Williams (1987:127), for example, argues that in Africa 
“corruption is an integral, institutionalised feature of political and economic 
processes. It is particularly difficult both to envisage how African politics would 
function without it and to trace the precise consequences of its presence.” On the 
same note, Médard (2002:382) states that “to say that corruption is all together 
systemic, generalised and that its price is high, enables us to distinguish it from the 
corruption observable in most industrialised societies. In Africa, corruption 
encompasses the government administration and the political levels, grand and petty 
corruption, corruption for survival and corruption for enrichment. The entire state 
apparatus is affected.” Similarly, Chabal and Daloz (1999:99) argue that African 
corruption is “not just endemic but an integral part of the social fabric of life”.  
“Corruption is not a matter of a few ‘rotten apples’ or of a venal ‘class’, even less an 
‘evil’ to be eradicated by means of vigorous ‘ethical’ campaigns. On the contrary, it is 
a habitual part of everyday life, an expected element of every social transaction.” 
(Ibid:99). 
 
This section has highlighted that corruption entails a myriad of actions which adds to 
the difficulty of providing a simple definition of the phenomenon as well as 
producing a holistic measurement of it. In addition, there is scope for arguing that the 
popular definitions may be Western-biased because they take for granted that private 
and public functions are clearly agreed upon and separated, which research has shown 
is not always the case in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. In the next section, I will 
discuss how researchers have used their creativity in the pursuit of empirically 
studying corruption. 
 
2.2  Using qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods to study 
corruption  
Because of the myriad of actions that fit under the definition of corruption – ranging 
from bribery to nepotism to the theft of state assets – the idea that a single 
measurement of corruption can be determined may itself be wishful thinking. The 
task of measuring corruption is further complicated by its illegal or immoral, and 
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therefore, hidden characteristics. Jain (2001:76) articulates these caveats in the 
following way: “by its nature corruption would be difficult to measure since it is 
carried out, in most cases, clandestinely and away from the public eye and records. A 
researcher trying to develop quantitative measures of corruption has to struggle with 
the question of what will be included in such a measurement, and then try to measure 
something that those who know about are trying to hide.”  
 
The difficulty of measuring corruption has, however, resulted in some highly creative 
pieces of research across the social sciences. In this section I will review some of the 
empirical studies found in the corruption literature. The aim of the review is not to be 
an all-encompassing review of the vast literature on corruption. For this task, each of 
the three empirical thesis chapters has its own focused literature review. Instead, the 
aim is to discuss how previous literature has dealt with the conceptualisation and 
measurement of corruption for the purpose of conducting empirical analysis and 
highlight some pros and cons of using different research methods. I will start by 
discussing some of the case study analyses which are part of the corruption literature 
and how they capture corruption using qualitative methods. Subsequently, I will 
provide some examples of how the concept has been measured and applied to 
quantitative analysis. Lastly, I will discuss the merits of using a mixed methods 
approach to studying corruption and how such an approach have been applied to 
some of the empirical analyses in this thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Qualitative approaches to the empirical study of corruption 
In the first group of qualitative analysis on corruption are country case studies that 
focus on the interplay between the state, its political elite, and the economy. Szeftel’s 
(2000) case study on Zambia under three different political regimes belongs to this 
category of research. The author looks at the relationship between political change on 
the one hand and patronage and corruption on the other hand and focuses his analysis 
on the ways in which the spoils of the state have been distributed to the Zambian 
political elite under the country’s different regimes. The historical narrative is based 
on data in the form of archival material and interviews. Since the author does not 
attempt to measure corruption or conceptualise it in any tangible way, corruption 
becomes synonymous with societal resource flows that are structured to only benefit 
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the political elite. Boone’s (1990) case study on Senegal is another example of a 
country case study on corruption. The author looks at the use of clientelist strategies 
of wealth accumulation and distribution, and the rent-seeking behaviour of the 
political elite in Senegal. The analysis spans a period of almost three decades and is 
based on the same type of data as the previous study on Zambia. While these case 
studies look at one country over time, Green’s (2011) case study adds one dimension, 
comparing two countries over time: Uganda and Rwanda. This comparative case 
study looks at what strategies have been used by the political leaders of the two 
countries over time to maintain political support. However, rather than specifically 
studying corruption, the author looks at the broader concept of patronage or 
clientelism.  
 
While all these case studies concern the political structures in which corruption occur, 
none of the studies focus on empirically investigating actual acts of corruption. 
Instead, they focus on the functionality or political raison d’être, of corruption and 
how it is used as a political tool by the countries’ leaders to remain in power.  These 
types of macro-level analyses are well suited for analysing the outcome of large 
societal changes, such as regime change. The in-depth focus on one country over time 
is also well suited for research concerned with hypothesis-building. In the second 
empirical chapter in this thesis titled ‘Coffee and Corruption: Economic Liberalisation 
and the Transformation of Political Corruption in Rwanda’, I am particularly 
interested in the political functionality of corruption, and my research question 
concerns the transformation of corruption triggered by changes in formal economic 
institutions. This research question is therefore approached using the research method 
of in-depth case study analysis of one country over time.  
 
While such case study research focuses on the association between different variable, 
such as economic regime and type of corruption, other types of in-depth case study 
analyses are more descriptive, focusing on investigating and mapping out systems of 
corruption. Wade’s (1982) anthropological and unusually close examination of 
corruption belongs to this category. In terms of research method, the author stumbled 
upon the corruption phenomenon while under contract to research irrigation systems 
in one Indian district between 1976 and 1981. “Only gradually, from conversations 
with dozens of engineers, government officials from other departments and farmers 
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did it become apparent that a ‘system’ was at work…” (Ibid: 291). Using such 
anthropological and informal means to gain the necessary knowledge, the author was 
able to map a system of corruption at multiple levels of government and 
administration in the government institution responsible for canal irrigation at the 
district level.  
 
Others who have provided rich description on systems of corruption come from 
outside academia. They include journalist Michaela Wrong (2009) who wrote a 
portrait of one of the largest known corruption scandals in Africa’s history: the 
Kenyan Anglo-Leasing scandal. The author recounts insider knowledge from the 
accounts of a whistle-blower on how the very top of the political hierarchy used their 
influence and ingenuity to enrich themselves and their political party at the expense of 
the Kenyan state. Another insider who has chosen to bring his insights into the public 
domain is former Member of Parliament for the ANC in South Africa, Andrew 
Feinstein (2009), who, in his book, gives an insider’s account of the web of grand 
corruption in that country. The author particularly recounts the events of a recent 
corruption scandal concerning senior politicians and their involvement in weapon 
deals.  
 
To sum up, using qualitative research methods to study corruption certainly brings 
richer contextual understanding of corruption and its political and social functionality 
than more quantitative approaches are able to do. This type of research method is 
therefore particularly well suited for hypothesis-building purposes or even just to shed 
light on the phenomenon through more descriptive analysis. However, as with other 
small-N approaches, the price to pay for gaining a contextualised understanding is 
often a poorer case for making inferences to other contexts.    
 
2.2.2 Quantitative approaches to measuring corruption  
A number of research papers using innovative ways to quantitatively measure 
corruption have been published in recent years. The majority of them approach the 
task of measuring corruption by assuming corruption to account for the difference 
between expected and real outcomes. Reinikka and Svensson’s (2004) well-known 
research into missing educational funds in Uganda uses such a strategy whereby 
corruption is measured as the difference between the money centrally earmarked for 
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primary schools and allocated via districts, and the money that finally reached the 
schools. Using this measure of corruption, the authors found that in the period 1991-
1995, 87 percent of the centrally earmarked funds had leaked before they reached the 
schools, the bulk being captured by officials and politicians.   
 
Such focus on financial leakages also forms the basis for more aggregate proxies for 
corruption, or illicit financial flows. The World Bank Residual Model compares a 
country’s source of funds with its recorded use of funds, and the Trade Misinvoicing 
Model uses partner-country trade data to find pricing discrepancies. Findings from 
these models show that financial leakages in terms of illicit financial flows from sub-
Saharan Africa amounted in the period 2000-2008 to a staggering $358 billion 
(Global Financial Integrity, 2010). 
 
Chang and Golden (2006) in their quantitative analysis on district-level corruption in 
Italy provide another proxy for corruption similarly based on the difference between 
expected and real outcomes. The authors measure corruption by the difference 
between public money earmarked for district-level infrastructure and the actual 
infrastructure observed in the districts, the assumption being that the difference is 
used for bribes and kickbacks connected to the infrastructure contracting process. 
Similar focus on output is provided by Olken (2007), in his famous quantitative study 
on village level corruption in Indonesia. The author uses highly elaborate methods to 
measure corruption, for example, creating a counterfactual to what the outcome of a 
village road construction project would have been without corruption. By constructing 
an identical road to the one being built in the villages, the author gained knowledge of 
the real cost of undertaking the project. By comparing the real cost to the cost 
proclaimed by those responsible for building the road, the author could then quantify 
the size of the infrastructure budget that disappeared to corruption.   
 
Instead of relying on proxies for corruption, Sequeira and Djankov (2009) were able 
to use a survey and directly measure the extent of bribery in two ports in Southern 
Africa. Relying on under-cover agents to administer the survey, the authors were able 
to measure the amount of bribes requested, their primary recipients, and the main 
reason for demanding a bribe. Using this research method, the authors found that 
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bribes are “high, frequent, different across ports and quantitatively significant for port 
officials.” (Ibid:35).  
 
This type of research that focuses on measuring the actual extent and cost of 
corruption is clearly useful for driving policy. For example, by providing numerical 
evidence of the large share of educational funds that went missing in Uganda, 
Reinikka and Svensson’s (2004) research findings could be readily used to demand 
the attention of policy makers. In addition, by measuring corruption at two points in 
time – once before and then after a certain information campaign had taken place – 
the authors could also provide numerical estimates about policy impact. One 
disadvantage of this type of research is, however, the lack of focus on why corruption 
takes place. Sensibly formulated policy should aim at providing a remedy for the 
causes of corruption and not merely the symptoms of it, which is what these studies 
are able to measure. The causes and political raison d’être of corruption are instead 
better addressed using qualitative research methods.  
 
While the qualitative case study methods as well as the quantitative approaches to 
measuring corruption discussed thus far offer valuable insights, they would clearly be 
hard to extend cross-nationally. That is why the vast majority of cross-national 
empirical analyses that concern the causes and consequences of corruption use cross-
national perception-based indices. These indices will be discussed further in section 
2.3.  
 
2.2.3 A mixed methods approach to studying corruption  
Having reviewed the qualitative and quantitative literature on corruption separately, I 
will in this section provide a discussion of what a mixed methods approach to the 
study of corruption may contribute. As mentioned above, the purpose of this chapter 
is partly to justify choices made in the empirical thesis chapters, and I have to some 
extent found it useful to combine qualitative and quantitative methods in the empirical 
analyses in this thesis. In fact, I believe that one of the contributions of this thesis to 
the literature on corruption is that it bridges the academic disciplinary divide found in 
the literature. It does so by using the economists’ methods to test the political 
scientists’ and anthropologists’ propositions, for which few have been empirically 
tested in any rigorous way.  
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A great strength of quantitative methods – being numerical, deductive and focused on 
answering ‘how much’ questions – lies in their generalisability of results, i.e. the 
analysis of a representative sample of a population will help us draw conclusions 
about the whole population. On the other hand, a great strengths of qualitative 
methods – being non-numerical, inductive and focused on answering why and how 
questions – lies in their ability to tease out complex causal mechanisms, and offer a 
deeper and context sensitive understanding of the relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables (Munck and Snyder, 2007; Shaffer et al, 2009). 
In turn, a mixed methods approach that is able to draw on the strengths from both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods can “approach the elusive goal of an 
explanation that has both generality and deep understanding.” (Faguet, 2005:3). That 
has been the goal with combining methods in this thesis. I believe that by focusing 
exclusively on the sub-Saharan African regions whose countries share similarities in 
terms of the institutional context in which corruption flourishes, as discussed above in 
section 1.3, the empirical analyses have been able to benefit from the generalisability 
offered by cross-country statistical analysis. At the same time, I have, by using 
qualitative research methods, been able to offer explanations to relationships that 
would have been difficult to do merely using quantitative data.  
 
Two different formal strategies for using mixed methods research, or nested analysis, 
that have been developed in recent years are worth discussing in light of the research 
strategies chosen in this thesis. First off is Lieberman’s (2005) nested analysis 
strategy whose mixed methods approach starts with testing a theory using large N 
statistical analysis and, depending on the outcome from that exercise, continues with 
model-testing or model-building qualitative small N analysis. In terms of this research 
project, I did not find Lieberman’s approach to offer the best alternative for 
combining research methods. The main problem was that there is a lack of readily 
available theories on which to apply the quantitative analysis. Of course, there is no 
shortage of theories on corruption but, as I argued in section 1.3, these are general 
theories that are not sensitive to the sub-Saharan African context. What theoretical 
foundation exists for hypothesising on corruption in this regional context constitute 
largely unproven theories and anecdotal evidence which I have had to further develop 
and rigorously justify before applying them to statistical analysis. In chapters 3 and 5, 
I did this by using qualitative data.  
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As a mixed methods strategy this approach corresponds more closely with Rohlfing’s 
(2008) nested analysis approach which starts with qualitative analysis of a case study 
and inductively builds the theory that is in the next stage tested using more cases in a 
statistical analysis. Instead of using case study analysis of one country, however, I 
have instead developed my hypotheses with the help of qualitative data that has 
provided examples of the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables from various African countries. In chapter 3 titled ‘Winning Elections with 
Grand Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa’, I use examples found in previous literature 
as well as journalistic accounts from various African countries to develop the 
hypothesis that African incumbents, when faced with competition for their leadership 
positions, succumb to buying political support using prebendal politics, which in turn 
is associated with increased corruption. I then test this hypothesis using panel 
regression analysis on a sample of sub-Saharan African countries. In chapter 5 titled 
‘Catching the ‘Big Fish’: The Ab(Use) of Corruption-Related Prosecutions across 
Sub-Saharan Africa’, I use as the starting point previous literature’s anecdotal 
references to a politicisation of corruption-related prosecutions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
I further develop the theoretical propositions with the use of qualitative analysis based 
mainly on journalistic accounts from across the region, and subsequently test these 
propositions using statistical analysis.  
 
In sum, by combining methods in line with the nested analysis approach, I believe that 
the statistical results offered by these empirical analyses are generalisable across sub-
Saharan Africa while, at the same time the qualitative analyses ensure that the 
proposed relationships between the variables of concern are well supported by real 
examples. 
 
That said, the combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses was not always 
possible as chapter 4 titled ‘Coffee and Corruption: The Transformation of Political 
Corruption in Rwanda’ bears witness of. Using the qualitative method of country case 
study, I find that corruption (the dependent variable) changed form in the advent of a 
change in the independent variable. However, since cross-country data on corruption 
are not refined enough to reveal changes in forms of corruption, the propositions 
developed in the qualitative study were not possible to test using quantitative methods 
that rely on available cross-country data. In this case, instead of looking outward and 
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seeking generalisability of the findings to a broader set of countries, I instead chose to 
look inwards and provide additional light on the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables through a within-country case study analysis. The next 
section will take a closer look at the available cross-country data on corruption.  
 
2.3  Taking a closer look at corruption perception indices  
As the name indicates, perception-based data on levels of corruption are based on 
perception rather than tangible measures. I will start this section by discussing how 
corruption is measured by the three most commonly used perception-based corruption 
indices: Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI); the World 
Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (KKZ after its founders: Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton), and the International Country Risk Group’s Corruption Index 
(ICRG). I will then go on to discuss some alternative perception-based sources of data 
on corruption applicable to the sub-Saharan African region.  
 
The CPI is perhaps the most well-known corruption index and has been produced on 
an annual basis since 1995. Since the index provides not only a score for each country 
but also focus attention on ranking countries, its annual release is frequently 
mentioned in media across the world. The index is a composite index, a poll of polls, 
itself made up of at least three sources for each country. According to its background 
document, the different sources used have in common their ultimate focus on the 
misuse of public power for private benefit, for example “bribing of public officials, 
kickbacks in public procurement, or embezzlement of public funds”. All sources also 
assess “the extent of corruption among public officials and politicians in the countries 
in question.” (Lambsdorff, 2002: no page number). 
 
The KKZ is part of the World Bank’s Governance Indicators and was published 
biannually from 1996 to 2002 and thereafter on an annual basis. This index has the 
most extensive coverage with data for 210 countries or territories included in its 2009 
index. According to its sourcebook, the index measures both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. This index 
is also a composite index made up from information provided from a number of 
indices and other sources of information. The CPI is one of these sources, so is the 
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ICRG although the KKZ’s extensive country coverage means that some sources are 
available for some countries and not for others.  
 
The ICRG is produced by the for-profit organisation Political Risk Service and is 
based on the perception of corruption by country experts. From the ICRG explanation 
of how its index conceptualises corruption, several different forms of corruption are 
stated. These are naturally intended to capture the types of corruption that 
international businesses (the rating company’s main paying clients) are concerned 
with. From its sourcebook it highlights its primary concern with types of corruption 
that may impact on the political stability in the country (“excessive patronage, 
nepotism, job reservations, favour-for-favours, secret party funding and suspiciously 
close ties between political and business”). It also intends to measure “demands for 
special payment and bribery” that directly affects foreign investors. According to 
Lambsdorff (2002), the ICRG does not measure a country’s level of corruption per se, 
but rather the political risk involved in corruption, which may in turn depend on a 
country’s level of tolerance for corruption. The ICRG provides the longest time series 
of these three indices and has therefore been popularly used in panel regression 
analysis.  
 
All three indices have been used by widely referenced empirical studies on 
corruption. For example, Treisman’s (2000) analysis on the causes of corruption, and 
Gupta et al.’s (2002) analysis of the effects of corruption on inequality and poverty, 
both use the CPI. Gerring and Thacker’s (2004) study on the effect of certain 
institutional structures on levels of corruption, instead uses the KKZ; and Mauro’s 
(1996) focus on economic growth, and Fisman and Gatti’s (2002) study on 
decentralization both use the ICRG. In addition, many empirical analyses triangulate 
their findings from cross-country regressions by using more than one corruption 
index.  
 
Despite the fact that a great number of empirical analyses using these indices have 
been published in well-regarded journals, the indices have received some criticism, 
especially with regard to what they are able to measure, or their lack of conceptual 
clarity. “Some surveys ask about the frequency of bribes, some about their size, 
others about the burden imposed on the economy or about the relative seriousness of 
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the problem. Some focus on low-level administrative corruption; others also seem to 
include political dirty tricks. Some have narrow regional coverage, and others are 
worldwide in scope. As a result, sceptics wonder what exactly the average is 
measuring…” (Treisman, 2007:215). Johnston (2000) refers to the composite indices’ 
‘single-number problem’, i.e. the difficulty of assigning comparable values to 
different types of corruption, such as petty and grand, across different types of 
political systems. “Some countries have high-level corruption, others find it lower 
down the political or bureaucratic hierarchies, and still others see most abuses in 
electoral politics and patronage.” (Ibid:16). The task of comparing corruption across 
different types of societies may thereby add to the indices’ conceptual vagueness. 
 
2.3.1 External reliability of perception-based data for sub-Saharan Africa 
What is usually mentioned as a justification for using these perception-based indices 
in empirical research despite their conceptual uncertainties is that the data must be 
legitimate due to high correlation between indices (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 
2006). “That different ratings produced by different organizations using different 
methodologies and even slightly different definitions of corruption turn out to be 
highly correlated among themselves suggests to some that these different spyglasses 
are aimed at a common target. At least the results are not purely idiosyncratic.” 
(Treisman, 2007:216). Figure 2.1 below shows the correlation between the CPI and 
the ICRG for 121 countries using data from 2003. I focus on the correlation between 
these two indices and not the KKZ for the reason that KKZ contains both CPI and 
ICRG. It appears from the distance to the ‘45 degree’ line, that the correlation is 
stronger for countries that score very high on both indices than for countries that are 
in the low and middle range of the spectrum.  
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Note: Figure 2.1 shows the correlation between CPI (0-10) and the ICRG (rescaled from 0-6 to 0-10) 
for 121 countries using data from 2003.  For both indices, the closer to 10 a country scores, the lower is 
its perceived level of corruption. Sources: Transparency International and Political Risk Service. 
 
Table 2.1: Correlation between two popularly used corruption indices 
 
Dependent variable: CPI, data from 2003 (1) Full sample: 
 
(2) Sub-Saharan  
African sample 
 
ICRG, data from 2003 
 
0.992*** 
(0.050) 
0.135 
(0.145) 
Constant  0.120 
(0.215) 
2.237*** 
(0.532) 
R-square 
 
0.71 0.03 
Number of countries 121 22 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the CPI from 2003. The parentheses contain robust standard errors.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The first regression model in table 2.1 above confirms the rather high correlation (R-
square 0.71) between the two indices. Regressing the ICRG on the CPI using data 
from 2003 (which is my last year of ICRG data) shows that an increase in the ICRG 
score by one is associated with an increase in the CPI by almost the same. However, 
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Figure 2.1: Correlation between CPI and ICRG (full sample)
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turning to the second model that only includes countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
picture becomes less coherent. In fact, there is no statistically significant correlation 
between the two indices for the sub-Saharan African sample of 22 countries, and the 
model fit is extremely low (R-square 0.03).  
The data for the sub-Saharan African sample are plotted in figure 2.2 below. While 
the CPI gives Zimbabwe and Madagascar about the same score, these two countries 
span the spectrum from most corrupt to least corruption according to the ICRG. 
Similarly, while the ICRG finds Botswana and Cote d’Ivoire to have similar levels of 
corruption, the CPI gives the former a score of almost 6 and the latter a score of 2. It 
is safe to say that for the African sample, the reliability of measurement cannot be 
justified on the basis of high correlation among indices. 
Note: Figure 2.2 shows the correlation between CPI (0-10) and the ICRG (rescaled from 0-6 to 0-10) 
for 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa using data from 2003.  For both indices, the closer to 10 a 
country scores, the lower is its perceived level of corruption. Sources: Transparency International and 
Political Risk Service. 
While this may be a result of the ICRG focusing on measuring the political risk of 
corruption rather than corruption per se (Lambsdorff, 2002), I rather believe that the 
many different sources used to produce the CPI and other composite indices 
contribute to conceptual stretching to such an extent that it is difficult to know what 
the phenomenon they claim to measure actually entails. Far from being more 
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Figure 2.2: Correlation between CPI and ICRG (sub-Saharan African sample)
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reassuring, for the ICRG, being constructed by country experts, we are forced to take 
the experts’ word for how a country is rated since the codebook does not provide 
information about what it means when a country is given a certain score; for example, 
what a move from a 4 to a 5 actually stands for (Knack, 2007).  
 
In short, while these indices are the most commonly used proxies of corruption we 
have, they do not agree on the verdict for the sub-Saharan African region. The fact 
that the indices do not overlap clearly leads to high level of uncertainty about what 
the indices actually measure.  
 
2.3.2 Alternative perception-based corruption data for sub-Saharan Africa  
The perception-based cross-country indices’ ‘single-number problem’, and 
subsequent concern about what exactly is measured by the indices, can be partly 
remedied by using non-aggregated household survey data. Two such surveys, for 
which questions are standardised and thus comparable across countries and over time, 
intend to capture households’ perceptions about the extent of corruption within 
various institutions in sub-Saharan African countries. The Afrobarometer survey on 
democracy and governance has been conducted on an approximately bi-annual basis 
since 1999 and covers 20 sub-Saharan African countries. Although this survey does 
not deal exclusively with corruption, certain survey questions concern the perception 
on levels of corruption across 11 different institutions, ranging from the office of the 
President, to the police, to customs officials. Transparency International’s Global 
Corruption Barometer, annually published since 2003 and undertaken by Gallup, 
likewise bases its survey questions on the perception of corruption in specific 
institutions. The survey includes questions about the extent of corruption in 14 
different institutions, including political parties and NGOs.  
 
While country coverage and institutional focus differ somewhat across the two 
indices, for seven sub-Saharan African countries and five institutions 
(parliament/legislators, education system, legal system/judiciary, medical services, 
and police) the indices do overlap. Figure 2.3 below shows a comparison between the 
Afrobarometer and the Global Corruption Barometer in terms of the perceived extent 
of corruption in a country’s parliament/legislators. The rescaled indices (0-1) ranges 
between the country perceived to have the lowest level of corruption in this institution 
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(Ghana and Zambia) and the country perceived to have the highest (Nigeria and 
Liberia). The two indices appear to show a slightly more coherent picture that the TI 
and ICRG aggregate indices, although they do not agree on all cases. 
 
Note: Figure 2.3 is based on data from two constructed indices (see Annex). The first index (ranging 
from 1 to 4) is based on the responses from the Afrobarometer (Round 4, 2008) question: How many 
Members of Parliament do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say? The second index (ranging from 1 to 5) is based on the responses from Global Corruption 
Barometer (2008) to the survey question: To what extent is Parliament/Legislature affected by 
corruption in your country? The two indices have subsequently been rescaled from 0 to 1. Sources: 
Afrobarometer (Round 4, 2008) and Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer (2009). 
In two of the empirical chapters in this thesis, the location of corruption is rather 
specific and the conceptual vagueness of the commonly used corruption indices is a 
matter of concern. In the first empirical chapter titled ‘Winning Elections with Grand 
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa’ the theoretical debate concerns the incentive of the 
country’s executive to act in a corruption-decreasing or corruption-increasing manner 
when faced with political competition. In order to translate this question into an 
empirical assessment, it is of some importance that the data captures the workings of 
the executive as opposed to capturing petty corruption, bribes paid by business or 
other rather unrelated phenomena which may be what the composite corruption 
indices capture. For that reason, I use the Afrobarometer survey and its specific 
survey question about the perception of corruption in the country’s executive office, 
i.e. the Office of the President or Prime Minister depending on the country’s political 
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system. In the third empirical chapter titled ‘Catching the ‘Big Fish’: The (Ab)Use of 
Corruption-Related Prosecutions across Sub-Saharan Africa’, I start the empirical 
analysis by assessing a theory that proposes a change in corruption among 
government officials following a certain policy intervention. Here too is a concern 
that the conceptual vagueness of the composite indices will influence the empirical 
strategy. I therefore resort, once again, to the Afrobarometer survey because of its 
specific survey question on the perceived extent of corruption among government 
officials.  
 
2.4  Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, the three empirical chapters in this 
thesis each deal with a narrow research question which leaves little room for broader 
discussions about issues that are highly relevant with regard to conducting research on 
corruption, such as definitions, data availability, as well as the reliability of the 
available data. The aim of this chapter was to fill that hole. Second, the empirical 
literature on corruption is vast and covers a wide range of research methods. 
Therefore, this chapter discussed the pros and cons with regard to making choices 
between various qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods research approaches. 
 
While interesting empirical research on corruption has come from both qualitative and 
quantitative methods camps in recent years, I argue for the merits of using a mixed 
methods approach to study corruption. However, with this approach the method of 
cross-country regression analysis is often left to shoulder much of the burden of 
hypothesis-testing. In turn, this demands good data with high levels of comparability 
across countries with regard to how corruption is conceptualised and measured.  
 
I find by examining the most commonly used cross-country perception-based 
corruption indices that they are worryingly incoherent, and therefore conceptually 
unclear, with regard to measuring levels of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. This, in 
turn, justifies my choice for using alternative data on corruption from the 
Afrobarometer survey, which is also perception-based, although less conceptually 
vague, and comparable across the sub-Saharan African region. 
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Annex: Summary of data used in section 2.3.2 
 
Table 2.2: Data for the Afrobarometer index  
 
Surveyed 
country 
None 
% 
Some of  
them % 
Most of  
them % 
All of  
them % 
Don’t  
know % 
Scale 
1-4 
 
No. of obs. 
Ghana 15 53 15 6 12 2.13 1199 
 
Kenya 5 47 33 8 6 2.47 1101 
 
Liberia 6 48 27 15 5 2.53 1200 
 
Nigeria 4 38 35 16 7 2.68 2324 
 
Senegal 10 24 18 7 42 2.37 1199 
 
Uganda 4 49 28 9 10 2.47 2431 
 
Zambia 6 50 21 6 17 2.33 1199 
 
Note: Data based on the responses to the survey question ‘How many Members of Parliament do you 
think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?’ The index scores are 
calculated in the following way. After subtracting the ‘don’t know’ responses from the Afrobarometer 
survey data, I give the remaining categories values on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 = ‘none of them’ 
to 4 = ‘all of them’. I then weight the percentage of respondents in each category accordingly and add 
the categories together. In theory, the Afrobarometer index thus ranges from 1 to 4. Source: 
Afrobarometer (Round 4, 2008). 
 
Table 2.3: Data for the Global Corruption Barometer index 
 
Surveyed 
country 
1=not at 
all 
corrupt 
% 
 
2 
% 
3 
% 
4 
% 
5= 
extremely 
corrupt 
% 
 
don’t 
know 
% 
Scale  
1-5 
No. of obs. 
Ghana 11 20 22 21 14 12 3.08 1190       
                      
Kenya 2 7 19 30 40 3 4.01 2007 
 
Liberia 8 4 8 27 49 5 4.09 1000 
 
Nigeria 5 11 17 25 32 10 3.76 5007 
 
Senegal 6 11 19 24 29 11 3.66 1480 
 
Uganda 8 18 18 24 25 7 3.43 1000 
 
Zambia 20 18 19 17 13 13 2.83 902 
 
Note: Data based on the responses to the survey question ‘To what extent is Parliament/Legislature 
affected by corruption in your country?’ Data is from 2008. The index is calculated in the following 
way. I subtract the ‘don’t know’ responses from the survey data and give the remaining categories 
values on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 = ‘not at all corrupt’ to 5 = ‘extremely corrupt’. I then weight 
the percentage of respondents in each category accordingly and add the categories together. In theory, 
the Global Corruption Barometer index thus ranges from 1 to 5. Source: Transparency International, 
Global Corruption Barometer.   
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3. Winning Elections with Grand Corruption in Sub-
Saharan Africa  
 
Abstract  
Two decades have passed since the third wave of democratisation swept over sub-
Saharan Africa. The consequent regime transformations held great promises of 
improving dire quality of governance and high levels of corruption by inducing 
accountability into the political systems. However, despite the regime changes and 
regularly held elections, the predicted improvement with regard to corruption is, on 
the whole, shining with its absence. This study concerns the effect political 
competition for a country’s executive position has on the extent of corruption at the 
highest political level, so called grand- or political corruption, across sub-Saharan 
Africa. Using insights from the literature on African neopatrimonialism and ‘Big 
Man’ rule, I seek to explain the lack of improvement in terms of corruption albeit 
democratisation. I propose that an incumbent, as a rational strategy of political 
survival, responds to an increase in political competition with an increase in the 
distribution of prebends with which he buys elite loyalty and, in that way, ensures 
continued incumbency. Such use of prebendal politics is, in turn, associated with high 
levels of corruption. I test this proposition using cross-section time-series regression 
analysis on a sub-Saharan Africa country sample and find that, as long as ‘Big Man’ 
rule continues to be the order of the day, an increase in political competition will 
increase the use of prebendal politics and corruption. I also find that this pattern 
breaks if and when a country’s democratic quality – or institutionalisation – reaches a 
certain point. The fact that corruption continues to be closely linked to political 
survival – via ‘Big Man’ rule and prebendal politics – sets the African experiences 
with democratisation apart from that of Western liberal democracies and this should 
be better acknowledged by the academic community and development practitioners 
alike.  
 
Keywords: sub-Saharan Africa, corruption, prebends, democratisation, elections 
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3.1  Introduction  
After a mixture of popular protests, aid conditionality imposed by the international 
donor community, and the political liberalisation of Eastern Europe, a wave of 
democratisation swept over sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. Already in the first 
18 months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, half of sub-Saharan African’s authoritarian 
regimes had signed up to multi-party democracy (Robinson, 1993:88). At the core of 
the liberalisation fight – fought by African citizens and the international donor 
community alike – was disappointment and anger about bad governance and 
corruption (the abuse of public office for private gain).  
 
From the side of African citizens, the popular demands for political liberalisation fed 
from a crisis of political legitimacy where “leaders had damaged their own claim to 
rule by engaging in nepotism and corruption.” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:99). 
In terms of international pressure, donors had with the end of the Cold War lost their 
impetus to prop up authoritarian and kleptomaniac regimes, and by the early 1990s, 
pushing for political liberalisation across Africa, many of them started to impose aid 
conditionality. Such conditionality referred to the linking of aid to political reform, 
among others, to open and accountable government. Already in June 1990, France’s 
President, François Mitterrand, announced at a summit of African Heads of State that 
“France would reduce its aid to regimes which conduct themselves in an authoritarian 
manner without accepting evolution towards democracy.” (Robinson, 1993:90). It 
would take another few years before a consensus about the link between democracy 
and corruption had been formed, making the push towards democratisation a 
cornerstone in the international donor community’s fight against corruption (Riley, 
1998). 
 
At the heart of the exerted pressure for African countries to accept multi-party 
democracy was a belief that leaders who are forced to face their electorate are more 
accountable and less corrupt. In particular, theory has it that political competition 
forces the incumbent to align with the preferences of the voters and thus use public 
resources in a way that favour public goods. Corruption, being as far from a public 
good there is, would thus whither in the face of the electoral competition brought 
about through multi-party democratisation.  
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Twenty years following political liberalisation, corruption levels across sub-Saharan 
Africa appear to have remained stubbornly high. Nicolas van de Walle, who has 
published extensively on the topic of democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa, writes 
that “democratisation has not altered long-standing political patterns in African 
politics… the transition [to multi-party democracy] did little to change the enduring 
weakness of vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms facing executives.” 
(Van de Walle, 2001:264). Similarly, judging from cross-country data on levels of 
corruption, the move to multi-party democratisation has not proven be a panacea for 
curbing corruption. Using time series data on corruption from the International 
Country Risk Group between 1985 and 2003 – where the higher the index value the 
lower the perceived level of corruption in the country – figure 3:1 below shows that 
while no drastic changes have occurred over time, average levels of corruption appear 
to have risen slightly from the mid-1990s onwards.  
 
Note: Figure 3.1 uses data from the International Country Risk Group index on corruption for the years 
1985-2003. This index spans from 0 signifying very high levels of corruption, to 6 signifying very low 
levels of corruption.   
 
Moreover, the Afrobarometer survey, which target a random sample of households in 
a set of sub-Saharan African countries includes, in its first survey round from 1999, 
questions pertaining to the extent of corruption perceived in the current government 
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Figure 3.1: Average levels of corruption across 27 African countries over time
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compared to that of the previous government under one-party rule.8 The survey results 
are ambiguous to say the least. Citizens from Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia indicated 
that corruption was a greater problem in the post-liberalised political environment of 
1999 than under the previous one-party governments. On the contrary, citizens in 
Mali and Lesotho found corruption to have been a bigger problem under the one-party 
state than after political liberalisation. In Ghana and Nigeria, the respondents believed 
that corruption had been greater under previous military governments. In South 
Africa, corruption was perceived to have been higher in 1999 than during pre-1994 
apartheid rule while the opposite was true for Namibia. In short, evidence from this 
small sample indicates that about half of the countries have registered improvement in 
governance with regard to levels of corruption while the other half have noticed an 
increase in corruption following political liberalisation.  
 
Another disconcerting note comes from a report published by the Washington-based 
institute, Global Financial Integrity (2010). The authors calculate that financial 
leakages in terms of illicit financial flows from sub-Saharan Africa alone amounted, 
in the period 2000-2008, to $358 billion and that this was a 30 percent increase 
compared to the previous decade (ibid:10). This number can be set in relation to the 
inflow of money to the sub-continent in the form of development aid. According to 
data from OECD (OECD.StatExtracts), total net official development assistance 
(ODA) to sub-Saharan Africa for the same period (2000-2008) amounted to $193 
                                                 
8
 Malawi, 1999, survey question 77C, “Is government of today more, about the same, or less corrupt as 
under the one-party regime of former President Banda?”  
Tanzania, 1999, survey question 81G, “Corruption was a worse problem under the old single party 
government than these days.” 
Zambia, 1999, survey question 77C, “Is government of today more, about the same, or less corrupt as 
under the one party regime of Kaunda?” 
Mali, 2001, survey question 81G, “Corruption was a worse problem under the old single party 
government than these days.” 
Lesotho, 1999, survey question 77C, “Is the government of today more, about the same, or less corrupt 
than under the government of President Leabua Jonathan?” 
Ghana, 1999, survey question 80, “Corruption was a worse problem under the old military government 
than these days.” 
Nigeria, 1999, survey question 85, “Corruption was a worse problem under the old military 
government than these days.”  
South Africa, 1999, survey question 77C, “Is government of today more, about the same, or less as 
under apartheid?” 
Namibia, 1999, survey question 77C, “Is government of today more, about the same, or less corrupt as 
under South African rule?” 
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billion, or just over half of the money that illegally left the region during the same 
time. Such capital outflow can be seen as the foregone chance for the elected leaders 
to enhance the level of public goods and thereby align with the preferences of their 
citizenry. In short, it fits uneasily with the notion that leaders are supposed to be 
weary of protecting their job titles.  
 
In this chapter, I take a closer look at the linkage between political competition and 
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. Using statistical analysis, I find that, contrary to 
popularly used theories originating from the experience of Western liberal 
democracies, in times of tense political competition the incumbent ensures his victory 
by using the resources of the state to buy the loyalty of the elite. In turn, since such 
prebendal politics works by distributing state resources for private means, it is linked 
to corruption. However, I argue that such political strategy is coupled with ‘Big Man’ 
rule that weakens as a country’s democratic consolidation and institutionalisation of 
the state is enhanced.  
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. In section 3.2, I discuss the theoretical 
linkages between political competition and corruption, starting with the 
conventionally used theories and juxtaposing these with propositions found in the 
political science literature on Africa. Section 3.3 deals with the data and variables 
used in the statistical analysis, and section 3.4 tests the formed propositions on a sub-
Saharan African sample using cross-section time-series regression analysis. Section 
3.5 forms a conclusion.  
 
3.2  Linking political competition with corruption in sub-Saharan 
Africa  
According to well-regarded literature on corruption, political competition, and the real 
risk of being voted out of office, goes hand in hand with increased accountability and 
less corruption. Lederman et al. (2005:4), for example, state that “any institution or 
rule that provides a punishment mechanism for politicians, such as the loss of 
elections or the possibility of being forced out of office, can induce politicians to 
improve their behaviour by aligning their own interests with those of their 
constituents. The more the system forces politicians to face the electorate, the higher 
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are the incentives to stick to good governance.” Humphreys and Bates (2005) model 
this logic through a principal-agent model, where voters constitute the principal and 
the government in office the agent. In essence, the fate of the government is in the 
hands of voters who will punish bad policies and political behaviour, such as 
corruption, by not re-electing corrupt leaders. In fact, being merely an agent, the 
government must apportion sufficient benefits to a sufficient number of voters (the 
majority) so that they will approve its return to office (ibid:7).  
 
We would therefore expect that by letting voters choose between different leaders, i.e. 
by introducing competition into the system, multi-party democracy, as opposed to 
one-party regimes, would limit the level of corruption in a country by forcing leaders 
to be accountable for their actions. According to Rose-Ackerman (1999:127), “a 
competitive political environment reduces the likelihood of corruption because it 
raises the stakes that politicians will be voted out of office.” Schleifer and Vishny 
(1993:612) argue this point by stating that leaders in countries with more political 
competition are more likely to use government organisations that contain rather than 
maximise the proceeds of corruption because of stronger public pressure against 
corruption. The authors add that “it is implausible to think, for example, that the US 
president maximises corruption proceeds, since such a president is likely to be 
exposed and thrown out of office.” (Ibid:612). 
 
In terms of empirical attention to the association between political competition and 
corruption, Lederman et al. (2005), using panel regression analysis with a maximum 
of 146 countries between 1984 and 1999, find that contested elections are associated 
with lower levels of corruption. As a concluding remark, the authors state that “efforts 
should be targeted at creating competition in all levels of the political structure.” 
(Ibid:28). In addition, Humphreys and Bates (2005) in their empirical study on the 
role of political competition for ensuring good governance in Africa find that an 
increase in political competition is associated with an improvement in their 
governance quality index (comprising corruption and risk of expropriation). They 
conclude by stating that “governments that are subject to electoral competition are 
more likely to employ public power to produce collective goods rather than to extract 
private benefits.” (Ibid:425).  
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The validity of the proposition put forth here – that political competition induces more 
accountability and less corruption – hinges on the assumption that citizens will use 
their votes to punish corrupt leaders, and that these leaders are fully aware of this risk 
and choose their policies and political behaviour accordingly. There are, however, 
various suggestions in the literature that this accountability relationship between 
voters and leaders is rather weak in many African countries (see, for example, Bratton 
and Logan’s (2006), and Chang and Kerr’s (2009) findings using the Afrobarometer 
survey) and that voting behaviour is shaped by other concerns than inducing more 
public welfare and less corruption.  
 
To start with, in patron-client societies, as those found in Africa, public resources are 
largely not distributed in the form of universal public goods and in accordance with 
citizens’ rights or equality before the law but rather on patron-client basis in which the 
client offers (for example through their vote) loyalty to the patron in exchange for 
gaining access to resources distributed by the patron. Having a resourceful patron in 
this context is what can enable a community to thrive. As I will come to later, one 
characteristic of African societies is that the executive branch, most often the 
presidency, sits on a disproportionate share of a country’s resources. The best patron 
to have in this case is therefore the president and those in coalition with him. 
Therefore, as van de Walle (2007:64) argues, political opposition in African countries 
often have difficulty attracting votes since voters believe that voting for a loser will 
not be rewarded with access to state resources. “Indeed, citizens often fear that they 
will be deprived of [social] services if they do not vote for the winning candidate.” 
(Van de Walle, 2003:313). Thus, rather than aligning their support behind the 
candidate with the cleanest record, voters are incentivised to stand behind the most 
likely victor in the political contest. Most often this is the incumbent since he can 
usually count on having the largest resource base on which to further his campaign.  
The fact that out of 91 elections across sub-Saharan Africa (1990-2010) in which the 
incumbent participated in the presidential race, the incumbent was victorious in 78 
elections (86 percent) is expressive of the gains perceived by voters from voting for 
the likely victor.
9 
 
                                                 
9 Notes: I have based these calculations on election information from African Elections Database, 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html. Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa 
have legislative elections only and Swaziland has non-party elections. Therefore, these countries are 
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This incentive to belong to the clientele of the political winner continues up the 
political hierarchy as can be seen, for example, from recent political developments in 
Malawi. When President Bingu wa Mutharika of the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) suddenly died in April 2012, Vice-President Joyce Banda from the People’s 
Party (PP) took over the presidential position. Banda had previously been a leading 
member of the DPP but had been expelled from the party and subsequently formed 
her own party with her own loyal followers. In the wake of this sudden presidential 
change, a mass ‘defection’ by DPP MPs to the PP has been reported (Guardian online, 
2012 retrieved 20 April 2012). Seen in the light of patron-client relations and strategic 
alliances; when the elite clients that stood behind the DPP lost their patron, there was 
little benefit of staying within the losing coalition and possibly much to gain from 
shifting party affiliation and join the ranks of the winning coalition and ultimate 
patron.     
 
If political accountability vis-à-vis citizens does not function in the way it does in 
western democracies, i.e., if political leaders do not really fear being punished by 
voters for bad policies and political behaviour; does this simply mean that political 
competition has little or no effect on corruption? Perhaps it does not in terms of what 
the abovementioned theories in the corruption literature suggest but that does not 
mean that political competition has no effect on corruption. To further investigate this 
linkage, we need to take a closer look at how leaders in Africa are likely to react when 
faced with competition for their office.  
 
African countries are characterised by the centralisation of power around the ‘Big 
Men’, usually the countries’ presidents. Such centralisation of power puts an 
enormous premium on competition for the presidency (van de Walle, 2003:315). This 
fierce competition is aggravated by the fact that a generally large portion of African 
countries’ wealth (and possibility for wealth creation) is concentrated in the hands of 
the political leadership, either directly through state ownership or indirectly through 
politicised markets. This creates fierce and sometimes zero-sum political battles over 
who will run the state. In Africa, the never ending series of coups d’état, claims about 
                                                                                                                                            
not included from this data. In addition, certain elections are not included because there has been no 
incumbent prior to election to stand in the election, e.g. following coup d’états or death of incumbent. 
Liberia's two elections (1997, 2005) are examples of this. 
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rigged elections, and violence in connection with national elections are evidence of 
the serious repercussions faced by those groups of people who end up on the losing 
side of the political battle. Several authors have highlighted the relation between the 
political battle field and economic possibilities in Africa. Mungiu-Pippidi (2006:89), 
for example, states that “the main prize in the competition for power is the state and 
all of its resources.” Bratton and van de Walle (1997:37) similarly argue that “where 
resources are scarce, the object of political contestation is to secure economic 
consumption, which in turn is best guaranteed by capturing the state.” Oketch and 
Polzer (2002:104), in their political analysis of Burundi, likewise find that “control 
over the state and political power is synonymous with control over economic 
opportunity, individually and as an elite group.” These features combined create a 
political environment where the personal stakes involved in the political game are 
quite a bit higher than those found in Western liberal democracies. 
 
To safeguard his position, the political leader needs to out-compete other ‘Big Men’ 
in waiting, such as formal candidates running for the leadership position or other 
figures who may nurture leadership ambitions. Such political competitions are in turn 
won through increasing the elite clientele linked to the ‘Big Man’. According to 
Médard (2002:383), “In Africa, it is in the politician’s interest, politically speaking, to 
redistribute part of the stolen money to keep their political clientele. The mechanics of 
patronage and therefore stability are at the heart of a leader’s political stability. The 
art of governing is not only the art of extracting resources, but also of redistribution: it 
is the only way of legitimising power, in the absence of ideological legitimacy.” 
Chabal and Daloz (1999:103) similarly assert that the political strategy used by 
African leaders is one of ‘sharing of the spoils’ from the state in exchange for 
recognition of the status and power of the incumbent. 
 
The loyalty of this elite clientele is in turn bought through offering prebends: the 
strategic political allocation of public offices to key elites which grant personal access 
over state resources (van de Walle (2012:113).
10
 By being granted access to these 
                                                 
10
 Prebendalism as a term was first used in the African context by Joseph (1983) where he refers it to 
“patterns of political behaviour which reflect as their justifying principle that the offices of the existing 
state may be competed for and then utilised for the personal benefit of office-holders as well as that of 
their reference or support group.” (Ibid:30). Prebends are thus closely linked to corruption as 
‘prebendal appropriation’ is “the exploitation of public offices for private gain.” (Joseph, 2003:162). 
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offices for political reasons, the political elite can subsequently subvert the rule of law 
for personal gain. Thus, such prebendal politics is heavily associated with corruption. 
In the words of Cammack et al (2007), “the ‘Big Man’ personally uses the power of 
the state to protect his cronies, eliminate his rivals and to buy support, for example by 
handling out cabinet posts and providing opportunities for rent.” Van de Walle 
(2001:264) argues that African political leaders, post-democratisation, continue to 
rely on such accommodation of a narrow political elite as a way to survive. Similarly, 
Joseph (1987:57) argues in the case of Nigeria that “a competitive electoral system, 
with its vast array of ministerial and sub-ministerial appointments, with legislative 
offices and their private staff positions to be filled, is a veritable boon to prebendal 
politics.” What this discussion has pointed to is that African political leaders, when 
faced with competition for their offices, ensure continued incumbency through 
offering prebends to selected elites and thereby ensure their loyalty.  
 
Various scholars focusing on Africa have provided concrete examples of such 
prebendal politics where the political leader ensures electoral victory by buying 
loyalty from the elite. Van de Walle (2001:266), for example, uses the case of the 
Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba, who dramatically expanded the number of 
high political and ministerial positions before an election. Since these positions came 
with great private benefits for the office holders, Chiluba could ensure the loyalty of 
the beneficiaries and, in turn, secure his electoral victory. Tangri and Mwenda 
(2006:104) in their case study on Uganda also found such elite accommodation for 
political reasons to be widely used. They argue that “by enabling individual power-
holders to divert public resources into their own hands, the top political leadership has 
been able to retain their loyalty and keep them within the ruling coalition.” Similarly, 
Lindberg (2010) touches upon the use of prebendal political appointments in his in-
depth case study on members of parliament (MPs) in Ghana. He states that President 
Kufour, while in office (2001-2009), created and distributed posts for MPs as 
ministers and deputies. The President also created a substantial number of lucrative 
seats on procurement and tender boards that he could “distribute on the basis of 
loyalty to him... The remaining MPs were in effect waiting in line to be appointed at a 
64 
 
later stage.” (Ibid:131). Lastly, in a recent public talk11, John Githongo, Kenya’s 
former ‘anti-corruption tsar’, hinted at the use of prebendal politics and its link to 
corruption when stating that corruption is the glue that has kept the post 2007 Kenyan 
coalition together as it has made no part of the elite having to feel left out. 
 
While the practice of prebendal politics is a general characteristic of African 
countries, certain variation is bound to exist across countries, and this variation, 
according to van de Walle, boils down to how well countries have managed to 
institutionalise themselves away from ‘Big Man’ politics and related neopatrimonial 
or hybrid systems of governance. One proof that such institutionalisation has taken 
place is, in turn, when countries have reached democratic consolidation. The less 
democratic the system, and therefore, the less sanctioned misconducts by the elite are, 
the more this type of prebendal politics will be the order of the day (van de Walle, 
2012:116). By contrast, “in a small set of African countries, relatively liberal 
democracies are emerging. I would argue that in these regimes, prebendalism is in the 
decline if not actually in the process of disappearing, at least as a systematic practice.” 
(Van de Walle, 2007:66).   
 
The proposition put forth in this section is that political competition does have an 
effect on corruption in African countries, not primarily in the way that theories on 
accountability found in the corruption literature see it, but rather in accordance with 
the logic on which prebendal politics is exercised. When faced with political 
competition, incumbents in African countries, especially those with low levels of 
democratic institutionalisation, react to this competition by increasing their entourage, 
or platform of elite loyalists. They do so by distributing prebends, which in turn is 
associated with an increase in corruption. As a result, in times of fierce political 
competition for a country’s leadership position, we are likely to see corruption 
increase. This hypothesis will be tested using statistical analysis in the section 3.4 
below.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Africa Talks public lecture, “African Whistle-blowers: Fighting Corruption from the Inside”, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 26 October 2010 
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3.3  Variables and data  
In this section, I will discuss the variables and data used in the statistical analysis in 
the subsequent section. The section starts with a substantial discussion about the pros 
and cons of different corruption measurements. Thereafter, the two main independent 
variables, political competition and prebendal politics, are discussed. Lastly, I discuss 
a number of institutional and political variables as well as a number of control 
variables that have come to be conventionally used in the quantitatively oriented 
corruption literature.  
 
3.3.1 Grand corruption 
The theoretical literature on corruption tends to distinguish between petty and grand 
corruption; a distinction which refers to the scale and protagonist, as well as the 
underlying functionality of corruption. As the name indicates, petty corruption (also 
known as bureaucratic corruption) is comparatively small in scale and conducted at 
the bureaucratic level. The reason behind this type of corruption is often, although far 
from always, motivated by necessity as a result of low wages, and the benefits are 
usually internalised on an individual basis: a bribe to a police officer in order to avoid 
a speeding ticket, money exchanged to receive a public service which would 
otherwise have been free of charge, or money exchanged for jumping the bureaucratic 
queue are all examples of such petty corruption. While this form of corruption can be 
deeply damaging, especially to poor households, it is not as relevant to the discussion 
of political competition and accountability as its counterpart, grand corruption.  
 
As the name indicates, the scale of grand corruption (also known as political 
corruption) is larger. The protagonists of this type of corruption involve policy makers 
and takes place at a higher level of the political system than the petty counterpart. 
Political corruption, be it through awarding infrastructure contracts to friends, 
awarding high level jobs on nepotistic grounds, or granting unsecured bank loans to 
political allies, often has a function beyond merely being a source of extrajudicial 
income. Williams (1987:70) writes that “unlike petty corruption, grand corruption 
often has a number of beneficiaries and normally involves elements of collusion and 
conspiracy.”  Amundsen (1999:3) describes the functionality of political corruption in 
the following way: “political corruption is when political decision-makers use the 
66 
 
political power they are armed with, to sustain their power, status and wealth… 
Political corruption is when laws and regulations are more or less systematically 
abused by the rulers, side-stepped, ignored, or even tailored to fit their interests”. On a 
similar vein, Philip (2002:42) uses the functionality of corruption to distinguish 
between institutional corruption and private corruption. While private corruption 
produces gains on an individual basis, institutional corruption yields gains for a 
politician within the political process and is ultimately about using the public office 
and state resources to remain in power.  
 
The data on corruption most commonly used in comparative research come from 
annual cross-country indices, such as Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index. These indices 
are perception-based composite indices which combine data for each country from a 
number of different sources, such as household surveys, analyses from country risk 
experts, and international investors. While these indices are extensive in country 
coverage, the variety of sources greatly increases the conceptual vagueness of the 
corruption measurement. Johnston (2000), for example, refers to the composite 
indices’ ‘single-number problem’ i.e., the difficulty of assigning comparable values to 
different types of corruption, such as petty and political, across different types of 
political systems. To illustrate the problem, the author asks how much nepotism or 
patronage is equivalent to a certain level of bribery in road construction?  
 
To remedy the vagueness of the composite corruption indices and specifically focus 
on grand corruption, I use corruption perception data from the Afrobarometer survey 
which is constructed, using random sampling, to be a representative cross-section of 
the adult population in each of the surveyed countries. The specific survey rounds of 
concern to this study took place between 2002 and 2009 and resulted in 56 surveys 
from 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The dependent variable is calculated from 
the response to a question about the perceived extent of corruption in the country’s 
highest executive office. For most parts, this refers to the President’s office although 
for the few countries with parliamentary system, it refers to the Prime Minister’s 
67 
 
office.
12
 By looking exclusively at corruption at the highest political level, the 
empirical analysis can provide a sharper focus on the political actions taken by the 
incumbent who, due to political competition for power, faces the risk of losing his 
position. This linkage is thereby not muddled by the incentives faced by other 
protagonists, e.g. lower level bureaucrats, whose perceived behaviour is included in 
the composite indices on corruption.  
 
The eligible response categories to the survey question are: none of them, some of 
them, most of them, all of them, and don’t know. From these responses I give each 
survey a score from 1-4 where the higher the value, the higher the level of perceived 
corruption in the executive’s office. In order to create these scores, I first subtract all 
the ‘don’t knows’ from the number of respondents. I then order the four categories 
from ‘none of them’=1 to ‘all of them’=4. Lastly, I weight the percentage of 
respondents in each category accordingly and add the categories together. In practise, 
the scores awarded to the different surveys spans 1.61 (Lesotho 2005) as the lowest 
perceived corruption to 2.78 (Nigeria 2005) as the highest score (see Annex).  
 
Figure 3.2 below shows the comparative scores across countries on the grand 
corruption index constructed using data from the Afrobarometer survey (Rounds 2-4, 
spanning the years 2002-2009). The size of the rectangle for each country corresponds 
to the inter-quartile data range and the whiskers indicate the range of the more 
extreme values. The within-country variation in perceived corruption depicted in the 
figure has generally been negative with 13 out of 18 countries reporting higher levels 
of perceived corruption in the most recent survey round compared to the first round.  
                                                 
12 
The exact questions are: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, 
or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The President and Officials in his/her Office? How 
many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say: The Prime Minister and Officials in his Office? 
68 
 
 
Note: Figure 3.2 shows the result from the Afrobarometer Survey (Rounds 2-4) on the question: How 
many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say: The President/Prime Minister and Officials in his/her Office? The calculated index 
spans from 1 to 4 (in reality from 1.61 to 2.78) where the higher the value, the greater the perception of 
corruption in the office of the country’s executive. The two surveys on Madagascar showed the same 
index result, hence the lack of variation for that country. Source: Afrobarometer.   
In the statistical analysis in the next section, I use this survey-based perception of 
grand corruption as the dependent variable. Since I use panel regression analysis, two 
countries that only had one survey each had to be dropped in order to allow for the 
observations to be clustered by country. This technique, in turn, ensures that country-
level characteristics are controlled for and that focus is set on explaining within-
country variation in levels of corruption. 
 
Certain caveats may be inherent in this type of data. First, due to the fact that the 
survey demands that respondents express their opinion about a topic as sensitive as 
high-level corruption, there is a fear that the scores may be biased downwards or that 
the responses disappear in the ‘don’t know’ category. Eifert et al. (2010) use the 
Afrobarometer survey on the similarly sensitive topic of ethnic belonging. They 
argue, however, that respondents are unlikely to be guarded in their responses since, 
on the one hand, the surveys are conducted in a confidential manner with politically 
unaffiliated enumerators, and on the other hand, the issue of corruption only covers a 
1.61 2.78
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Figure 3.2: Perceived levels of grand corruption across countries
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handful of questions in a survey of more than 175 questions (Ibid:498). Whether these 
20 countries constitute a representative sample of sub-Saharan Africa in its totality is 
another potential concern in terms of enabling inference to be drawn from the 
statistical results. Testing the difference in group means between the sample of these 
20 countries and a larger sample of 40 countries for the year 2008 shows statistical 
similarity for all variables (see Annex) apart from democratic quality for which the 
sample of 20 scores statistically significantly higher (F=3.98) than the larger sample 
of 40 countries. 
 
The greatest potential caveat may, however, be the fact that the Afrobarometer survey 
data is based on citizen’s perception of corruption. Is perceived corruption a reflection 
of true corruption and, if so, how could we possibly know that when actual levels of 
corruption, especially the type of grand corruption that is of concern in this study, is 
not really measurable? While the real extent of some kinds of petty corruption can 
pretty much be measured using people’s own experiences, ordinary citizens are 
unlikely to base their perception on grand corruption from own experiences and are 
instead likely to base their judgement on reports in the media, rumours and gossip, or 
direct observation of wealth being clustered among citizens with certain functions 
(Konold, 2007:8). Apart from believing that there would be no smoke without a fire, 
i.e., people would not perceive corruption to be common if this was not the reality, 
there is no way we can know with certainty that perceived levels of grand corruption 
resemble actual levels of grand corruption.  
 
A few researchers have gone beyond this rather defeatist attitude and investigated 
where perceptions about high or low levels of corruption come from. Chang and Kerr 
(2009), for example, use the Afrobarometer survey to statistically investigate 
variations in within-country perceived levels of corruption at the highest level of 
government. They find support for their proposition that political insiders – those who 
share party affiliation and ethnic identity with the incumbent – perceive grand 
corruption to be lower than political outsiders. In other words, perceived corruption 
may in this sense reflect general attitudes towards those in power with supporters 
perhaps being overly forgiving and opponents perhaps being overly cynical. Media 
exposure is another variable thought to affect perceptions on corruption. A free, 
vibrant and wide-reaching media helps expose corruption and thus, as democratisation 
70 
 
and media freedom improves in a country, it may affect perceptions of corruption 
while actual levels of corruption may remain unchanged. Chang and Kerr (2009), 
using Afrobarometer data, found evidence that citizens who were more exposed to 
media information tended to perceive higher levels of corruption, thereby providing 
support for the proposition that perceptions of corruption are created via media. Based 
on this finding, it should also matter whether citizens are exposed to government-
owned media with all its censorship or independent media, and whether a country is 
able to provide high quality of investigative journalism. However, contrary to this 
finding, Mattes and Africa (1999), using citizen-level data from South Africa, found 
no correlation between media exposure and perceptions of corruption. In sum, the 
choice of equating perceptions of grand corruption – in this case perceptions at the 
citizen-level – with actual levels of grand corruption unfortunately comes at the cost 
of uncertainty of how well perception correspond to reality.  
 
To overcome this caveat, at least partly, and to triangulate the findings using 
alternative data, I use the International Country Risk Group’s (ICRG) corruption 
index as the dependent variable in alternative regression specifications. The time-
series data spans the years 1985-2003 for 27 countries. The ICRG Corruption Index 
was developed by the for-profit organisation Political Risk Service and is based on the 
perceptions of corruption by country experts. As such, it is not a composite index like 
the ones developed by the World Bank and Transparency International discussed 
earlier, and neither is it constructed using perceptions among general citizens. To ease 
comparison with the previous proxy for corruption, I have inverted the index to span 
from minus 6 to zero. An increase in the value from, say, -4 to -2, indicates an 
increase in perceived corruption. According to its codebook, this index intends to 
primarily capture “excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favour-for-
favours, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and 
business”, as well as “demands for special payment and bribery”.  
 
3.3.2 Political competition/vote margins 
The main independent variable of concern in this study is political competition and 
how it affects prebendal politics and grand corruption within the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
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Previous studies focusing on the effect political competition has on corruption have 
used several different measurements to proxy political competition. Treisman (2000) 
for example, uses the minimalist measure of 45 years of uninterrupted democracy to 
capture political competition in a country, and the measure of political competition 
used by Lederman et al. (2005) takes the form of a dummy variable for whether 
democratically contested elections are held in the country. Humphreys and Bates’s 
(2005) measure of political competition is less minimalist and takes discrete values 
between 1 and 7; higher values indicating greater executive electoral competition. 
Values ranging from 1 to 5 proxy different levels of autocratic regimes where either 
opposition is banned or there is no electoral competition taking place. Values 6 and 7 
are of more interest in the post-1990s sub-Saharan African political context, where 6 
indicates that de jure electoral competition between candidates and parties takes place 
and a score of 7 is awarded to countries whose executive’s vote share is less than 75 
percent and would thus indicate that de facto political competition takes place.  
In order to fully capture the de facto political competition faced by the incumbent, I 
follow Eifert et al. (2010:501) and use vote margins, i.e. the percentage difference 
between the winner and the runner up in the most recent election for the country’s 
executive position, as a proxy for the level of real political competition faced by the 
incumbent. This means that the larger the vote margin, the lower the level of political 
competition facing the candidates for the executive seat. During one-party states, 
these vote margins would thus have been 100 percent since no competition was 
allowed. Data on election results are taken from the African Elections Database, and I 
use the data from the first round of elections in those cases where two rounds took 
place.  
For the 40 sub-Saharan African countries constituting the statistical sample, two 
countries (Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo) have only had 1 multi-
party election since 1990, and four countries (Burundi, the Republic of Congo, 
Liberia, and Rwanda) have held only two. On the other end of the spectrum, four 
countries (Comoros, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia) have experienced five multi-party 
presidential elections since 1990. The average vote margin for each of these rounds of 
elections is shown in table 3.1 below. 
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Table 3.1: Real political competition for the executive office 
 
Election (during period 
1990-2010). 
 
Average vote margin between the presidential election winner and 
the runner-up (percent of total votes). 
 
First election  
 
34.4 (40 countries) 
 
Second election  
 
44.3 (38 countries) 
 
Third election  
 
31.8 (34 countries) 
 
Fourth election  
 
29.1 (24 countries) 
 
Fifth election    8.6 (4 countries) 
 
Note: Author’s own calculations of multi-party executive election results in 40 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2010. Source: African Elections Database 
What is noteworthy is that the second multi-party election was much less competitive 
on average (had higher vote margins) than both the first one and the ones after that 
(see Lindberg (2006:74-88) for an in-depth discussion on the competitiveness of 
African elections over time). In comparative terms, vote margins for the presidential 
position during the same period (1992-2008) in the United States was 4.8 percent 
which indicates that African political competition for the executive position is on 
average relatively low, 30-40 percent vote margin besides the much smaller vote 
margin of 8.6 percent in the fifth election. 
 
3.3.3 Prebendal politics 
The second main independent variable, following the stated proposition in the 
previous section on the linkages between political competition and grand corruption, 
is prebendal politics, or the handing out of lucrative positions in exchange for political 
support. Not surprising, there is no straight forward way of quantifying such political 
behaviour. However, in previous empirical research, a country’s cabinet size has been 
used as a proxy (Arriola, 2009). This proxy is, in turn, based on van de Walle’s 
(2001:103) discussion about elite clientelism in which the author states that “in most 
[African] countries, a ministerial appointment is an important position for a member 
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of the political elite, bringing with it patronage opportunities as well as significant 
perks and status-enhancing privileges.” In Arriola’s (2009) empirical study, the 
number of ministers in an African country’s cabinet thus represent the number of elite 
clients sustained by a regime’s leader, and an increase in this number is interpreted as 
an attempt by the incumbent to expand his loyalty base (ibid:1346). Thus, following 
the discussion in the previous section, an increase in a country’s cabinet size signifies 
an increase in prebends and is expected to have an augmenting effect on grand 
corruption.  
 
Such ministerial privileges have been reported in the media. For example, in April 
2008, after the troubled presidential elections in Kenya, The Telegraph (2008, 
retrieved 20 April 2011) highlighted the large portion of the national budget that is 
dedicated to the running of the country’s relatively large political top echelon, stating 
that “cabinet members benefit from annual salaries exceeding £83,000 and numerous 
perks, including official cars and ‘entertainment’ allowances of £600 per month.” 
Salaries among Nigerian politicians, which are not made public but are believed to be 
among the highest in the world, received some media attention in relation to the 
country’s 2011 elections (BBC News, 2011, retrieved 20 April 2011). 
 
Data on the size and composition of cabinets across countries and over time are 
reported in the annual publication Africa South of the Sahara published by Europa 
Publications Limited. However, this data is not without its caveats as the reported 
cabinets may include positions, such as deputy ministers, ministers of state, and 
minister-delegates for certain years but not for others. To ensure consistency across 
time and countries, I have followed Arriola (2009) and included ministers and vice 
presidents, but excluded deputy ministers, minister-delegates, assistant ministers, and 
secretaries of state (where their position is lower than that of a minister). I have 
included ministers of state if these are reported as being part of the cabinet but have 
excluded them in cases where they are reported as being outside of the cabinet, i.e. in 
Uganda (2001-2010) where over 40 ministers of state where reported outside of its 
cabinet, and Nigeria where half of that number was reported.  
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Note: Figure 3.3 shows the spread within and across countries in sub-Saharan Africa with regard to 
their size of cabinet. The size of the rectangles in the boxplot corresponds to the inter-quartile range 
and the whiskers indicate the range of the more extreme values. Some countries have dots outside the 
boxes and these signify outliers. Source: Europa Publications Ltd “Africa South of the Sahara” (various 
years). 
The variation across countries for the years 1985-2010 is shown in figure 3.3 above. 
The mean size of the cabinets in the sample is 22 members even if some countries 
have chosen to have significantly larger cabinets. For example, having roughly the 
same population size as Spain, although only a fraction of Spain’s size of government 
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Figure 3.3: Variation in cabinet size across Africa
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expenditure, Kenya nonetheless afforded 39 cabinet ministers in 2008 compared to 
Spain’s 18. As shown in the figure, certain countries have also seen large variations in 
cabinet size across time, e.g. Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal. 
 
3.3.4 Democratic quality and other accountability variables 
As asserted by van de Walle (2012:116) and mentioned in the previous section, some 
African countries have managed to step away from the systematic use of prebendal 
politics. They have, according to the same author, done so by institutionalising the 
state away from ‘Big Man’ rule and in favour of democratic consolidation which is 
more unforgiving of political abuse and elite clientelism. Therefore, at some point on 
a democratic quality continuum, we could expect countries to leave prebendal politics 
behind and, as a result, experience a decrease in grand corruption. This reasoning is in 
coherence with some recent cross-country empirical findings. Monitola and Jackman 
(2002) and Rock (2009), both using cross-section regression analysis, found that once 
a country has passed a threshold in terms of democratic quality and duration, they 
experience considerably less corruption. 
 
Democratic maturity varies across African counties with countries such as Mauritius 
and Botswana constituting well-functioning democracies and countries such as 
Equatorial Guinea and Togo scoring very low in terms of democratic quality. While 
the third wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991) swept across sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1990s, the broom was more effective in some places than in others. In 
some countries, according to van de Walle (2003:307), democracy is not much more 
than the holding of elections, and “the turn to multi-party competition amounted to 
little more than an erstwhile authoritarian ruler donning the garb of democracy and 
tolerating regular elections as a successful strategy for holding on to power.” For 
example, as stated by an opposition politician in Cameroon: “it is common knowledge 
that incumbent presidents in Africa use the government machinery and all the powers 
at their disposal to manoeuvre the electoral process.” (Reuters, 2008, retrieved 10 
November 2010). Where democracy has become the ‘only game in town’ (Linz and 
Stepan, 1996), however, there is little room for the electoral shenanigans that are 
common in many less democratic African countries.  
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Such electoral shenanigans have been extensively reported on in the case of African 
countries. For example, Africa Confidential reports that since President Bongo of 
Gabon was persuaded to share power with opposition following uncertain election 
results in 1993, “all credible opposition has been crushed or co-opted.” (Vol. 46, no. 
2:5). In Togo, the leaders of the main opposition to President Eyadéma were either in 
exile or had just got out of prison when elections took place (Vol. 43, no. 14:4). A 
similar example of unequal playing field is the latest election in Equatorial Guinea 
which was scheduled for 2010. However, in October 2009, President Obiang 
announced that elections would take place in November the same year, leaving 
opposition parties 45 days to campaign and the incumbent to win with 95 percent of 
the votes (Reuters, 2009, retrieved on 15 November 2010). In all these cases, 
democratic consolidation and institutionalisation of the state is lacking and, regardless 
of constitutional provisions, the ‘Big Man’ still manages to set the rules of the game. 
 
Note: Figure 3.4 uses data from Polity IV (democracy minus autocracy plus 10) for the years 1985-
2009. This index spans from 0 signifying no democracy, to 20 signifying the highest quality of 
democracy.   
 
Using average scores on democratic quality across African countries over time, figure 
3.4 above shows how the sub-continent became more democratic in the early 1990s 
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Figure 3.4: Average democracy score across 42 African countries over time
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and how this trend has fizzled out in later years. In fact, not much average 
improvements in democratic quality can be seen from mid-1990s onwards.  
 
In the statistical analysis in the next section, I use the Polity IV dataset to measure 
democratic quality and the institutionalisation of the state away from ‘Big Man’ rule. 
The choice of dataset that covers a large number of African countries over time was 
between the Polity IV and Freedom House’s dataset on political freedom and civil 
liberties and I would argue that Polity IV is more in line with the theoretical reasoning 
offered here to why high democratic quality would go against ‘Big Man’ rule. The 
Polity IV dataset offers a minimalist definition of democracy (Munck and Verkuilen, 
2002) and “intends to reflect institutional characteristics of a country’s government, 
particularly how open and competitive are the processes for selecting chief 
executives.” (Knack, 2004:255). It specifically includes an attribute called ‘constraints 
on executive’ which deals with ‘who exercises power’ in the country and thereby 
touches upon democratic institutionalisation away from ‘Big Man’ rule. Freedom 
House’s dataset on democracy, on the other hand, offers a maximalist definition of 
democracy, including attributes such as socioeconomic rights, freedom from gross 
socioeconomic inequalities, property rights and freedom from war (Munck and 
Verkuilen, 2002:9). These are many more attributes than the theoretical reasoning 
offered here can answer for. In addition, this maximalist definition of democratic 
quality also contains aspects of corruption which makes it a faulty independent 
variable in regressions where corruption constitutes the dependent variable (Rock, 
2009:61).  
 
Following Jensen and Wantchekon (2004:822), I use the Polity IV democracy score 
minus its autocracy score and rescale it by adding 10. The measure becomes an 
ordinal measure ranging from zero to 20 where the higher the value, the greater a 
country’s democratic quality. Some years in the sample are given the index score of -
77 (“interregnum, during which there is a complete collapse of central political 
authority”), or -88 (“period of transition”). In the index construction formula given 
above, these years receive a score of 10, which creates misleading variation in the 
variable. Therefore, I have added a dummy variable taking the value 1 during these 
troublesome years. I call this variable ‘political instability’. 
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Lederman et al. (2005) include two institutional variables in their analysis that may 
affect levels of grand corruption, both dealing with horizontal accountability induced 
by a country’s legislative branch. The weakness of horizontal accountability exercised 
by legislators goes to the heart of the notion of African ‘Big Man’ rule. Increased 
horizontal accountability may have ramification for a country’s level of grand 
corruption as the MPs would exercise their power to keep the executive in check. 
Lindberg’s (2010) unusually close look at the accountability mechanisms for 
members of parliament in Ghana, however, shows a definite lack of incentives for the 
MPs to exercise executive oversight due to the fact that they would risk losing out 
when the president uses his discretion to reward those MPs loyal to him. 
 
Lederman et al. (2005) use a dummy variable that indicates whether a country has a 
presidential system as opposed to a parliamentary or other system. According to the 
authors, parliamentary systems ought to have lower levels of corruption since their 
legislators can remove the executive more readily than in presidential systems. Most 
countries is sub-Saharan Africa have presidential systems. However, since there have 
been no within-country variation over time with regard to these systems, and since the 
statistical analysis in this study focuses on within-country variation in corruption, this 
variable does not lend itself to panel regression analysis. The second added variable of 
horizontal accountability from Lederman et al. (2005) is more time-variant. This is a 
dummy variable where the value 1 means that the executive’s party has control over 
all relevant chambers of the country’s legislature. If those legislators loyal to the 
executive do not exercise their political power vis-à-vis their own patron, as Lindberg 
(2010) finds, the legislators loyal to another party may well do so and affect the 
manoeuvring of the incumbent. It would thus be expected that the executive control 
dummy is associated with higher levels of corruption. Data for this variable is taken 
from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions.  
 
The final institutional control variable to be discussed here is one that distinguishes 
between governments which are formed by a coalition and those that are formed by 
one winning party. The intuition behind the inclusion of this variable goes back to the 
abovementioned statement by John Githongo about Kenya and how corruption has 
worked as the glue that has kept the power-sharing government together after the 
post-2007 crisis. This government solution, in turn, resulted from the contested 
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victory and tight vote margin in the 2007 election between President Mwai Kibaki 
and runner-up Raila Odinga. Looking at the data for grand corruption in 2008, it is 
indeed perceived to be slightly higher than in 2006. At the same time, the number of 
cabinet ministers increased from 33 in 2007 to 39 in 2008. The same story, in terms of 
tight vote margin and increase in cabinet size, can be seen from the post-2008 power 
sharing situation in Zimbabwe. From these two cases, it would seem that the coalition 
variable would correlate with both the political competition variable and that of grand 
corruption, and a failure to account for this could result in omitted variable bias. 
Using information about political party compositions in the cabinet obtained from 
annual volumes of Europa Publications Limited Africa South of the Sahara, I create a 
dummy variable where the value 1 means that there is more than one political party 
represented in the cabinet, i.e. the government is based on some form of political 
coalition.  
 
3.3.5 Other control variables 
Certain control variables have become standard to include in quantitative cross-
country analyses on corruption. National income is one of them. According to 
Treisman (2000:404), “economic development increases the spread of education, 
literacy, and depersonalized relationships – each of which should raise the odds that 
an abuse will be noticed and challenged.” Treisman finds variation in national income 
to be by far the greatest explanatory variable of variation in levels of corruption across 
countries. Using a mixture of rich and developing countries in his statistical sample, 
he finds that an increase in a country’s national income is associated with a decrease 
in levels of perceived corruption. Following Treisman, I measure national income by 
log GDP per capita PPP using data from the World Development Indicators online. 
Another standard control variable deals with degrees of ethnic diversity across 
countries. “The presence of many different ethnolinguistic groups is significantly 
associated with worse corruption, as bureaucrats may favour members of their same 
group.” (Mauro, 1995:693). Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997) find in 
their cross-section regression analyses empirical evidence that countries with higher 
degrees of ethnic diversity have higher levels of corruption. This variable is, however, 
largely time-invariant and does not render itself to panel regression analysis. In the 
statistical analysis, such structural country characteristics are instead controlled for 
using country fixed effects.  
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3.4 The effect of political competition on grand corruption 
Using the variables described in the previous section, I will in this section asses the 
proposition put forth in Section 3.2, that through the logic of prebendal politics, we 
are likely to see corruption increase when competition for the executive position 
increases. In short, the dependent variable is grand corruption, or specifically, 
perceived corruption in the country’s executive office. The two main independent 
variables of interest are political competition for the executive position, measured by 
the vote margin in the most recent election, and prebendal politics, measured by the 
size of a country’s cabinet. To test the effect political competition has on corruption in 
country i at time t, I use the following baseline model: 
Grand corruptioni,t = β1 (Vote margini,t) + β2 (Cabinet sizei,t) + β3 (Controlsi,t) + 
Country i + εi,t                                                                                                                                                       
(1) 
The regression models in table 3.2 below use alternative estimators including random 
effects and country fixed effects.
13
 The fixed effects estimator controls for country-
specific characteristics, such as ethnic diversity mentioned above. A lagged dependent 
variable is included in model 7 to account for the path dependency of levels of 
corruption and model 8 uses the Arellano-Bond’s (1991) generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimator to control for the same path dependency as well as likely 
endogeneity among some of the independent variables.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 
According to the Hausman test, both random effects and fixed effects are applicable. I therefore 
include both specifications (pooled and fixed effects).  
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Table 3.2: Explaining variation in grand corruption  
Independent variables: Pooled OLS 
(Afrobarometer)  
(1) 
Fixed effects  
OLS 
(Afrobarometer ) 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(Afrobarometer ) 
(3) 
Fixed effects  
OLS  
(Afrobarometer)  
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(ICRG) 
(5) 
Fixed effects  
OLS (ICRG) 
(6) 
Fixed effects  
OLS  
(ICRG) 
(7) 
 
Arrelano-
Bond 
(ICRG) 
 (8) 
Grand corruption t-1 
 
      0.82*** 
(0.03) 
0.81*** 
(0.04) 
Vote margin 
 
-0.00   
(0.00)     
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
Cabinet size 
 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Democratic quality 
 
  0.06 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
Democratic quality (squared)   -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Political instability 
 
  NA NA -0.22 
(0.29) 
-0.09 
(0.29) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.20* 
(0.11) 
Legislative control by 
executive’s party 
 
  0.05 
(0.09) 
0.15 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(0.25) 
-0.15 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
Coalition government 
 
  -0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.09 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.14) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.19** 
(0.08) 
Log GDP per capita PPP 
 
  0.07 
(0.15) 
0.94 
(0.74) 
0.80 
(0.51) 
2.61* 
(1.35) 
0.69 
(0.61) 
0.43 
(0.46) 
Fixed effects NO YES NO YES NO YES YES NO 
R-square 0.18 0.11 0.36 0.21 0.04 0.12 0.73  
Number of observations 54 54 48 48 420 420 400 367 
Number of countries 18 18 16 16 27 27 27 27 
 
Note: In models 1 to 4, the dependent variable is levels of perceived corruption in the country’s executive office, and in models 5 to 8 the ICRG corruption index is the 
dependent variable. An increase in the value of the dependent variables means an increase in the perceived level of corruption. The parentheses for models 1 to 7 contain 
robust standard errors clustered by country and model 8 uses GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991).  * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.2 above shows the results from the eight different regression models using 
two different corruption indices as dependent variables (Afrobarometer and ICRG). 
The results indicate that an increase in the vote margin (i.e. a decrease in de facto 
political competition) is associated with neither a decrease nor an increase in levels of 
grand corruption. However, the degree of democratic quality in a country, proxied by 
the Polity IV democracy index, shows some statistical significance. The signs of the 
variables (positive in value and negative in squared value) resemble those found by 
Monitola and Jackman (2002) and Rock (2009) and indicate that democratic quality 
correlates with levels of grand corruption in a non-linear way, i.e. the correlation has 
the shape of an inverted U-curve. Compared to autocratic regimes, low quality 
democratic regimes (neopatrimonial or hybrid) are burdened with higher levels of 
grand corruption while, in countries with high degree of democratic quality, a further 
improvement correlates with lower levels of grand corruption.  
 
Turning to the independent variables called ‘cabinet size’, table 3.2 confirms that 
prebendal politics is indeed positively associated with grand corruption. An increase 
in a country’s cabinet size is associated with higher levels of grand corruption across 
the different regression specifications. 
 
The statistical analyses thus far have rendered support for the proposition that there is 
a positive correlation between prebendal politics and levels of grand corruption. 
However, we have yet to establish that there is an association between political 
competition and the distribution of prebends. For this task, the dependent variable 
changes from levels of grand corruption to prebendal politics, which I again proxy by 
cabinet size. The main independent variable continues to be political competition 
proxied by vote margin and the regression equation is the following:  
Cabinet sizei,t = β1 (Vote margini,t) + β2 (Controlsi,t) + Country i + εi,t                                 (2) 
The time series span the period from 1985 to 2010 and the maximum number of sub-
Saharan African countries in the sample is 40, making the number of observations 
much larger than was possible in the regression analyses on corruption. Table 3.3 
below shows the result from the panel regression analyses. The results from the first 
two models indicate that an increase in the vote margin of the last presidential 
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election, meaning a decrease in de facto political competition, is correlated with a 
decrease in the cabinet size. Put differently, the tougher the competitive environment, 
the larger the cabinet size. This finding supports the proposition that, when faced with 
political competition, the incumbent turns to prebendal politics, i.e. buying elite 
support with state resources.  
 
When the rest of the variables are included, however, this correlation loses its 
statistical significance, which may, in turn, be due to the close correlation between 
political competition measured by vote margin, and the Polity IV proxy for 
democratic quality (R-square 0.32). Similarly to the results from the regressions on 
grand corruption, the level of democratic quality in a country is associated with 
prebendal politics in a non-linear way: in the form of an inverted U-curve. The results 
show that, ceteris paribus, compared to autocratic regimes, regimes scoring low in the 
democratic quality index (neopatrimonial or hybrid) distribute more prebends.  
However, as a country reaches a certain level of democratic quality – or 
institutionalisation of the state – the use of prebendal politics decreases. 
84 
 
Table 3.3: Political competition and prebendal politics  
 
Independent variables: Pooled OLS  
(1) 
Fixed effects OLS 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
 
Fixed effects OLS 
(4) 
Fixed effects OLS 
(5) 
Arrelano-Bond 
 (6) 
Cabinet size t-1 
 
    0.71*** 
(0.03) 
0.69*** 
(0.03) 
Vote margin 
 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
Democratic quality 
 
  0.90* 
(0.46) 
0.85* 
(0.47) 
0.30 
(0.19) 
0.49** 
(0.20) 
Democratic quality 
(squared) 
 
  -0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
Political instability 
 
  -2.09 
(1.47) 
-2.00 
(1.46) 
-1.31** 
(0.63) 
-1.79*** 
(0.69) 
Coalition government 
 
  1.74 
(1.55) 
1.68 
(1.57) 
1.02 
(0.65) 
1.30** 
(0.55) 
Log GDP per capita PPP 
 
  4.84*** 
(1.87) 
6.75*** 
(2.09) 
1.89** 
(0.88) 
9.25*** 
(2.11) 
Fixed effects 
 
NO YES NO YES YES NO 
R-square 
 
0.0 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.58  
Number of observations 
 
1021 1021 875 875 841 804 
Number of countries 
 
 
40 40 36 36 36 36 
 
Note: The dependent variable is number of cabinet ministers. The parentheses for models 1 to 5 contain robust standard errors clustered by country and model 6 uses GMM 
of Arellano and Bond (1991. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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A calculation of the outcome from regression model 3 in table 3.3, fixing all 
independent variables at their mean values, predicts that the critical point where this 
inverted u-shaped association turns is at a Polity IV index value of 15. As figure 3.4 
above showed, the average democratic quality score across African countries was 
short of 13 out of 20 in 2009. Thus, a score of 15 out of 20 is at a rather high 
democratic level and only 20 countries in the sample of 40 countries had in 2009 
managed to reach a value of 15 or above.14 
 
In terms of the added control variables, the results show that an increase in a country’s 
income, all else equal, increases the distribution of prebends. That an increase in 
prosperity further fuels such clientelistic behaviour is completely counterintuitive 
from a backdrop of Western experiences and propositions coming from modernisation 
theories and may be an indication that the African development path will not follow 
that of Western liberal democracies.  
 
The result thus far has shown that, at low levels of democratic quality, an incumbent 
responds to augmented political competition by increasing the use of prebendal 
politics, which in turn is associated with higher levels of grand corruption. However, 
one piece of the hypothesised picture has thus far been missing and that is the 
question of timing. When does the incumbent resort to handing out prebends? 
Following the discussion above, it would make sense for the incumbent to make sure 
he takes care of the elite loyalty as an election draws closer. In that case, we would 
expect an increase in distributed prebends, proxied again by cabinet size, prior to a 
presidential election. It is also plausible that an increase in cabinet size could be the 
result from post-election elite bargaining and political settlements. Table 3.4 below 
shows the result from a regression analysis using a set of time dummy variables for a 
25 year period (1985-2010) to explain variations in the use of prebendal politics in 
accordance with a country’s election cycle.15 The categories called ‘Election-2’ and 
‘Election-1’ constitute the two years directly preceding all presidential elections; the 
category ‘Election year’ marks the actual year of all presidential elections; and the 
                                                 
14
 Benin; Botswana; Burundi; Cape Verde; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Ghana; Guinea-Bissau; 
Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Malawi; Mali; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; Senegal; Sierra Leone; 
South Africa, and Zambia.  
15 This statistical strategy loosely follows from Khemani’s (2004) research on election cycles and 
economic policy in India. 
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two years after all presidential elections are noted as ‘Election+1’ and ‘Election+2’.
16
 
‘All other years’, referring to years outside of election cycles and thus exempt from 
political competition, constitute the reference category.  
 
Table 3.4: Prebendal politics as a political strategy 
 
Election cycle reference category: all other years   
 
Fixed effects 
OLS 
(1) 
 
Fixed effects 
OLS 
(2) 
 
Election -2 
 
2.35** 
(1.02) 
1.71 
(0.18) 
Election -1 
 
2.28** 
(0.99) 
1.63 
(1.06) 
Election year 
 
2.35** 
(1.05) 
1.43 
(1.17) 
Election +1 
 
2.35** 
(1.05) 
1.62 
(1.23) 
Election +2 
 
2.52** 
(1.11) 
1.46 
(1.24) 
Vote margin 
 
 -0.03** 
(0.01) 
Fixed effects 
 
YES YES 
R-square 
 
0.04 0.07  
Number of observations 
 
931 931 
Number of countries 
 
39 39 
 
Note: The dependent variable is number of cabinet ministers. The reference value for the categorical 
variables is the category ‘all other years’. The parentheses contain robust standard errors clustered by 
country. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The statistical results from table 3.4 show that the years within normal election cycles 
are associated with greater use of prebendal politics than years that are further from 
elections, and little difference in prebendal distribution exists within the standard 
election cycles. However, when controlling for the degree of political competition, 
again proxied by vote margins, the difference in cabinet size within and outside 
regular election cycles disappear. In short, this result once again highlights that when 
faced with political competition in the form of elections, the executive rationally 
choses to resort to prebendal politics in order to ensure electoral victory. 
                                                 
16 
This categorisation requires that a country’s election cycle is five years long which is the most 
common length of the election cycles across sub-Saharan Africa although both shorter and longer 
elections cycles exist. In a few cases where the electoral cycle is only four years long, I have skipped 
the ‘Election +2’ dummy, and in the very few cases where the election cycle is constitutionally set at six 
or seven years, the two years in between are scrapped from the sample.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
On the backdrop of disappointing outcomes in the fight against corruption across sub-
Saharan Africa during the past 20 years of multi-party democratic regimes, this 
analysis takes a closer look at the proposed link between political competition for a 
country’s executive office and levels of corruption. According to well-regarded 
theories in the corruption literature, political competition is a key component in 
ensuring political accountability and a polity free of extensive corruption. The 
theories propose that since the incumbent can be replaced if he or she loses the favour 
of the electorate, political competition ensures that the preferences of the incumbent 
and the electorate are aligned. Hence, the more competitive the political environment, 
the lower is the likelihood that the incumbent will get away with high levels of 
corruption. While this proposition is highly plausible in the context of Western liberal 
democracies, in the political context of sub-Saharan Africa where voter behaviour 
tend to follow a slightly different logic, the proposed accountability mechanism does 
not stand up to statistical scrutiny. Instead, political competition for the executive 
office in countries characterised by ‘Big Man’ rule help increase levels of corruption. 
It does so by letting the incumbent buy elite support through the distribution of 
prebends, which in turn, gives the office holder opportunities to illicitly enrich himself 
on behalf of the state. 
 
I use cross-section time-series regression analysis on a sample of sub-Saharan African 
countries to test the effect of political competition on the extent of corruption. Levels 
of corruption are quantified from the result of the Afrobarometer survey question of 
perceived extent of corruption in the country’s executive office. As such, the 
corruption variable measures grand corruption as opposed to petty corruption and is 
linked, to a greater extent than composite corruption indices, to the actions taken by 
the incumbent when facing political competition. The statistical analysis renders 
statistically significant support for the proposition that an increase in political 
competition is associated with an increase in the use of prebendal politics. An increase 
in the distribution of prebends is, in turn, associated with an increase in corruption. In 
addition, the results show that, all else equal, such prebendal politics is likely to 
continue until a country reaches a relatively high level of democratic quality. Whether 
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the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are heading that way or are stuck in a path of ‘Big 
Man’ rule is however beyond the scope of this research to answer.  
 
What the statistical analyses show, for certain, is that the theoretical propositions 
linking political competition with good governance and accountability have thus far 
not been valid in explaining the phenomenon of corruption in the multi-party 
democratic political environment in sub-Saharan Africa. In turn, this finding points to 
the need for researchers and development practitioners alike to remain context 
sensitive and avoid the pitfall of supposing that assumptions that are valid in the 
context of Western liberal democracies, which is the home base for most research as 
well as policy formulation with regard to corruption and anti-corruption, are valid by 
default in the context of sub-Saharan African countries.    
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Annex: Summary of data 
 
Table 3.5: Data used in regressions on grand corruption 
 
Country and year Perceived  
level of 
corruption in  
the executive’s 
office 
Vote margin  
in most 
recent 
election 
Cabinet 
size 
Polity IV 
electoral 
quality  
score  
 
 
Log GDP per 
capita PPP 
Benin (2005) 2.69 18.3 21 16 3.12 
Benin (2008) 2.25 11.56 24 17 3.13 
Botswana (2003) 2.12 31.20 15 18 4.05 
Botswana (2005) 1.99 25.67 16 18 4.07 
Botswana (2008) 1.64 25.67 17 18 4.11 
Burkina Faso (2008) 2.17 75.47 29 10 3.03 
Ghana (2002) 1.65 13.80 19 16 3.04 
Ghana (2005) 2.03 7.81 19 18 3.08 
Ghana (2008) 2.07 7.81 33 18 3.14 
Kenya (2003) 1.81 30.90 24 18 3.10 
Kenya (2005) 2.27 30.90 29 18 3.13 
Kenya (2008) 2.32 2.35 39 17 3.16 
Lesotho (2003) 1.84 32.48 17 18 3.07 
Lesotho (2005) 1.61 32.48 18 18 3.08 
Lesotho (2008) 1.93 33.33 19 18 3.12 
Liberia (2008) 2.40 18.80 23 16 2.55 
Madagascar (2005) 1.82 15.56 19 17 2.95 
Madagascar (2008) 1.82 43.14 18 17 2.99 
Malawi (2003) 2.44 7.20 28 15 2.79 
Malawi (2005) 2.08 8.80 21 16 2.80 
Malawi (2008) 1.99 8.80 21 16 2.87 
Mali (2002) 2.42 7.40 21 17 2.96 
Mali (2005) 2.13 7.40 29 17 2.99 
Mali (2008) 2.53 52.05 27 17 3.02 
Mozambique (2002) 1.97 4.58 24 15 2.77 
Mozambique (2005) 1.72 32.00 26 15 2.82 
Mozambique (2008) 1.95 32.00 26 15 2.89 
Namibia (2002) 1.85 66.33 21 16 3.68 
Namibia (2003) 1.79 66.33 22 16 3.69 
Namibia (2006) 1.94 69.16 23 16 3.75 
Namibia (2008) 1.90 69.16 24 16 3.78 
Nigeria (2001) 2.44 25.56 33 14 3.17 
Nigeria (2003) 2.70 29.75 33 14 3.19 
Nigeria 2005) 2.78 29.75 30 14 3.24 
Nigeria (2007) 2.67 50.94 22 14 3.27 
Nigeria (2008) 2.48 50.94 21 14 3.29 
Senegal (2002) 1.99 10.29 24 18 3.17 
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Senegal (2005) 2.05 10.29 38 18 3.21 
Senegal (2008) 2.42 40.98 30 17 3.22 
South Africa (2002) 1.88 56.79 28 19 3.90 
South Africa (2004) 1.97 57.32 29 19 3.92 
South Africa (2006) 2.08 57.32 29 19 3.95 
South Africa (2008) 1.97 57.32 29 19 3.98 
Tanzania (2003) 1.86 55.48 24 9 2.99 
Tanzania (2005) 1.67 55.48 29 9 3.03 
Tanzania (2008) 1.92 68.60 28 9 3.08 
Uganda (2002) 2.39 42.05 23 6 2.91 
Uganda (2005) 2.26 42.05 22 9 2.95 
Uganda (2008) 2.53 21.87 26 9 3.03 
Zambia (2003) 2.16 1.95 22 15 3.03 
Zambia (2005) 2.35 1.95 22 15 3.05 
Zambia (2008) 2.36 1.99 23 17 3.10 
Zimbabwe (2005) 2.50 14.20 32 6 . 
Zimbabwe (2009) 2.69 4.63 40 11 . 
 
Mean values   
(this sample) 
 
2.16 
 
34.55 
 
25 
 
15.55 
 
3.19 
Mean values  
(sub-Saharan Africa) 
X 37.57 27 12.89 3.18 
 
Note: the data sources are described in section 3.3. The calculations of mean values for this sample of 
20 countries are based on data for 2008. The mean values for sub-Saharan Africa are calculated using 
data from 2008 on 40 countries.  
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4. Coffee and Corruption: Economic Liberalisation and the 
Transformation of Political Corruption in Rwanda 
 
 
Abstract 
Following decades of international pushing for a decrease of the state’s role in the 
domestic economy in developing countries, this analysis looks at what happens to 
corruption in light of widespread economic liberalisation in a sub-Saharan African 
political context. Applying theoretical insights from the literature on sub-Saharan 
African neopatrimonialism to a country case study of Rwanda, I focus on forms of 
state intervention in the economy and associated forms of corruption during an 
interventionist regime compared to a pro-market regime. The analysis particularly 
draws on insights from the Rwandan coffee sector. The findings suggest that with 
economic liberalisation, state intervention in the form of prebendalism and associated 
corruption has decreased. However, as the informal institutions of ‘Big Man’ and 
winner-takes-all politics have not changed across time, the incumbent elite has had to 
continue manipulating economic opportunities in order to ensure its continued 
political incumbency. It has done so by moving from predominantly sharing slices of 
the state (through prebendalism) to mainly allocating slices of the (on paper) free 
market to political loyalists. As a consequence, there has been a transformation of 
political corruption following economic liberalisation towards covert and intertwined 
relationships between politics and business. While the new type of political corruption 
may have dire consequences for political stability, it does not appear to have had the 
negative effect on economic growth or investment that theories on corruption would 
predict. 
 
Keywords: corruption, economic liberalisation, Rwanda, sub-Saharan Africa 
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4.1  Introduction  
Corruption, most popularly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain, took 
centre stage in development policy when the international community initiated its 
anti-corruption agenda in the mid-1990s. Since then, the causes of corruption as well 
as its negative effects on development-related indicators have been widely theorised 
and empirically analysed. This work has led to certain commonly held beliefs about 
what institutional structures are prone to cause extensive corruption.  
 
One institutional structure that is widely believed to cause high levels of corruption in 
developing countries is the state’s direct involvement in the national economy. As a 
consequence, the international community has pushed for structural change in the way 
developing country governments manage their countries’ economic resources through 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation of the market. This neo-liberal and 
market-focused policy agenda, originating from academic research on corruption and 
rent-seeking, remains intact also after the birth of the good governance and anti-
corruption agendas in the 1990s. To this end, both the World Bank and the IMF have 
made statements proclaiming that a decrease in the government’s ability to intervene 
in the private market will lessen levels of corruption in developing countries (Hopkin 
and Rodriguez-Pose, 2007; World Bank, 1997:105). In the words of a prominent IMF 
economist: “…corruption will be reduced mainly in those countries where 
governments are willing to substantially reduce some of their functions.” (Tanzi, 
2000:133). And “the best policy to reduce corruption will be a reduction of the 
opportunities to engage in it by scaling down the government’s role in the economy.” 
(Ibid:100). On the backdrop of this extensive economic liberalisation policy agenda, 
this chapter concerns the effect economic liberalisation has had on corruption in the 
sub-Saharan African political context.  
 
The neo-liberal distrust for the state has its origin in the rent-seeking literature that 
started with Krueger (1974) and argued that state intervention in the economy 
resulted in rent-seeking and thereby economic inefficiencies and lack of development. 
The solution was simply to remove the state from the economy. The economics 
literature particularly sees corruption flourishing where state interventions disrupt 
competition in the market place by creating rents which people will seek to obtain 
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through bribing those officials responsible for upholding the market regulations. “The 
economist’s natural approach to corruption control is to appeal to the concept of 
competition as it is argued that bribes are harder to sustain where perfect competition 
prevails.” (Ades and Di Tella, 1999: 982). According to Coolidge and Rose-
Ackerman (1997:4), more competitive economies have less corruption because they 
have fewer economic rents available for capture by corrupt agents. “Thus policies that 
lower controls on foreign trade, remove entry barriers for private industry, and 
privatise state firms in a way that assures competition will all contribute to the fight 
against corruption.” (Rose-Ackerman, 1997:51). In short, according to these 
propositions, corruption will be weeded out as a result of the removal of direct state 
interference in the market and insurance from the government that it will uphold 
perfect competition in the market place. In terms of empirical evidence, Ades and Di 
Tella (1999) found in their cross-country statistical analysis that corruption is higher 
in countries with less market competition and Hopkin and Rodriguez-Pose (2007) 
found in their regression analysis of OECD countries that state intervention in the 
economy can be a powerful predictor of corruption.  
 
While the economics literature has been highly influential in shaping policy and 
conventional wisdom regarding the best way to weed out corruption, its theoretical 
proposition has one shortcoming: it disregards politics. By assuming that a state’s 
withdrawal from the market restores perfect market competition, it disregards the fact 
that the market place is not an apolitical environment in less developed countries, 
such as the vast majority of sub-Saharan African countries where, as I will discuss 
below, the governments have powerful incentives to intervene in the economy. North 
et al. (2007:9) argue that for countries in which rent-creation for political survival 
dictates the political logic, political and economic opportunities are naturally closely 
held by the political leadership and no private organisations, neither economic nor 
political and separated from the sanction of the state are allowed. Similarly, 
Hutchcroft (1997:641) states that “the allocation [of rents] is likely to be based not 
only on the market but also on a range of non-market considerations, including ethnic, 
regional, party, and old-school ties. Politics, not the market, provides the best clues to 
these processes.” Finally, Szeftel (1998:233/234) argues, on the issue of economic 
liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa that “it is also clear that liberalisation creates a set 
of new problems while not always eradicating the old sources of dishonesty. The use 
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of patronage and bureaucratic ‘rent-seeking’ has not been ended by market reforms; 
rather they have been joined by new kinds of graft.”   
 
Because of these political considerations, the neo-liberal theories where the corruption 
opportunity tap can be turned on and off with the presence or absence of state 
intervention may work as a framework for considering corruption in its micro-form by 
looking at isolated government programmes, but they leave much to be considered 
from a macro-political perspective. Using insight from the literature on 
neopatrimonialism in Africa, the analysis in this chapter aims to shed light on what 
happens to corruption when the state formally withdraws its involvement in the 
economy. It suggests that the political rationale state intervention in the economy fills 
does not change as long as the informal institutions governing political life, such as 
‘Big Man’ and winner-takes-all politics, remain intact. Therefore, as opposed to 
eliminating corruption, economic liberalisation, in a context where such informal 
institutions prevail, rather transforms it. The case study on Rwanda under two 
different political regimes, one proclaiming heavy state intervention and the other 
being pro-market, illustrates this case.  
 
Rwanda can be considered an ideal case for studying corruption and economic 
liberalisation, having experienced large variation over time in both variables. The 
country has experienced large-scale economic liberalisation, and since the end of the 
1990s, nearly all the country’s state-owned enterprises have been privatised (Booth 
and Golooba-Mutebi, 2011:12). According to the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World Index on business regulations, which was used by Hopkin and 
Rodriguez-Pose (2007) to measure state intervention in the economy in their study on 
corruption in OECD countries, Rwanda received the highest score in 2008 of all 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Having previously had highly interventionist 
economic policies, such high scores from this free-market advocating think-tank 
indicate that the country has experienced a large decrease in the degree of state 
intervention in the economy. In addition, Rwanda was in 2009 nominated as the 
world’s top business reformer by the World Bank’s Doing Business Index. 
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Note: The index spans the values -2.5 to 2.5 where the higher the value, the lower the level of 
perceived corruption. Source: World Bank, Control of Corruption Index, Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. 
In terms of changes in corruption levels, figure 4.1 above shows the level of perceived 
corruption in Rwanda relative to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The horizontal 
axis shows perceived levels of corruption from the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption Index from 2010 and the further to the right a country is placed in the 
figure, the lower is its level of perceived corruption. The success stories from this 
dimension are Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius and Rwanda. The vertical axis 
instead depicts countries’ variation in perceived corruption over time (between 1998 
and 2010). The further to the top of the graph the country is located, the larger 
decrease in perceived corruption the country has experienced during this period of 
time. Rwanda is clearly a success story in this regard, together with Liberia and Cape 
Verde.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: in section 4.2, I discuss the linkages between 
state intervention in the economy and corruption, as well as the political rationale 
underlying state intervention in the sub-Saharan African political context. In the 
subsequent Rwandan case study analysis in section 4.3, I start by applying the 
political rationale for intervening in the market to the country’s two most recent 
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Figure 4.1: Rwanda - a sub-Saharan African success story
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regimes and continue by analysing how and to what extent the forms of state 
intervention in the economy as well as corruption have changed in the light of 
economic liberalisation. An in-depth case study of Rwanda’s coffee sector in section 
4.4 provides additional insights into the association between formal economic 
institutions and corruption. Section 4.5 forms a conclusion. 
 
4.2  The politics of state intervention in the economy in sub-Saharan 
Africa  
Before offering an analysis on economic liberalisation and corruption in Rwanda, I 
will in this section present a theoretical framework on how, in the context of sub-
Saharan African countries, state intervention in the economy is linked to corruption, 
and what political rationale underpins state intervention in the economy. This 
theoretical framework will help approach the question of what happens to corruption 
in the light of widespread economic liberalisation? Does it vanish as proposed by 
theories found in the economics literature and popularly advocated by the 
international financial institutions and donor community, or is something else at play? 
 
4.2.1 State intervention and its link to corruption 
To start with, it is appropriate to set out what state intervention in the economy 
implies in the context of Rwanda and sub-Saharan Africa more generally, and how 
this is linked to corruption. The concept of prebends and prebendal politics will guide 
this discussion. According to van de Walle (2012:113), patron-client politics in Africa 
is characteristic by prebendalism, which is the strategic political allocation of public 
offices to key elites, granting personal access over state resources. This is opposed to 
broader patronage-based reward systems found in other developing and many 
developed countries. In the words of van de Walle (2012:114): “Hiring a member of 
one’s ethnic group to a senior position in the customs office is an example of 
patronage. Allowing the customs officer to use the position for personal enrichment 
by manipulating import and export taxes is an example of a prebend.”  
 
The reference to prebends have its origins in describing offices in feudal states that 
could be obtained in recognition of services rendered to a noble person, or through 
outright purchase, and then utilised to generate income for the holder of such office 
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(Keller, 1996:214). Since Richard Joseph introduced the concept of prebends or 
prebendal politics in the African context in his political analyses of Nigeria, the 
concept has seen wider usage in the literature on African politics. Joseph refers 
prebendal to “patterns of political behaviour which reflect as their justifying principle 
that the offices of the existing state may be competed for and then utilised for the 
personal benefit of office-holders as well as that of their reference or support group.” 
(Joseph, 1983:30).  
 
Prebends largely result in two different types of jobs: jobs in state-owned enterprises, 
and jobs in public offices, ranging from ministers to low-ranking bureaucrats. What 
connects these jobs and make them prebends is that extra-legal wealth can be 
generated from them. In terms of state-owned enterprises, van de Walle (1994:133) 
argues that “these enterprises create a large number of (not necessarily well-paying) 
‘jobs for the boys’ plus a few lucrative positions of power and prestige for the ruler’s 
political allies.” On the top of the political hierarchy, the political aristocracy are 
rewarded with prebendal control over public offices as public resources are privatised 
to the benefit of the presidential loyalists (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:66). 
Examples of such allocation of lucrative positions in state-owned enterprises are 
found, for example, in MacGaffey’s (1987:46-48) analysis on Zaire under President 
Mobuto. When the government took over all large-scale commercial, agricultural and 
industrial enterprises in the country, the directors of these new state-owned entities, 
having been appointed by the president, ended up being current or former politicians 
or their friends. Szeftel (2000:213), in his analysis on Zambia, found that access to 
parastatal employment was more lucrative than access to a government office and 
much more profitable than being part of the private sector.  
 
Public offices may also come with the possibility for generating extra-judicial 
income, especially if the office holder has responsibility for upholding regulations. 
Cumbersome regulations can in fact be seen as evidence that prebends have been 
allocated “as corrupt officials seek to extend regulations in order to create and extract 
even greater rents.” (Hopkin and Rodriguez-Pose, 2007: 10-11). Prebends in the form 
of jobs in non-production-related public offices may also be privately hugely 
lucrative. In Benin, for example, it was found that the average customs agent, being 
employed by the state, had daily ‘parallel income’ equivalent to two and a half times 
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the monthly salary of a college professor (Bako-Arifari, 2001:41, referenced in van de 
Walle, 2007:56).  
 
Since prebends come with personal benefits to the office holders which surpass the 
normal salary, they are closely linked to corruption. In fact, Joseph (2003:162) refers 
to ‘prebendal appropriation’ as ‘the exploitation of public offices for private gain’ 
which has the same ring to it as the standard definition of corruption being ‘the abuse 
of public office for private gain’. Since corruption can take many forms, it is useful to 
distinguish political corruption (also known as grand corruption) from petty 
corruption (also referred to as bureaucratic corruption) in terms of prebendalism. In 
short, the distribution of prebends by the top of the political hierarchy most closely 
corresponds to the definition of political corruption. Political corruption “usually 
takes the form of favouritism and patronage politics [and] includes a favouritist and 
politically motivated distribution of financial and material inducements, benefits, 
advantages, and spoils.” (U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre, website last visited on 
5 May 2011). The use of prebends, on the other hand, produces private benefits to the 
office holder and thereby corresponds more closely to the concept of petty corruption. 
What is important to note, however, is that the type of corruption linked to prebends 
is part of a specific reward system in which slices of the state, or the spoils of the 
state, is allocated on a personal basis.  
 
Seeing corruption as being clearly linked to the way in which the state intervenes in 
the market through the use of prebends, it would be reasonable to expect that 
corruption would disappear if the possibility to allocate prebends disappeared. In 
other words, a decrease in the state’s direct involvement in the market through state-
owned enterprises as well as an easing of the regulatory burden imposed by the state 
on the market would signify a decrease in the use of prebends, which should also lead 
to a decrease in corruption. In short, economic liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulations, all being part of the neo-liberal anti-corruption consensus, ought to 
produce a significant dent in levels of corruption. However, before buying into this 
line of thinking we need to accept that there may be a political rationale to state 
intervention in the economy. As argued by van de Walle (1994:133): “African rulers 
have favoured state intervention in the economy because the resources it generates to 
the state facilitate the consolidation and maintenance of political power.” The key 
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therefore is to see what effect, if any, market liberalisation has on changing the 
political rationale of corruption-related state intervention in the economy.  
 
4.2.2 The political rationale for state intervention in the economy  
The political arena in African countries is popularly looked at through the theoretical 
lens of neopatrimonialism. This signifies a mixed system of patrimonialism and 
rational-legal systems in which a country’s informal institutions function according to 
patron-client relations while, at the same time, its formal institutions are constructed 
along rational-legal lines. In other words, it refers to African countries having adopted 
the same types of institutions found in Western democracies, e.g. property rights, 
whilst, on top of this, the real politics is conducted through informal institutions. 
While the informal institutions are where the real politics take place, they have often 
been ignored by scholars in favour of focusing on formal institutions. To understand 
the political rationale of state intervention in the economy, however, we need to focus 
on the informal institutions.   
 
One such informal institution that is of interest here is that of ‘big man politics’ and 
‘personal rule’ (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; van de Walle, 2012), which refers to 
power across Africa being personalised and disproportionately in the hands of the 
‘Big Men’ which are usually the presidents. A ‘Big Man’ is “literally above the law, 
controls in many cases a large proportion of state finance with little accountability, 
and delegates remarkably little of his authority on important matters.” (van de Walle, 
2003:310). Because a country’s economic resources are largely under the control of 
the ‘Big Man’ and his entourage, “political power is the origin of wealth and the state 
is the pie that everyone greedily wants to eat.” (Médard, 1982:182). Several Africanist 
scholars have highlighted the association between political power and economic 
possibilities in Africa. “Where resources are scarce, the object of political contestation 
is to secure economic consumption, which in turn is best guaranteed by capturing the 
state.” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:37). According to Bayart (1993:89), the 
struggle for power in Africa is perhaps chiefly the struggle for wealth, and Oketch and 
Polzer (2002:104), in their political analysis of Burundi, likewise state that “control 
over the state and political power is synonymous with control over economic 
opportunity, individually and as an elite group.” The competition for the ‘Big Men’ 
positions, being coupled with such extensive power, are naturally fierce and 
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characterised by winner-takes-all in a way that is alien to political competition in 
Western democracies. Hyden (2006:99) calls these political games zero-sum and a 
recent book on Kenyan ethnic politics and corruption by Wrong (2009) captures this 
zero-sum politics well in its title ‘It’s Our Turn to Eat’.  
 
Consequently, the type of state intervention in the economy characterised by 
prebendal politics and associated corruption is linked to this high-staked battle over 
the presidency and the resources of the state. To become a ‘Big Man’ as well as to 
sustain the elite clientelist loyalty networks require the personal generation and 
distribution of a considerable amount of resources. Chabal and Daloz (1999:15) 
describe this logic in the following way: “the legitimacy of the African political 
elite… derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests.” 
Seen in the light of this informal institution, state intervention in the economy through 
prebends, being in fact targeted distribution of state resources to certain individuals, 
fills an important function in securing the ‘Big Man’s continued power over the state. 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997:66) argue that “the fact that political authority [rests] 
on selective allocation of state resources to individuals [creates] powerful incentive 
for extensive regulation of economic activity, through which the incumbent elite 
[gains] control over a wide range of monopolies and economic rents.” Boone 
(1990:428) states these points in the following way: “While patterns of state 
intervention in domestic economies and the distribution of state resources have 
enriched political classes by design and by default, they have simultaneously served 
other political purposes. State allocation of resources has worked to promote the 
consolidation of weak and loosely-integrated regimes, create social bases of support 
for those regimes, penalise and marginalise opponents of the status quo, and give 
regimes some claim to legitimacy.” 
 
To sum up, there is a political rationale to state intervention in the economy. It 
enables the ‘Big Man’ and its political entourage to redistribute spoils from the state 
and thereby gain legitimacy and loyalty from those who benefit from this 
redistribution. In fact, prebendal politics and consequent corruption fills an important 
role in ensuring continued political power in a context of oftentimes zero-sum 
political games.  
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Having discussed the political rationale for state intervention in the economy in the 
sub-Saharan African political context, it is worth looking back to the neo-liberal 
propositions on corruption and state intervention in the economy which argue that the 
best way to fight corruption is to remove the state from the equation. From the 
discussion in this section, it is unlikely that reality looks as simple as the cause and 
effect proposed by the economics theories mentioned above, especially as a removal 
of the state’s ability to use these interventionist tools could endanger the ‘Big Man’ 
and ruling elite’s prospects of holding onto power. Seen in this light, it is implausible 
to think that any ‘Big Man’ in power would voluntarily give up the possibility of 
using prebends by prescribing to the neo-liberal policy packages of liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation. However, the fact that the World Bank’s structural 
adjustment programmes starting in the 1980s more or less forced African countries to 
prescribe to neo-liberal reform packages means that most African countries have to 
varying degrees changed the formal institutions governing their state-market relations. 
The interesting question therefore concerns what tools, if any, these ‘Big Men’ use, 
post-liberalisation, instead of prebends to distribute benefits for political survival and 
whether these tools are linked to corruption. The next section will analyse this 
question in the light of Rwandan recent history.  
 
4.3  State intervention and corruption in Rwanda 
By comparing two different regimes in Rwanda, one interventionist and one pro-
market, I aim to shed light on the question of how economic liberalisation from heavy 
state regulation and ownership has affected corruption. I focus on the country’s two 
most recent regimes: the pre-genocide and largely interventionist regime under 
President Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994), and the post-genocide largely 
liberalised regime under the leadership of Vice-president and later President Paul 
Kagame (1994-present). An in-depth analysis of the country’s coffee sector, having 
constituted the largest economic sector in Rwanda, helps shed further light on the 
question at hand. Apart from using previous literature, the subsequent analysis is 
based on first-hand information gathered in Rwanda and Belgium from October 2009 
to January 2010. The qualitative research strategy is particularly inspired by Tansey’s 
(2007) discussion on non-probability sampling for process tracing as the interviewees 
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were chosen because of their specific knowledge of Rwandan politics and its coffee 
sector.  
 
It needs to be highlighted that Rwanda’s troubled history which escalated into 
genocide in 1994, as well as the general political instability in the region, have 
resulted in highly polarised views on politics in Rwanda among academics as well as 
journalists and others expressing opinions in the public domain. Occupying one side 
of the spectrum are those who praise recent efforts to ensure political stability and 
economic development and in their praise tend to forget or foresee those aspects of 
political life in the country that are of a questionable nature. Occupants of the other 
side, many of them in exile, criticise the government for running the country as a 
police state. A strong political wish to waterproof the country’s reputation in terms of 
good governance has disabled a free and vibrant media and thus hindered an 
otherwise possible option of using the media as a source of relatively objective 
information.
17
 While people in the government or occupiers of public offices quite 
naturally have few incentives of departing from official narratives, those people 
occupying other successful parts of society might have equally weak incentives to 
offer a nuanced view in the case of Rwanda. Civil society too is not necessarily free 
from political infiltrations and generally fills a weak foundation for real political 
advocacy. This politicised environment demanded some sensitivity on the choice of 
interviewees. All in all, I interviewed about 25 people, some expats living in Rwanda, 
some Rwandans, and some with long experience of conducting business in Rwanda. 
While the names of these interviewees cannot be revealed due to the politically 
sensitive nature of the topic, where information from interviewees is used in the text, I 
describe them by their position, function or other ways in which they acquired 
expertise in the subject. The people I interviewed largely fall under the categories of 
                                                 
17
 The press in Rwanda is highly polarised with the regime friendly New Times being the main 
newspaper in Rwanda and the more regime critical UMUSESO and Newsline, being run from Uganda, 
constituting the main voice of government opposition. Needless to say, the stories coming out of the 
two polar news sources in terms of the issues with which this analysis is concerned, e.g. the power of 
President Kagame, corruption and the interrelationship between politics and business, differ to a great 
extent. This largely discourages the use of media analysis a methodology for backing up and 
triangulating the information gathered from interviews.  
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government officials, business leaders, people working in NGOs and donor agencies, 
and academics.  
 
4.3.1 ‘Big Men’ and continued winner-takes-all politics in Rwanda  
To set the stage for the subsequent analysis of state intervention in the economy and 
corruption, this section compares the two Rwandan regimes in relation to the informal 
institutions of ‘Big Men’ and winner-takes-all politics discussed in the previous 
section. In short, I propose that African politics is characterised by ‘Big Men’ who 
have large power over their countries’ wealth and wealth-generating possibilities and, 
therefore face fierce competition. The analysis in this section will show that this 
informal institution is applicable to Rwanda and that the two regimes in question have 
shown a consistent need to uphold the type of politics characterised by ’it’s our turn to 
eat’.   
 
General Juvénal Habyarimana became the president of Rwanda’s Second Republic 
through a coup d’état in 1973. In order to secure his hold on power, Habyarimana not 
only put ex-President, Grégoire Kayibanda, and his wife in house arrest where they 
were left to starve to death, but he also dissolved the power base of his predecessor in 
the centre of the country and moved all power, privilege and wealth to his family’s 
home towns of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in the north-western part of the country 
(Golooba-Mutebi, 2008:12). President Habyarimana surrounded himself with a 
narrow elite called the Akazu, meaning ‘little house’. This unofficial powerhouse 
constituted the single most influential interest group in Rwanda and was made up of 
relatives and allies of Habyarimana (Storey, 2001:373). They sat on top of the state 
machinery, and controlled the top positions in the government, the army, and the 
state-owned sector (Uvin, 1998:36). This group formed a special circle to ensure their 
continued hold on power and anyone who appeared a threat to them was quickly 
arrested, often tortured and sometimes killed (Kinzer, 2008:37). While this narrow 
elite group benefitted disproportionally from having Habyarimana as their ‘Big Man’; 
by extension, Habyarimana’s own region and ethnic group (Hutu) also benefitted at 
the cost of other regions and the other main ethnic group (Tutsi). “Gisenyi, heartland 
of the Akazu, supplied one-third of the top jobs in government and almost all leaders 
of the security forces, as well as enjoying a wholly disproportionate share of 
development projects and higher education places.” (Storey, 2001:367). 
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While Habyarimana’s control over the country was extensive, it started to deteriorate 
in the end of the 1980 as bad economic times helped create a nascent internal 
opposition to the regime. In addition to the internal opposition, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF), made up primarily by descendants of the large number of Tutsi that had 
fled the country from 1959 onwards, saw its chance to return by force to Rwanda and 
take over from Habyarimana. According to Storey (2001:368-369), “the question of 
who would retain or assume ‘ownership’ of this apparatus of (corrupt and repressive) 
control was the key stake of political struggle in Rwanda in the early 1990s.” While 
some factions of the political elite had started to organise itself politically and 
militarily already in the early 1990s, in 1994, this elite chose genocide as a political 
strategy to remain in power (Hintjens, 1999; Des Forges, 1999). The same night as 
President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down in Kigali, the genocide started. While 
almost every opposition figure in the country had been killed within the first twenty-
four hours of the plane crash, the genocide lasted for three months and cost some 
800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus’ lives (Kinzer, 2008:148).  
 
In July 1994, after assuming victory over those who had organised the genocide, the 
RPF formed a transitional government under the presidential leadership of Pasteur 
Bizimungu. President Bizimungu, a Hutu by ethnicity, had during the 1980s been the 
director of a state-owned enterprise and a close ally to President Habyarimana. In 
1990, after falling out with the president, Bizimungu joined the RPF and rose in rank. 
The real power over the new Rwandan state however belonged to Vice-president and 
Minister of Defence, Paul Kagame, a Tutsi by ethnicity who as a young child had left 
Rwanda for a life in Ugandan exile. Several elements of winner-take-all politics 
repeated itself with the new political leaders assuming power in Kigali. First of all, the 
old elite, both political and economic, had to make room for a new elite, which was 
facilitated by the previous top elite being either in exile or in prison for having 
conducted the genocide.  
 
Although Rwandan politics portrays itself for having once and for all stepped away 
from practising politics based on ethnicity, several authors and a number of 
interviewees highlight the fact that the government is overwhelmingly Tutsi by 
ethnicity. Ansom (2009:8) states that the “characteristics of Rwanda’s current 
105 
 
political elite contrast strongly with those of the majority of Rwandans. The former 
are mainly Tutsi, nearly always urban-based, and often born and raised in a 
neighbouring country. The latter are mostly Hutu, rural peasants, and born and raised 
in Rwanda.” There is also evidently a pecking order among the post-1994 Tutsi elite. 
Waught (2004:158) states that “the Ugandan-exiled Tutsis simply walked in and took 
over, not only politically but materially as well. The top government and military 
posts were frequently allocated to the ‘Left Hand Drivers’ as the dominant group from 
Ugandan exile were nicknamed.” A Wikileaks cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in 
Kigali to the U.S. Secretary of State in August 2008 highlights the skewed power 
balance between Tutsi and Hutu in terms of minister positions.
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“President Kagame is a Tutsi.  So, too are the important Ministers of 
Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Infrastructure, Local Government, 
and Information. Close Kagame confidant, Chief of Defense Staff 
General James Kabarebe, is Tutsi, as are the chiefs of the army and 
air force, the military district commanders and the heads of the 
Rwanda National Police and the National Security Service.  Indeed, 
all are English speakers who grew up in Uganda.  Some major 
positions are held by Hutus, but their actual authority often appears 
limited, and they are widely perceived to be “twinned” with more 
powerful Tutsi colleagues.”  
 
While the Akazu had constituted an informal powerhouse during the Habyarimana 
regime, similar developments occurred in the post-genocide regime. A couple of years 
into the working of the transitional government, Prunier (1997:369) writes that in 
Rwanda, “there are two channels of authority: one is the official administrative 
structure of the cabinet and the ministers; the other is the RPF network, both civilian 
and military, which runs parallel to the official administration and makes up an 
unofficial government of the shadows controlling the reality of the decision-making 
process.” The narrow RPF-based elite around President Kagame have thus taken the 
place of the old Akazu. According to Willum (2001:111), the new Rwandan elite is 
mainly made up of high-ranking military officials and the political elite. One indicator 
of where wealth is concentrated is the ownership of the mansions in Kigali that have 
popped up in recent years. According to one international lawyer in Kigali, the large 
mansions in the fashionable neighbourhood of Nyarutarama are owned mainly by 
members or ex-members of the RPF-affiliated military, the political elite and the 
                                                 
18
 Cable 08KIGALI525, title: Ethnicity in Rwanda – Who governs the Country? 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08KIGALI525.html 
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handful of ‘legitimate’ businessmen in Rwanda. This neighbourhood goes under the 
nickname of ‘Merci Congo’ which refers to the Rwandan military-related wealth that 
has been extracted in connection with the conflict in the neighbouring Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  
 
This brief political account of the two regimes in question point to the continuation of 
‘Big Men’ politics where both Habyarimana and Kagame and their elite circles have 
enjoyed large amount of power. It also points to the continuation of ‘winner-takes-all’ 
or ‘it’s our time to eat’ politics where the elite and economic opportunities closely 
adhere to the regional and ethnic belonging of the ‘Big Man’. With these informal 
institutions continuing from one regime to the other, we would also expect that both 
‘Big Men’ would need to distribute some of the spoils from the state by intervening in 
the economy and thereby ensure their hold on power. 
 
4.3.2 From a reliance on prebends to a different type of political corruption  
President Habyarimana, having assumed power before the neo-liberal era of structural 
adjustment, practiced a largely interventionist policy vis-à-vis the market. Economic 
opportunities were closely guarded by the regime and there was no independent 
domestic private sector to talk of. According to Uvin (1998:21), “the state was the 
main if not the sole avenue for rapid wealth accumulation for the new elites. By far 
the largest share of formal sector jobs was in public service…even jobs in the private 
sector required permission and control from the Ministry of Labour.” It can easily be 
assumed that this regulatory environment was highly geared towards redistributing 
spoils through prebends. Uvin (1998:60) argues that it was well known that the 
dignitaries of the regime had become increasingly corrupt during the 1980s, as 
evidenced, among other things, by the abuse of public enterprises. Sibomana 
(1999:36) similarly states that the people in power, at that time, were not interested in 
ensuring prosperity of the country but were instead too busy plundering the country’s 
resources, adding that “corruption had completely eaten into the wheels of the state: 
anything could be bought and sold.” In addition, because foreign aid was channelled 
through the state and other revenue sources were minimal (apart from revenues from 
coffee, tea and tin); wealth could not be obtained without first ensuring the power 
over the state (Prunier, 1997:84). According to Des Forges (1999), those who got rich 
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in Rwanda during this time were those who worked for the state directly as well as 
those in charge of the state-owned enterprises, i.e. those who had been allocated 
prebends.   
 
The allocation of wealth in post-genocide Rwanda under President Kagame looks 
different from that under the interventionist Habyarimana regime. During the past few 
years, large efforts have been made to liberalise the economy, ease the regulatory 
environment for doing business, and privatise large parts of the formerly state-owned 
enterprise apparatus. With these changes to the country’s formal economic 
institutions, Kagame and his elite circle have largely foregone their chances to 
allocate and receive prebends. As such, it can be concluded that at least the petty 
corruption that come from the abuse of public offices has declined in the country with 
this widespread economic liberalisation. However, when it comes to the political 
corruption previously associated with the distribution of prebends, the story looks 
more complicated. In fact, while the sharing of the spoils for political survival does no 
longer take the form of distributing prebends, it nonetheless still exists in the form of 
informal ties between the ‘Big Man’ and the country’s new economic elite.  
 
In post-liberalised Rwanda, the country’s economy has become occupied by an 
economic elite with close ties to the political leadership and the RPF. As one NGO-
affiliated interviewee stated: “It is very important to have good relations to the RPF if 
you want to succeed in business in Rwanda. Everyone knows this but it is not freely 
expressed.” This phenomenon was described by an expatriate businessman in Kigali 
who said that “if you want to succeed economically and have status in Rwanda, it is a 
given to be a member of the RPF.” Another interviewed expatriate businessman 
similarly stated that “you get kicked out of the country if you do not keep good 
relations with the government.” This control over wealth generating opportunities 
follows a political rationale consistent with winner-takes-all politics as explained by a 
governance expert within the donor community in Rwanda:  
“In Rwanda the main purpose of having close political and 
economic elite has to do with the need to obtain political control 
over the country. They make sure that the economic elite do not 
grow powerful politically. The political leadership is aware that this 
situation is not sustainable in the long run but they see it as a must in 
order to avoid potential conflicts.”  
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However, compared to President Habyarimana’s regime that exercised formal control 
over the economy through direct ownership in the country’s productive capacities; the 
control exercised by Kagame is of a more informal nature. Needless to say, under the 
proclaimed pro-market political ideology advocated by the Rwandan government, 
these, more informal, relations between politics and business are highly opaque. 
Information about business ties to Kagame and, by extension the RPF party, is 
difficult to obtain, but as an indicator, one report from the International Crisis Group 
(2002:11) states that “eight out of nine Rwandan banks are managed by RPF members 
and that 25 out of 29 leaders of the top state-run companies in Rwanda are RPF 
members.” As one expatriate long-term observer of Rwandan business life stated, “the 
RPF tries to control the lucrative parts of the economy little by little. All sectors are 
run by the RPF. This is difficult to grasp for an outsider visiting Rwanda since, 
according to the books, everything is in order.” 
 
The RPF is the owner of one of these businesses, formerly called Tri-Star Investments 
SARL, and recently rebranded as Crystal Ventures Ltd. (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 
2011:7). According to Willum (2001:115), who has conducted much research on the 
topic, “Since its start in Uganda, Tri-Star has grown enormously and is today involved 
in a number of the most dominant and profitable businesses in Rwanda. Tri-Star is no 
doubt a major player in Rwandan business life, though the exact composition of its 
portfolio remains to be established.” Kinzer (2008:241) states that digging into the 
holdings of Tri-Star, ‘the RPF’s shadowy business empire’, is a taboo in Rwanda, and 
in the words of one donor-affiliated governance expert in Rwanda, “Tri-Star is an 
investment company that operates in the shadows but constitutes a clear linkage 
between the political and economic elite in Rwanda. Tri-Star is involved in all big 
enterprises.” The regime-unfriendly Rwandan newspaper, Newsline (retrieved 19 
December 2010), recently published a testimony by four former high-level political 
and military allies to President Kagame in which they describe the linkage between 
the RPF and Tri-Star, and President Kagame’s role as the head of both. According to 
this source, “the RPF is the biggest business enterprise in Rwanda” and “only 
President Kagame has information on the complete state of affairs of the RPF’s 
business environment.  
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It thus appears that the RPF, with Kagame as the ‘Big Man’ holds the key to the 
reward structure in post-liberalised Rwanda. However, the RPF appears to distribute 
few prebends and has had little patience with public officials stealing from the public 
till. For example, Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011:11) note the absence of using 
managerial and technical positions in Tri-Star/Crystal Ventures firms as ‘jobs for the 
boys’. Its strategy for ensuring legitimacy to its leadership is another form of political 
corruption. Instead of offering a slice of the state in order to accommodate the 
country’s elite which was the strategy used by Habyarimana, Kagame offers the elite 
a slice of the private market. As stated by a Rwandan academic during an interview: 
“In earlier times, the only way to get rich was to be part of the political leadership. 
When appointed you behaved like a king. This is now changing. Nowadays you can 
get rich from business.”  
 
As such, it can be concluded that economic liberalisation has changed the way state 
intervention in the economy takes place. It has exchanged the reliance on 
prebendalism for political survival for covert ties between the political leadership and 
the country’s business elite. As a consequence, corruption has also changed from 
blatant abuse of public offices to murky relationships between politics and business 
based on favouritism. Table 4.1 below summarises these observations and the 
proposed relationship between degree/type of state intervention in the economy and 
corruption.    
 
Table 4.1: The association between state intervention and corruption in Rwanda  
 
Regime  Degree of state 
intervention in the 
economy 
Predominant type of 
corruption 
President Habyarimana  
1973-1994 
Heavy – both on the 
production side and on the 
regulatory side. The state 
or ‘Big Man’ directly 
controlled opportunities 
for wealth generation. 
Prebendalism linked to 
political and petty 
corruption. Political 
legitimacy/control 
dependent on controlling 
and sharing slices of the 
state. 
Vice-President (turned 
President) Kagame  
1994-present time 
Light – free market 
policies and reforms 
undertaken in terms of 
liberalisation, privatisation 
and deregulation. Still, the 
Covert and intertwined 
relationship between 
political elite and big 
business. Political 
legitimacy/control 
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‘Big Man’ and his party 
indirectly control 
opportunities for wealth 
generation. 
dependent on controlling 
and sharing slices of the 
private market.  
 
The next section will present an in-depth case study of the Rwandan coffee sector 
during the two regimes and will shed further light on the proposed relationship 
between formal economic institutions and corruption, and what happens to corruption 
in the light of economic liberalisation.   
 
4.4  A case study of the Rwandan coffee sector 
The coffee sector, having constituted the largest economic and most politically 
important sector in Rwanda, provides an interesting case on which to analyse the 
forms state intervention in the economy and associated corruption have taken during 
the two regimes.  
 
The production of coffee for export has constituted the backbone of the Rwandan 
economy since colonial times when state-led production of coffee was introduced as a 
measure to extract taxes and commence a monetary economy in the predominantly 
rural country. The production of coffee today as well as in the past has been 
conducted by smallholders as opposed to being produced on big plantations. Most 
Rwandan coffee producers are poor farmers to whom the yearly lump sum proceeds 
from their coffee trees constitute the primary source for household spending. The 
colonial government established rules and regulations pertaining to the coffee sector, 
introducing a mandated minimum price for coffee, quality guidelines, and special 
licenses that allowed only some firms to purchase coffee (Boudreaux and Ahluwalia, 
2008:7). The state-led approach to the country’s coffee production continued after 
independence through the coffee company TRAFIPRO. The company was established 
in 1957 in the southern Rwandan town of Gitarama, primarily benefiting southern 
businessmen and politicians. During its first years, the company was headed by 
Grégoire Kayibanda who later became the first president of Rwanda (Kamola, 
2008:64). TRAFIPRO was set up as a monopsony, buying coffee from domestic 
producers. In 1964, a Belgian businessman, Victor Hasson, started the company 
Rwandex and entered the sector as an exporter of Rwandan coffee. The export went 
through the London-based trading company Drucafe. At this time coffee accounted 
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for more than 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings and little had been done since 
national independence to diversify the economy away from its heavy dependence on 
coffee.  
 
Soon after President Habyarimana took power in the country in 1973, he dismantled 
the old TRAFIPRO powerhouse and in its place established the government coffee 
agency or marketing board, OCIR-Café. OCIR-Café and Rwandex purchased and 
exported all coffee grown in Rwanda. The proceeds from the sector during the 
Habyarimana regime continued to be of great macro-economic importance, 
accounting for between 60 and 80 percent of state revenues (Verwimp, 2003). To 
ensure political benefits from the sector, President Habyarimana nationalised 
Rwandex, taking 51 percent of the company and leaving the former owners with the 
remaining 49 percent. The coffee business in Rwanda boomed in the mid-1970s as 
Brazil, the largest exporter of coffee, was hit by a frost, and the international coffee 
prices skyrocketed at the same time as the country export quotas set by the 
International Coffee Organisation were temporarily relaxed. At the same time, 
political problems in neighbouring Uganda provided the Ugandan coffee farmers with 
incentives to sell their coffee via Rwanda. The Rwandan Central Bank and Rwandex 
used this opportunity to smuggle Ugandan coffee to Rwanda where they sold it 
through Rwandex as Rwandan coffee and thereby dramatically increasing the 
revenues from the coffee sector.  
 
In order to ensure that the economically and politically important revenues from the 
coffee sector were forthcoming, a coffee law was introduced in 1978. According to 
this law, it became illegal to uproot or mistreat coffee trees as well as to interplant 
coffee trees with other crops. The Habyarimana regime used the state-apparatus down 
to the lowest administrative level of the country’s 143 communes to control coffee 
farmers and safeguard revenues from the coffee sector. Each commune was provided 
with a monitor whose role was to advise farmers on coffee production as well as to 
uphold the coffee law. The monitors were entitled to fine farmers who breached the 
law (Verwimp, 2003) and they tended to situate themselves hierarchically towards the 
farmers, and abuse their positions (Uvin, 1998:131; Newbury, 1992:207). This law 
was particularly dire in times when the government set the coffee prices relatively low 
and it made more sense economically for farmers to use their scarce land for other 
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crops, particularly bananas. “The effect of the forced cultivation of coffee on the 
peasant population … became more and more coercive in the process of decreased 
coffee-prices.” (Verwimp, 1999:41). Boudreaux (2007:8) goes as far as to say that the 
government “forced people to grow coffee even when famine threatened” and “with 
the extensive system of local monitors, farmers found it difficult to ignore this law.” 
(ibid:6). The imposed coffee law is illustrative of the government’s power vis-à-vis 
the farmers; the political importance of the coffee revenues, and the measures the ‘Big 
Man’ and his elite circle were prepared to take in order to ensure that these revenues 
were forthcoming.  
 
A decade-long decline in the international price for coffee began in the mid-1980s, 
exacerbated by the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989. Revenues 
from coffee exports declined from a peak of $144 million in 1985 to $30 million in 
1993. Habyarimana’s government compensated for the decrease in coffee revenues by 
decreasing the price it paid coffee farmers for their produce (Verwimp, 2003). 
Farmers responded, despite breaking the law, by uprooting 300,000 coffee trees in 
1992 (Rosenberg, 1999:13). Since the civil war broke out in 1990 with the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army marching into Rwanda from neighbouring countries, particularly 
Uganda, many coffee farmers had also become internally displaced which had 
negative impacts on the country’s coffee production.  
 
As a result of heavy international debt, produced by falling coffee revenues and 
increased investment in military capacity prompted by the civil war, President 
Habyarimana was forced to sign a structural adjustment package with the World Bank 
in 1991. The policy conditionalities coupled with the financial aid package included 
the common Washington consensus market reforms of economic liberalisations and 
macro-economic stability, as well as a coffee sector reform (Storey, 2001:371). Since 
the old political elite, being on the receiving side of the revenues generated from the 
coffee sector, were naturally unlikely to constitute the driving force for change, the 
authorities chose not to go ahead with the coffee sector liberalisation reform.  
 
Reform, however, happened following the death of President Habyarimana and the 
subsequent genocide, and soon after the new RPF-led government had come to power. 
With the new leadership installed, the coffee sector underwent large changes, first and 
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foremost with regard to state intervention in the sector. The World Bank’s nagging 
about liberalisation and privatisation of the coffee sector had, at last produced the 
intended results, perhaps because of the desperate need for financial aid felt by the 
new leadership in the aftermath of the country’s absolute economic ruin (Waugh, 
2004:102). A new and profitable market in refined specialty coffee for the 
international market has emerged since the liberalisation of the sector. Post-
liberalisation, the sector has increased its output of fully-washed coffee, as opposed to 
the less treated bulk coffee that was sold before liberalisation, resulting in a higher 
value added export product (Boudreaux and Ahluwalia, 2008). Rwandan coffee can 
these days be bought in places such as Starbucks and Marks and Spencer. In a study 
by the World Bank from 2011 titled ‘Yes Africa Can: Success Stories from a 
Dynamic Continent’; the Rwandan coffee sector liberalisation was one of 20 
development success stories from across sub-Saharan Africa identified and 
documented.  
 
4.4.1 State intervention and corruption in the coffee sector 
The coffee sector during the Habyarimana regime undoubtedly constituted the bread 
and butter on which the regime survived. Boudreaux and Ahluwalia (2008:6) state 
that the regime captured the profits of the sector and used the funds to maintain 
power, and Uvin (1998:21) adds that “the control of state revenues… provided 
enormous opportunities for both personal enrichment and patronage.” The fact that 
the government offices in charge of the coffee sector were filled with the presidents’ 
friends, relatives and loyalists clearly suggests that prebendalism with consequent 
corruption was practised. This prebendal allocation included high level officials as 
alluded to by a Rwandan business man with a long career in the coffee sector:  
“Rwandex had the monopoly of the sector and was close to the 
government. They used to keep the proceeds outside the country, 
kept in the international company Drucafe. Sometimes they brought 
some profit back to Rwanda in the form of gifts to some ministers. 
The ministers had much personal interests in the Rwandan coffee 
sector prior to 1994.”  
 
Boudreaux and Ahluwalia (2008:8) also state that President Habyarimana appointed 
relatives and supporters to positions of authority at OCIR-Café and Berlage et al 
(2003:14) agree by stating that the Akazu were the ones in charge of OCIR-Café. 
Apart from being used to distribute prebends, the coffee sector under state ownership 
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also generated revenue which in turn was used by the Habyarimana regime to buy 
political loyalty (Berlage et al, 2003). 
 
All this changed after 1994 and the liberalisation of the coffee sector. Shortly after the 
new political regime took power in 1994, OCIR-Café left its former trading role for a 
purely regulatory directive. The opportunity for allocating prebends thereby 
diminished as the government lost the direct control over the production side of the 
sector. In short, the liberalisation of the coffee sector formally disentangled the state 
from the sector and, as such, terminated the possibilities for allowing the state to be 
used for personal enrichment of the political elite which had previously enjoyed such 
benefits. Liberalisation of the coffee sector therefore decreased political and petty 
corruption linked to the distribution and enjoyment of prebends.  
 
However, as I have argued earlier, state intervention coupled with political corruption 
in the form of favouritism and covert relations between the RPF and the economic 
elite appears have replaced the distribution of prebends also in the post-liberalised 
coffee sector. After liberalisation, new exporting and importing companies entered the 
sector. Some of the new entrepreneurs were Rwandan and some were international 
investors and, on paper, it looks as though the political involvement in the coffee 
sector had completely disappeared. However, as one NGO-affiliated interviewee in 
Kigali asserted, the big profits from the coffee sector remain in a few hands. When the 
government made the coffee sector reforms, the elite close to the RPF were able to tap 
into the money from the coffee sector. That economic reforms bring opportunities 
from which a country’s elite benefit is not uncommon. However, it appears that the 
‘Big Man’ and ruling political party have enjoyed more involvement in the sector than 
they would formally be entitled to under its liberalised form. According to an 
expatriate businessman and long-term observer of the Rwandan coffee sector, while 
the front figures of the coffee export companies are normal businessmen, behind 
every company, there is RPF involvement. For example, according to the same 
source, among the largest exporters of Rwandan coffee, the company Rwacof is 
directly linked with President Kagame’s family through its connection with the 
Ugandan-based coffee company Sucafina, and the company Coffee Business Center is 
partly owned by the president’s wife. Thus, while the coffee sector is no longer state-
owned, there is a clear connection between the ‘Big Man’, the RPF-linked elite and 
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the businesses involved in the sector. These interviewees still see political muscle 
being used in order to manipulate economic resources as President Kagame and the 
RPF, far from being separated from the market, exert influence to determine the 
directions of wealth for political reasons. 
 
It can be concluded from the analysis in this section that by disentangling the coffee 
sector from direct ownership and control by the state, the liberalisation of the sector 
made previous reward systems in the form of prebends obsolete. However, following 
the logic of ‘Big Men’ and winner-takes-all politics, it appears that prebendalism has 
been replaced by another form of political corruption: that of favouritism and covert 
relations between politics and business.  
 
4.5  Conclusion 
Following decades of international pushing for a decrease of the state’s role in the 
domestic economy in developing countries, this analysis concerns the effects of 
economic liberalisation on the form and extent of corruption in Rwanda. I base my 
analysis on theories on neopatrimonialism in sub-Saharan Africa and highlight the 
political rationale for ‘Big Men’ to intervene in the economy and how this is 
associated with corruption via prebendalism. I then apply this theoretical framework 
to Rwanda and analyse how economic liberalisation has changed corruption.  
 
The analysis of Rwanda concurs with Szeftel’s (2000:222) argument based on the 
Zambian experience that “institutional change… is unlikely to contain corruption and 
factionalism unless reforms are aimed also at changing the underlying political 
imperatives that drive the process, namely the use of clientelism for purposes of class 
formation and factional rewards. Like water seeking its level, clientelism, factional 
competition and corruption flourish if not in one way then in another.” Indeed, rather 
than turning off the tap of corruption as theories based on rent-seeking and corruption 
suggest, economic liberalisation has brought about other ways of ensuring continued 
political power through market interventions. 
 
With economic liberalisation of the coffee sector as well as other sectors in Rwanda 
from direct state control, the predominant form of state intervention and associated 
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corruption used to accommodate the country’s elite and thereby ensure continued 
political power for the incumbent has changed. The allocation of prebends has 
decreased and with it the blatant abuse of public offices as the prebendal rewards 
constituted slices or spoils of the state. As such, it has moved opportunities of 
enrichment from the public offices to the private market where highly opaque 
relations between politics and business make sure that the politically loyal are on the 
receiving end of wealth generating opportunities. In short, while the lower degree of 
direct state intervention in the economy has had an impact on corruption, especially 
petty corruption, it has but merely transformed political corruption.  
 
Because of the winner-takes-all politics and the political instability facing the RPF-led 
government, particularly with regard to its ethnic minority position in a country where 
the wounds of genocide are still raw; a decrease in political corruption is unlikely to 
take place. Instead, when political allies need to be catered for, while, at the same 
time, unchecked economic prosperity may mean claims for increased political 
influence and ultimately a threat to the government, it is natural that economic 
opportunities are still tied to the ‘Big Man’ and his elite circle.  
 
Having discussed the changing face of corruption, the question remains what effect 
the form of corruption associated with the heavy presence of the RPF in the market 
has had on economic growth and development in the country. The first thing to note is 
that the Rwandan economy has not fallen prey for a rentier class of entrepreneurs that 
for example Boone (1990) saw happening in Senegal. The economy has, despite being 
in shackles after the genocide, grown with considerable force and been able to 
diversify away from the primary sector to higher value added ventures. At the same 
time, and possibly as a consequence of favouritism and the associated close links 
between business and politics, Rwanda has gained a reputation of supplying a good 
business milieu for international investors with low levels of petty corruption and 
cumbersome regulatory environment. As such, the business undertakings of the RPF 
have been long-term as opposed to predatory (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2011:16). 
That said the side effects of the type of political corruption used in post-liberalised 
Rwanda is likely to be more political than economic. The risk is that the close links 
between having the power over the state and sitting on all serious business 
opportunities as President Kagame and the RPF do will lead to power struggles within 
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the RPF as well as feed resentment among those who are in the political wilderness. 
In such political environment, political instability rather than economic stagnation 
may ultimately become the key side-effect of this type of political corruption.   
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5. Catching the ‘Big Fish’: The (Ab)Use of Corruption-
Related Prosecutions across Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Abstract 
Since the start of the international donor community’s good governance agenda in the 
1990s, the focus on curbing corruption has been a priority issue in donors’ relations to 
many developing countries, particularly countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
analysis concerns the use of punitive actions to curb corruption. On the one hand, the 
theoretical literature on corruption argues that by prosecuting offenders for 
corruption-related crimes and thus ending impunity, particularly among high level 
political figures (‘big fish’), a political culture of less corruption will evolve. On the 
other hand, various political commentaries on sub-Saharan Africa propose that 
prosecutions of ‘big fish’ occur, not in order to end impunity, but to get rid of 
opponents. I empirically test the proposition that corruption-related prosecutions 
affect levels of corruption, using survey-based data for a group of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa that have visibly, and on a large scale, prosecuted ‘big fish’ for 
corruption-related crimes. I find little empirical support for the theoretical proposition. 
I then compile a unique database on corruption-related prosecutions at the level of 
ministers across the sub-continent and find patterns that suggest that prosecutions are 
politicised and serve as a way to eliminate political rivals. In particular, the results 
suggest that ‘big fish’ are not prosecuted in relation to the timing of their crimes but in 
relation to where a country is in its election cycle, and this timing differs for different 
types of ‘big fish’ in accordance to the threat they pose to the incumbent. These 
findings caution against the international community’s overly technical and apolitical 
approach to anti-corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Keywords: corruption, anti-corruption, prosecution, sub-Saharan Africa 
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5.1  Introduction  
James Wolfensohn, then President of the Wold Bank, kick-started the international 
donor community’s anti-corruption agenda and broke the Bank’s taboo on the issue of 
corruption when he declared, in a speech in October 1996, that the Bank needed to 
tackle the ‘cancer’ of corruption in developing countries. Since then, there is hardly a 
country in Africa that has not experienced donor-imposed anti-corruption conditions 
on their aid, as well as different types of more concrete donor-initiated anti-corruption 
interventions (Bryane, 2004). This international anti-corruption agenda is also highly 
visible in the political rhetoric coming from African leaders. The condemnation of 
corruption in African countries used to be voiced primarily by military leaders as a 
justification for overthrowing civilian governments. However, since the issue of 
corruption became a high priority for international donors, the public response from 
African leaders has become more pronounced. The language of ‘zero tolerance of 
corruption’ and ‘war against corruption’ has since become a popular election 
platform. These slogans have also been adopted by incumbents who have already 
enjoyed decades in power, and have been used by African leaders whose countries top 
the international rankings of most corrupt countries in the world. In short, the anti-
corruption message has caught on.  
 
Of course, campaigns against corruption are not new on the African continent (Harsh, 
1993; Riley, 1998). For example, the executions of former political leaders in Ghana 
in 1979 can be seen as extreme punishments for alleged corruption. In the 1970s, 
President Murtala Mohammed in Nigeria launched ‘Operation Purge the Nation’, an 
anti-corruption measure that removed an estimated 11,000 persons from their offices. 
The subsequent Nigerian Buhari regime launched another dose of the same medicine 
called ‘War against Indiscipline’ where a large number of politicians and businessmen 
were arrested and tried for economic crimes before special military tribunals 
(Williams, 1987:109, 110). With democratisation sweeping the continent in the 1990s, 
such executions and collective punishments have given way for arranging the punitive 
actions against corruption in prosecutors’ offices and courtrooms (Harsh, 1993). 
Coldham (1995), who has looked into the legal responses to corruption in Africa, 
argues that setting up special commissions, making anti-corruption law more 
draconian, and using the court system to punish office holders for corruption are ways 
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in which the African governments, pressurised to produce quick results, show that 
they are ‘doing something’ about the problem. 
 
As a result of the heightened international focus on curbing corruption in developing 
countries, many countries have institutionalised their fight against corruption by 
setting up anti-corruption agencies. These are state agencies set up to prevent 
corruption through measures such as investigation and prosecution. The Hong Kong 
and Singapore anti-corruption agencies, set up in the 1970s and 1950 respectively, 
have been popularly used as blueprints in the set-up of such government institutions 
throughout the developing world due to their assumed corruption-curbing effect on 
both city-states (Meagher, 2005). African governments and international donors alike 
have taken such success stories to heart in their anti-corruption efforts. By 2008, 
Africa had established 18 stand-alone and five integrated anti-corruption agencies (de 
Maria, 2008). 
 
The donor community’s response to corruption-related prosecutions of high-level 
political figures, or so-called ‘big fish’, in African countries has been positive. For 
example, a news article in Africa Confidential from 2008 reports how, in Tanzania, 
using the courts to punish some high level political figures for corruption was enough 
for the donor community to disburse budget support which had been withheld due to 
concerns about corruption in the country (Vol. 49, No. 24:12). A news article in the 
Daily Telegraph (7 December 2007, retrieved on 17 August 2010) commended 
Rwanda’s many corruption-related arrests, writing that “hardly a week goes by 
without a prominent official going to jail in Rwanda, where the government has 
declared zero tolerance against corruption… Most African governments like talking 
about their fight against corruption… but Rwanda, most notably for the past two 
years, have been putting its money where its mouth is.”  
 
While the use of criminal law to combat corruption has received attention from the 
academic community, the policy prescriptions for its use depend heavily on academic 
discipline. On the one hand, the economics literature on corruption argues that by 
prosecuting offenders for corruption-related crimes and thus ending impunity, 
particularly among high level political figures (‘big fish’), a political culture of less 
corruption will evolve. On the other hand, various political analysts, notably on sub-
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Saharan Africa, propose that prosecutions of ‘big fish’ occur, not in order to end 
impunity, but to get rid of opponents. Such selective punishment will, in turn, have 
little effect on the culture of corruption. Theories aside, the issue has received very 
little systematic empirical attention. Although the use of criminal law to combat 
corruption has escalated with the international anti-corruption drive that has spread 
across Africa, no study to my knowledge has attempted to either assess the effect of 
‘big fish’ prosecutions on levels of corruption or assess the counter claim about a 
politicisation of such prosecutions.  
 
This empirical study, using data on corruption-related ‘big fish’ prosecutions across 
sub-Saharan Africa, concerns the question of whether such prosecutions end impunity 
as predicted by one set of theories or whether they are merely used as a tool to dismiss 
political rivals. The chapter is structured as follows: in section 5.2, I discuss the issue 
of ‘big fish’ prosecutions in terms of what the two diverging theories predict, and in 
sections 5.3 and 5.4, I assess the theoretically driven hypotheses using data on ‘big 
fish’ prosecutions from across sub-Saharan Africa. Section 5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2  Ending impunity or eliminating political rivals? 
Much of the literature on corruption from the economics discipline focuses on 
individual’s incentives, in the form of cost versus benefits, for entering into corrupt 
deals or not. Where most public offices are abused for personal gain and detection and 
punishments of such abuse are rare, the personal cost of being corrupt is low and 
office holders have an incentive to be corrupt. Following such reasoning, an increased 
probability of being caught for corruption-related offences has a negative impact on 
the personal cost-benefit ratio as it increases the personal cost of entering into such 
deals. At the aggregate level, a signal that the cost of being corrupt has increased 
would, in turn, have ramifications throughout the political system.  
 
For such cultural change to take place, political leaders need to show their political 
will for change and one highly visible way of doing that is to go after the political 
elite. Klitgaard et al. (2000:79) argue that when a culture of impunity has developed 
in a country, it is essential to break this culture by ‘frying big fish’. “Big, corrupt 
actors must be named and punished so that cynical citizenry believes that an anti-
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corruption drive is more than words.” Meagher (2005:73) argues that the successful 
anti-corruption strategies in Hong Kong and Singapore were dependent on the ability 
to investigate and prosecute the ‘big fish’. By targeting the elite, including ministers, 
MPs and senior directors in government agencies, the political leaders in these city-
states set a new moral tone against corruption across government and administration.   
 
Collier (2002) argues with specific reference to the African continent that nothing 
other than a ‘big push’ on anti-corruption can alter levels of corruption in countries 
that have reached a locally stable equilibrium of high levels of corruption. In such 
cases, he reasons, the prosecution of ‘big fish’ can help change the expectations and 
incentives throughout the system. “Where the public believes that many top people 
are corrupt, unless an anti-corruption campaign includes the prosecution of some of 
these people, the public will not take it seriously.” (Collier, 2002:203). Taylor (2006), 
looking particularly at Zambia, uses a similar argument with reference to using the 
courts to seek retribution for corrupt offences committed by former heads of state.  
“Prosecution of past presidents can help to mitigate corruption by sending a message 
to all socio-political actors, including incumbents, that a political culture of impunity 
will be increasingly challenged by one that elevates accountability.” (Taylor, 
2006:282). He further sees the possibility for cultural change with regard to 
corruption by arguing that those who catch the ‘big fish’ “are binding themselves, 
consciously or otherwise, to an evolving set of norms and legal-institutional remedies 
that constrain future corruption.” (Taylor, 2006:298). Riley (1998:153) does not 
suggest prosecution per se but argues that “African politicians could demonstrate their 
commitment to public integrity by dismissing corrupt ministers and announcing the 
reason for their dismissal…” Following these theoretical propositions, the effect that 
we would be likely to observe in countries that have inflicted highly visible punitive 
actions for corruption-related offences, particularly among the ‘big fish’, is lower 
levels of corruption across public offices. This hypothesis will be tested in the 
subsequent section.   
 
The second type of literature that deals with corruption-related prosecutions does not 
focus on individual-level incentives for public office holders to engage in or abstain 
from corrupt behaviour, but on the political rationale for political leaders to inflict 
punitive actions for corruption-related offences. Africanist scholars, such as Jean-
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Francois Bayart, Patrick Chabal, Jean-Pascal Daloz, Jean-Francois Médard, and Jean-
Pierre Oliver de Sardan, argue that corruption in Africa is not about a few rotten 
apples that can be removed from an otherwise clean barrel. Corruption is the rule 
rather than the exception, and so is impunity. Oliver de Sardan (1999:30), for 
example, argues that “in the eventuality of an embezzlement hunt in high places, the 
majority of African politicians would stand to face trial.” The very issue of 
politicisation of anti-corruption efforts, which several academics focusing on the sub-
Saharan African region have highlighted, is therefore not a question of whether the 
charged official has committed corruption-related crimes or not. It is neither about the 
origin of the anti-corruption campaigns, which, for example, can be domestic or donor 
pressure for change (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991). Instead, it is a claim about 
selective punishment; why one corrupt ‘big fish’ is caught while his or her equally 
corrupt colleagues are not. These political science and anthropology scholars argue 
that corruption constitutes a politically important informal institution in Africa’s 
clientelist governance systems where political loyalty to the leadership is ensured 
through sanctioning the ability for office holders to gain more from their position than 
the formal salary. Following this logic, those who are singled out to be prosecuted for 
having abused their public offices must therefore have dishonoured this loyalty code 
and thereby lost the favour of the leaders.  
 
One direct way of losing the favours of the country’s leadership would be to pose a 
challenge for the leadership position and the benefits (material and status) it entails. 
According to Bayart (1988) and referred to by Harsh (1993:33): the anti-corruption 
campaigns initiated in Africa are “designed in part to deny rival factions the financial 
resources necessary to mount effective political challenges, while ensuring a 
monopoly on illicit accumulation for those currently in authority and/or favour.” 
Médard (2002:395) writes that anti-corruption sanctions are not about fighting 
corruption but about getting rid of someone for political reasons. Chabal and Daloz 
(1999:104) similarly state that corruption purges in Africa are “more often than not, 
convenient devices for eliminating political rivals rather than a real attempt to reform 
the political ‘order’.”  Oliver de Sardan (1999, footnote no. 9) suggests that “the rare 
cases of prosecution in the higher spheres…correspond to the legal ‘execution’ of an 
undesirable individual.” Following these assertions, we would expect those ‘big fish’ 
that do get caught for corruption-related offences, in one way or another to be an 
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inconvenience to the country’s leadership. This hypothesis will be tested below using 
data on ‘big fish’ prosecutions from across sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
5.3  Curbing corruption by ending impunity 
This section will assess the hypothesis that highly visible punitive actions against ‘big 
fish’ for corruption-related offences have a corruption-decreasing effect across 
government. I assess this hypothesis by comparing levels of corruption amongst 
government officials before and after instances of highly visible judicial actions 
against ‘big fish’ corruption offenders. Several countries in sub-Saharan Africa have 
in various ways used highly visible punitive actions against ‘big fish’ for corruption-
related offences and would thus constitute good cases for testing the hypothesis. Some 
of these cases are, however, difficult to include in the analysis due to the lack of 
appropriate data by which to compare levels of corruption before and after judicial 
interventions.  
 
Corruption is by its very nature notoriously difficult to measure and, therefore, the 
most common measure of corruption is the perception, rather than actual evidence, of 
the prevalence of corruption. Among the most popular perception-based data are those 
indices that give each country one corruption score or rank, such as Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption Index which is part of its Governance Indicators. While these indices have 
wide country coverage, they provide but a crude and generalist assessment of levels of 
corruption (Søreide, 2005). Other measurements of corruption may provide better 
tools for assessing the posed hypothesis. The Afrobarometer has conducted a survey 
on democracy and governance in several African countries on an approximately bi-
annual basis since 1999. Although this survey does not deal exclusively with 
corruption, certain survey questions concern perception on levels of corruption across 
various institutions and areas of the government and the private sector, such as among 
parliamentarians, school teachers and government officials. For certain countries, this 
data source can be triangulated with data from Transparency International’s Global 
Corruption Barometer which offers a more nuanced picture of the prevalence of 
corruption than the more popular perception-based indices. These two data sources 
constitute the basis for the descriptive statistics used in this section.  
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As a note of caution, however, the findings obtained from this research endeavour 
may be seen as indications rather than firm proof due to the fact that the data are 
based on citizen’s perceptions rather than more concrete evidence of actual corruption 
taking place. Whether perceived levels of corruption - either by citizens on which the 
two surveys used here are based or by country experts on which some corruption 
indices are based - is a true reflection of corruption occurring in a country is next to 
impossible to know for sure. Apart from believing that there would be no smoke 
without a fire, i.e., people would not perceive corruption to be common if this was not 
the reality, we have few ways of knowing with certainty that perceived levels of 
corruption resemble actual levels of corruption. For some types of corruption, citizens 
may base their perception on their own experiences with government officials. 
Perceptions about corruption higher up the political hierarchy may instead be 
influenced by media, rumours and gossip, or direct observation of wealth and 
behaviour.  
 
The perception-based characteristics of the data introduce some serious caveats to 
measuring the effect highly visible judicial actions against ‘big fish’ corruption 
offenders have on corruption levels among government officials. To start with, highly 
visible corruption raids on ‘big fish’ most probably come with a great amount of 
media exposure. In turn, media exposure of corruption most probably positively 
influences citizen’s perception of corruption. Therefore, by definition, raids on ‘big 
fish’ should increase people’s perception of corruption. In terms of empirical research 
on media’s influence on corruption perception, Chang and Kerr (2009), using 
Afrobarometer data, found evidence that citizens who were more exposed to media 
information tended to perceive higher levels of corruption, i.e. perceptions of 
corruption are created via media. However, contrary to this finding, Mattes and Africa 
(1999), using citizen-level data from South Africa, found no correlation between 
media exposure and perceptions of corruption. On the other hand, the ‘big fish’ raids 
are executed in the name of anti-corruption and should be reported in the media in the 
context of fighting corruption rather than in the context of unearthing corruption 
scandals. As such, a raid against a few ‘big fish’ may induce a belief among citizens 
that the government has no tolerance with corruption and that the few that misbehave 
will be detected and punished. In that case, media exposure of corruption in the 
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context of punishing corrupt ‘big fish’ may instead influence corruption perceptions 
negatively, meaning that media attention to corruption makes citizens perceive 
corruption to be lower than might be the case in reality. In short, media exposure of 
‘big fish’ prosecutions for corruption-related crimes may well affect citizen’s 
perception of corruption without affecting real levels of corruption, and this influence 
may go in either direction.  
 
Another data caveat concerns attribution from ‘big fish’ raid to a change in 
(perceived) corruption. Many other things could have happened in the country that 
could have influenced (perceived) corruption making it impossible to isolate and 
single out the effects on corruption from the ‘big fish’ raids.  Finally, the theories 
discussed in the previous section are silent with regards to the amount of time it 
would take for highly visible punishments against corruption, i.e. raids against ‘big 
fish’, to have an actual effect on corruption levels across government. The 
Afrobarometer and Global Corruption Barometer data spans a maximum of five years 
so if the effect is slower than that, it would not be reflected in the data used here. 
Taking these data caveats into consideration, the findings from this section’s 
statistical analysis may be seen as indicative rather than firm proof of the validity of 
the theory it sets out to test. By triangulating perceived levels of corruption with 
citizen’s perceptions about the government’s effectiveness in fighting corruption, the 
data analyses nonetheless offer some clues to how well the chosen anti-corruption 
tactic is actually working.  
 
The countries which have enacted on highly visible ‘big fish’ prosecutions and for 
which data on levels of perceived corruption exists from these two data sources are, in 
the order of analysis: Zambia, Malawi, Cameroon, and Nigeria. These countries have 
used different strategies in terms of ‘big fish’ prosecutions. While Zambia and 
Malawi have mainly focused on getting retribution for offences made by previous 
governments, the large scale corruption raids in Cameroon and Nigeria have focused 
on offences made under the leadership of the contemporary presidents. Thus, apart 
from assessing the impact of punitive actions as an anti-corruption strategy in general, 
the analysis also gives an indication about the effectiveness of these different 
strategies.  
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The first cases of ‘big fish’ corruption-related prosecutions to be assessed are the 
Zambian and Malawian cases which have targeted previous governments. In July 
2002, after the new President, Levy Mwanawasa, who was handpicked by President 
Frederick Chiluba (1991-2001) to be his successor, had been in office for just six 
months, the Zambian parliament lifted Chiluba’s immunity against prosecution. Over 
the following months the national courts upheld this parliamentary decision and in 
February 2003, Chiluba was arrested and charged with over 200 counts involving 
theft of state funds in excess of $40 million (Taylor, 2006:286). The ex-President’s 
head was not the only one to roll during that time. Ketele Kalumba, having held the 
important positions of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance under 
Chiluba, was arrested and charged with corruption too. The prosecutions received 
much support from the donor community in terms of money and expertise and, 
according to Taylor (2006:289) the British high commissioner declared that ‘this 
campaign against corruption is a delight to see’.  
 
The prosecution against such high political personalities proved to be a difficult task 
for the Zambian judiciary and the longevity of the case against Chiluba seems to have 
affected people’s opinion about the government’s anti-corruption intentions. The 
news magazine, Africa Confidential, reported in 2005 (Vol. 46, No. 3:6) that 
President Mwanawasa’s “anti-corruption fight against ex-President Chiluba and his 
cronies began with wide support but people are now doubting whether it was serious. 
Many prosecutions have been discontinued or lost and compensation for those 
acquitted costs a lot of money.” The survey question ‘how well or badly would you 
say the current government fights corruption in government?’ features in the 
Afrobarometer Zambia surveys for the years 2003, 2005 and 2008. While 28 percent 
of the respondents rated the government’s anti-corruption efforts very badly or fairly 
badly in 2003, these two response categories had almost doubled to 54 percent in 
2005 and increased yet more to 67 percent of respondents in 2008. These data indicate 
a lower level of public trust in the government’s anti-corruption efforts after the ‘big 
fish’ prosecution campaigns had taken place compared to before.  
 
In Malawi, following the election victory in 2004 of Bingu wa Mutharika, who was 
hand-picked by ex-President Bakili Muluzi to succeed him, several of the political 
figures that had been close to Muluzi found themselves under investigation for 
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corruption allegedly conducted during their tenure in the previous government. The 
level of corruption in government is believed to have been rampant during Muluzi’s 
leadership (1994-2004). For example, it has been acknowledged that approximately 
one-third of the national budget disappeared into the pockets of ministers and their 
clients on a yearly basis (Africa Confidential, Vol. 45, No. 23:4). Despite high levels 
of corruption, anti-corruption drives in Malawi were not absent during Muluzi’s 
presidency. For example, in 2000, Muluzi opted for a high-level corruption purge 
when, following a parliamentary report on corrupt behaviour in the government, he 
sacked his entire government. Anti-corruption rhetoric was also used during his time 
in office and full-page advertisements, apparently paid from Muluzi’s own pocket, 
could be found in the local press carrying the slogan ‘resist corruption, reject 
corruption, report corruption: our actions count NOW’ (Africa Confidential, Vol. 41, 
No. 22:3).  
 
However the use of ‘big fish’ prosecutions is a more recent phenomenon. The first 
‘big fish’ to be arrested for corruption was former Finance Minister, Friday Jumbe, in 
late 2004 (Africa Confidential, Vol. 45, No. 23:4) although Africa Confidential (2008, 
Vol. 49, No. 6:9) states that “Most UDF [United Democratic Front] leaders have 
corruption charges handing over their heads from their time in Muluzi’s government.” 
The party spokes-person for Muluzi’s UDF, Sam Mpasu, was charged in 2005 and 
sentenced to six years in prison. Investigation and the building-up of a case against 
ex-President Muluzi himself were initiated already in 2004 and in July 2006, he was 
arrested for 42 counts of corruption. At that time, however, the charges against him 
were dropped (BBC News online, 28 July 2006). These anti-corruption raids can be 
seen as evidence that anti-corruption is high on the priority list of Mutharika’s 
government and should, according to theory, have had an effect on the levels of 
corruption in the country. However, an article in Africa Confidential from 2008 (Vol. 
49, No. 6:9) states that while politicians hurl abuses at each other, corruption in 
Malawi is as bad as ever.  
 
The survey question ‘How many officials in the government do you think are 
involved in corruption?’ features in Afrobarometer’s data for Zambia in the years 
2003, 2005 and 2008 and for Malawi for the years 2005 and 2008. These years cover 
the timing of the ‘big fish’ prosecutions in the two countries. We would thus expect, 
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in accordance with theory that levels of corruption among government officials would 
have declined in the later years compare to the earlier ones. However, the survey 
results, calculated as percentages of respondents in table 5.1 below, do not support 
this proposition. In 2003, 29 percent of Zambian respondents believed that most or all 
government officials were involved in corruption. In 2005, two years after such high-
level prosecutions, 37 percent of respondent fit into this category and in 2008, 38 
percent had such high level of distrust in the country’s government officials. Thus, 
this data indicates that the to-start-with high perception of corruption within the 
government in Zambia did not diminish but rather increased after the ‘big fish’ 
prosecutions. Similarly, in the case of Malawi, there is no indication that levels of 
corruption among government officials have decreased between 2005 and 2008, 
rather the opposite.   
 
Table 5.1: Perceived extent of corruption among Zambian and Malawian 
government officials 
 
Year None Some of 
them 
Most of 
them 
All of them Don’t know No. of obs. 
 
Zambia 
 
2003 5% 56% 22% 7% 11% 1198 
2005 6% 45% 31% 6% 13% 1200 
2008 4% 44% 29% 9% 14% 1200 
 
Malawi 
 
2005 15% 30% 20% 5% 30% 1200 
2008 14% 36% 23% 7% 20% 1195 
 
Note: The percentages in table 5.1 have been calculated from the responses to the following survey 
question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: Government officials? Source: Afrobarometer, Survey Rounds 2, 3, 
and 4 for Zambia, and 3 and 4 for Malawi. 
While both Zambia and Malawi have inflicted highly visible punitive actions against 
corrupt ‘big fish’, there is no evidence from the data used here that such strategy has 
had the effect of decreasing corruption across government. Perhaps the focus on past 
governments’ corruption after a change in political leadership, as was largely the case 
in Zambia and Malawi, does not have as much of an influence on the behaviour of 
officials in the current government as a raid that focuses on current ‘big fish’ might 
have. As argued by Klitgaard et al. (2000:79), a campaign against corruption runs the 
risk of becoming a campaign against opposition and, therefore, the government 
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should focus on ‘frying some big fish’ that belong to the party in power. The 
experiences from Cameroon and Nigeria both provide such cases.  
 
Cameroon has several times in recent years been awarded the title of Africa’s most 
corrupt country by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, thus a 
big push against corruption in the form of high-level prosecutions can be seen as 
being just what the doctor ordered. During his long stay in office, President Paul Biya 
(1982-present) has acted harshly against corruption among high-level politicians 
several times. In 1997, the Secretary General at the Presidency, Titus Edzoa, was 
sentenced to 15 years in prison for embezzling state funds and in 1999, the Minister of 
Post and Telecommunication was sentenced to 20 years in prison for corruption. The 
large purge against corruption, however, came in 2006 and has been known as 
‘Operation Sparrowhawk’. Between 2006 and 2008, many high-level politicians and 
other senior figures in Cameroon were arrested for corruption, including two former 
finance ministers, one health minister, and one secretary general of the presidency. 
While those who were sent to jail in 2008 still await their sentences, the energy and 
water minister, Alphonse Siyam Siwe, who was arrested in 2006, was sentenced to 30 
years in prison.  
 
To the survey question of what will happen to levels of corruption in Cameroon in the 
next three years, 65 percent responded that it will increase. Data on the perception of 
levels of corruption among government officials in Cameroon are not available from 
Afrobarometer. Instead, the result from the similar survey question regarding the 
extent of perceived corruption in political parties from Transparency International’s 
Corruption Barometer has been used to assess the impact of Cameroon’s anti-
corruption purge. In Cameroon, the state has for long been symbolic with the leading 
presidential party, Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, which obtains about 
85 percent of the seats in the national assembly, thus the results from this survey 
question should be a good indicator also on public office corruption in the country. As 
shown in table 5.2 below, most respondents still believe that political parties are 
extremely corrupt although there has been a slight general improvement in perceived 
corruption levels with a fall from 60 to 47 percent in the proportion of people 
perceiving political parties to be ‘extremely corrupt’. Despite these signs of 
improvement, 62 percent of survey respondents in the 2009 Global Corruption 
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Barometer responded to the question ‘how would you assess your current 
government’s actions in the fight against corruption?’ that the government’s fight 
against corruption has been ineffective or somewhat ineffective. Similar signs of 
public distrust for the government’s anti-corruption efforts were also reported in the 
Global Corruption Barometer in 2007. 
 
Table 5.2: Perceived extent of corruption in Cameroonian political parties 
 
Year 1 =  
Not at all 
corrupt 
 
2 3 4 5 = 
Extremely 
corrupt 
Don’t 
know 
No. of 
obs. 
2006 4% 4% 8% 19% 60% 5% 528 
2008 3% 7% 15% 24% 47% 4% 519 
 
Note: The information in table 5.2 is reported in the result file in the abovementioned source for the 
following survey question: To what extent is this category affected by corruption in your country: 
Political parties? Source: Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer (2007 and 2009). 
Another country which has focused its anti-corruption drive on current ‘big fish’ is 
Nigeria. Anti-corruption has been high on the political agenda since Olusegun 
Obasanjo took office after the 1999 presidential election. The then President of the 
World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, in his endorsement of Obasanjo’s anti-corruption 
efforts stated in 2006 that “The president of Nigeria is making a strong effort to deal 
with corruption…taking on corrupt officials at a level that was unheard of in his 
country.” (Cited from Africa Confidential, Vol. 47, No. 19:1). The largest purge on 
corruption has been targeted to the country’s state governors. The first arrests came in 
2005 with five governors being charged with corruption after having been impeached 
and thereby lost their immunity from prosecution (Lawson, 2009:85). Following these 
arrests, the first prison sentence came in 2007. Although the national anti-corruption 
body, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, had been thought to be 
compromised before the elections (Obasanjo’s camp being accused of using 
corruption charges to remove political opponents from the 2007 election contestation, 
African Confidential, Vol. 48, No. 22:2; Vol. 48, No. 1:2), the purge continued and 
several governors were arrested also in late 2007 and 2008 (Lawson, 2009:88). 
 
The survey result from Afrobarometer on the perception of corruption among 
government officials in Nigeria (illustrated in table 5.3 below) shows no significant 
change between 2005 and 2008. According to a news article in Africa Confidential 
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from 2007, the effect of the purge on governors, at least in one area of the country, 
has not had the impact theory proposes. “The legacy of the outgoing group of state 
governors – massive vote-rigging, corrupt and opaque contracts, subterranean 
involvement in illicit oil deals and shadowy links to militant groups – has passed 
seamlessly to the next generation of state governors in the Delta.” (Vol. 48, No. 12:2). 
 
Table 5.3: Perceived extent of corruption among Nigerian government officials 
 
Year None Some of 
them 
Most of 
them 
 
All of them Don’t know No. of obs. 
2005 2% 35% 39% 21% 3% 2363 
2008 2% 36% 39% 18% 5% 2324 
 
Note: The percentages in table 5.3 have been calculated from the responses to the following survey 
question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: Government officials? Source: Afrobarometer, Survey Rounds 3 and 
4. 
By using survey-based data on the perception of corruption among government 
officials in four African countries, I have attempted to assess the proposition posed by 
several scholars, mostly from the economics discipline of the corruption literature, 
that the use of prosecution of high-level political figures can have a corruption-
curbing effect across government. The results I obtain by comparing levels of 
perceived corruption pre- and post these highly visible corruption-related raids on ‘big 
fish’, which target previous as well as current officeholders do not however lend 
much support for the posed hypothesis. Instead, following episodes of high-level 
purges on corruption, some of the countries have seen a marked decrease in their 
populations’ trust in their governments’ ability to tackle corruption. The findings in 
this section largely correspond to what Kpundeh (1997:100) states with regard to 
African countries: “the record of failure is exceedingly high for measures that use the 
blunt instrument of prosecution (or the fear of prosecution) as their principal tool for 
compliance.”  
 
Does this mean that those theories claiming that corruption can be curbed by ending 
impunity are wrong? Not necessarily. The question is rather whether this sort of anti-
corruption strategy actually ends impunity. The reason for the apparent bleak 
corruption-curbing effect of this type of anti-corruption strategy may be that the 
probability of ‘big fish’ getting caught has not decreased at large because only some 
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‘big fish’ are punished for corruption. In the next section, I will look deeper into this 
claim.  
 
5.4  Eliminating political rivals through prosecution 
This section will empirically assess the hypothesis derived from the work of some 
prominent Africanist political scientists and anthropologists that those ‘big fish’ who 
do get caught for corruption-related offences are targeted because they are, in one way 
or another, in an inconvenient position vis-à-vis the country’s leadership. In this 
branch of the literature the claims about politicisation of prosecutions are rarely 
backed up by specific cases and no study, to my knowledge, has systematically 
assembled evidence of, and analysed, this claim. This is not surprising since such task 
is filled with methodological obstacles. Since it is assumed that corruption is the rule 
and that those who are charged with corruption are guilty as claimed, the notion of 
politicisation cannot be tested by assessing the effectiveness of the judicial system, for 
which somewhat objective data could be gathered. Instead, the heart of the matter is 
internal power-politics at an informal level for which data is much harder to assemble, 
especially across many different cases.  
 
I have used two strategies in order to overcome this obstacle and approach a 
systematic assessment of the claim of politicisation and selective targeting. First, I 
have collected contextualised information about ‘big fish’ prosecutions from across 
sub-Saharan Africa in order to find patterns of who gets prosecuted and what the 
political purposes, if any, of the prosecutions are. Using mainly journalistic accounts, 
this research strategy provided material for hypothesis building. Much of these data 
have come from the newsmagazine Africa Confidential which provides current affairs 
reports and analyses from across Africa. Because this news source does not reveal the 
identity of its reporters, it can better escape both the government censorship and self-
censorship that many news providers across Africa are burdened with and can, 
therefore, be judged as being more objective in their analyses than media that is 
owned or in other ways supported by a government.  
 
Second, in order to test the hypotheses derived from using the abovementioned 
strategy, I have enlarged the sample and assembled all cases of ‘big fish’ prosecutions 
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at ministerial level mentioned in Africa Confidential. When looking closer into the 
cases mentioned in this news source using various news sources and other sources of 
information found through desk-top research (for example, cases reported by the 
Washington-based NGO Global Integrity) I have found additional information about 
other cases. The resulting database on corruption-related prosecutions across sub-
Saharan Africa is intended to cover the universe of such cases, although some cases 
might have been missed if they have not been extensively mentioned in the news 
press. All in all, the database contains 39 cases of corruption-related prosecutions at 
the level of ministers across sub-Saharan Africa (see Annex). At first, I considered 
broadening the sample to include other types of ‘big fish’, such as members of 
parliament, but there were very few such cases and, therefore, I settled for 
prosecutions at the level of ministers. The cases are from 1996 to 2010 and this 
timeframe corresponds well with the start of the international donor community’s 
anti-corruption agenda.  
 
5.4.1 Using media articles to identify patterns in ‘big fish’ prosecutions 
This section concerns what types of ‘big fish’ get prosecuted for corruption, when 
such prosecutions occur, and why. The first thing that becomes apparent from the 
cases of ‘big fish’ prosecutions is that formal party-political ‘opposition’ is rarely 
targeted and that, instead, the vast majority of prosecutions are targeted at officials 
who belong to the party of the president. Since the party systems, at large, in sub-
Saharan African countries constitute a large dominant party surrounded by small and 
highly volatile parties (van de Walle, 2007:61), the real political rivalry for the 
incumbent in many places is likely to come from within the dominant party as 
opposed to from challenging parties. 
 
Ghana, with its two strong parties, is an outlier in this case. In addition, the ‘big fish’ 
that have been targeted for prosecutions have belonged to the formal party-political 
opposition. In President John Kufour’s anti-corruption campaigns, the opposition 
party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), was targeted. After winning the 
elections in 2000, Kufour’s government arrested three former ministers from ex-
President Rawling’s (NDC) government for corruption; in 2001 and 2002, a Fast 
Track High Court sentenced them to between four and 10 years in prison. These three 
former ministers had constituted ‘big fish’ at the highest level in the former 
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government: one Minister of Finance and his deputy, and one Minister of Trade and 
Industry. However, in 2005, President Kufour exercised his constitutional right and 
pardoned the three ex-ministers only a couple of years into their sentences (Africa 
Confidential, Vol. 49, No. 16:9). A few years later, in 2008, a former advisor to ex-
President Rawling was sentenced by the same Fast Track High Court to five years in 
prison for corruption. An articles in Africa Confidential (Vol. 50, No. 20:9) reports 
that many viewed the prosecution as politically motivated and an attempt by the 
Kufour government to tarnish a key member of the opposition. In early 2009, just 
days after the inauguration of the new NDC President, John Atta Mills, the former 
advisor was released and regained his role as key advisor to the new president. In the 
case of Ghana, it seems that the weapon of corruption-related prosecutions has been 
used in a party political war rather than being used to seriously signal a change in 
political culture away from impunity with regard to corruption.  
 
This first category of ‘big fish’ prosecutions can be described as ‘old big fish’ since 
they were targeted after a new incumbent had taken the political throne. The cases of 
Zambia and Malawi, which were discussed in the previous section, also constitute 
examples where prosecutions may have been used in order to get rid of opposition. In 
both Zambia and Malawi as mentioned earlier, the investigations, arrests and 
prosecutions began following the inauguration of the new presidents, Mwanawasa in 
Zambia and Mutharika in Malawi, and they predominantly targeted those ministers 
who had constituted ‘big fish’ under the previous presidents. In both cases, the new 
presidents came from the party that was already in power, thus, one can assume that 
many of the previous ‘big fish’ could continue in their already established roles, 
forming a power house that might have sufficient political strength to pose problems 
for the new presidents. In the case of Zambia, Taylor (2006:288) states that President 
Mwanawasa “moved to marginalise or remove powerful insiders remaining from [ex-
President] Chiluba’s government”. In the case of Malawi, a news article in Africa 
Confidential from 2004 (Vol. 45, No. 16:6) states that after President Mutharika won 
the election, the ‘old guard’ were at ‘daggers drawn’ with the new president’s 
reformers who, in turn, used arrests and dark warnings of corruption proceedings to 
keep their powerful adversaries at bay. Another article states that “Most [United 
Democratic Front] leaders have corruption charges hanging over their heads from 
their time in Muluzi’s government.” (Africa Confidential, Vol. 49, no.1:8). Even in 
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2009, five years into Mutharika’s presidency, Africa Confidential (Vol. 50, No. 18:12) 
reports that much of the Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau’s time continues to be 
spent chasing ex-President Muluzi’s allies.  
 
The second category of prosecuted ‘big fish’ can be called ‘upcoming big fish’ and 
consist of political figures close to the incumbent who have risen in political hierarchy 
and pose some sort of challenge to the incumbent. In Malawi, Brown Mpinganjira, 
senior minister and former right hand man of President Muluzi, was sacked from 
government and subsequently arrested for corruption in 2000. It is widely believed 
that the political heavyweight was having presidential ambitions and had fallen out 
with President Muluzi over the former’s attempt to change the constitution to be able 
to run in the 2004 election. According to a BBC news report (2000, retrieved on 15 
October 2010), the former minister was “accompanied to the police by a horde of 
supporters who chanted songs praising him as the next state president of the Republic 
of Malawi.” He later formed his own party for which he ran, and lost, in the 2004 
elections (Africa Confidential, Vol. 42, no. 7). In Senegal, the internal rivalry between 
President Abdoulaye Wade, in power since 2000, and Idrissa Seck, prime minister 
between 2002 and 2004, is also believed to have prompted prosecution. The two of 
them go back far in time and Seck was for many years seen as the protégée and right 
hand man of Wade. However, in April 2004, Seck, having gained popularity and 
influence, was sacked from his post and suspended from the Senegalese Democratic 
Party. In July 2005, he was detained and charged for corruption as well as for 
threatening state security and was put in prison until February 2006 when the charges 
were dropped. In April the same year, Seck announced that he would run for president 
in the 2007 election against Wade (Africa Confidential, Vol.48, No. 3:12; Vol. 49, 
No. 5:9; Vol. 50, No. 8:9; BBC New online, 25 July 2005, retrieved on 5 August 
2010).  
 
The case of the Cameroonian ex-Secretary-General of the Presidency, Titus Edzoa, 
who was sentenced to 15 years in prison for corruption, is another example of such 
internal rivalry. Edzoa had, at the time of his arrest, just resigned from his post as 
Minister of Health to stand in the 1997 presidential elections against President Biya 
(Africa Confidential, Vol. 49, No. 6:4). Biya’s more recent anti-corruption campaign, 
Operation Sparrowhawk that was discussed in the previous section, can also be seen 
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in this light. One news article from Africa Confidential report that “One advantage of 
[Biya’s] anti-corruption crusades, apparent and real, is that they warn potential 
successors to keep their political ambitions to themselves, for fear of becoming the 
next head on a spear outside the Presidential Palace.” (Vol. 49, No. 12:10). A few 
months after this report, the same news source wrote that “Many criticise [Biya’s] 
much trumpeted anti-corruption drive…as highly selective and designed to strengthen 
his hand as he organises his next reshuffle and prepare for yet another presidential 
term.” (Africa Confidential, Vol. 49, No. 15:9).   
 
Having distinguished the ‘old big fish’ and the ‘upcoming big fish’ as certain types of 
‘big fish’ being prosecuted for corruption, the final category can be called the 
‘recycled presidents’ and it constitutes cases in which former presidents have risen to 
directly challenge the incumbent. The case of Rwanda’s first post-1994 president, 
Pasteur Bizimungu is telling in this regard. In 2000, Bizimungu resigned from his post 
as president after having been politically side-lined by his vice-President, Paul 
Kagame. In 2001, Bizimungu announced the establishment of a new political party 
with which he would enter the 2003 presidential election race. He was subsequently 
arrested, put under house arrest and imprisoned, and later sentenced to 15 years in 
prison for corruption and for attempting to form a militia and inciting violence. He 
was, however, released from prison in 2007 after having been pardoned by President 
Kagame (Amnesty International, 2008; Front Line, 2005:10; BBC News online, 31 
May 2001, retrieved on 5 August 2010).  
 
The show-trial given to ex-president, Pascal Lissouba, of the Republic of Congo can 
also be put in the ‘recycled presidents’ category. Lissouba was the Congolese 
President from 1993 to 1997 when he was overthrown by Denis Sassou-Nguesso. In 
December 2001, three months prior to the presidential elections in which Lissouba 
was seen as the main rival to President Sassou-Nguesso, the exiled ex-president was 
sentenced in absentia to 30 years hard labour for corrupt deals involving the personal 
abuse of oil revenues back in 1993. The trial lasted only two days and was dismissed 
by the ex-president as a joke. President Sassou-Nguesso subsequently won the 2002 
elections with nearly 90 percent of the vote (Africa Confidential, Vol. 42, no. 7; Vol. 
43, no. 6; BBC News online, 2001, retrieved on 15 October 2010). In the case of 
Malawi and President Mutharika’s anti-corruption campaign against ex-President 
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Muluzi, the ex-President had been arrested for corruption in 2006 although the case 
against him had at that time been discharged. Muluzi had continued to be the leader of 
the United Democratic Front, the party that President Mutharika had left in 2005, and 
was in 2008 chosen to be the party’s presidential candidate for the 2009 elections. 
However, only three months prior to the elections, Muluzi was arrested and charged 
with over 80 counts of corruption (BBC News online, 27 February 2009, retrieved on 
18 August 2010).  
 
The news articles mentioned here appear to support the proposition from the 
Africanist scholars that the ‘big fish’ that constitute a source of political opposition or 
rivalry to the incumbent are the ones who are prosecuted for corruption, i.e. the use of 
prosecution for corruption-related crimes appears to fill a power-political function. 
From the analysis based on news material, I have derived three different categories of 
‘big fish’ prosecutions with regard to who gets prosecuted, why, and when it happens.  
The first category consists of the ‘old big fish’ who are lingering on the political scene 
after a presidential change. The second category of prosecuted ‘big fish’ consists of 
the ‘upcoming big fish’. Finally, the third category is called ‘recycled presidents’ and 
include three previous presidents who were prosecuted while preparing to directly 
challenge the incumbent in the polls.  
 
5.4.2 Testing patterns of ‘big fish’ prosecutions 
While it would be practically impossible to systematically test the hypothesised 
reasons for why prosecutions of the three types of ‘big fish’ take place because of the 
informal nature of such power-politics, it is possible to indirectly assess whether 
politicisation and targeting of prosecution is likely to have taken place. This can be 
done by systematically analysing the timing of prosecutions. Two hypotheses on 
timing can be tested. First, there are no patterns in the timing of prosecutions, i.e. 
there is no evidence of politicisation and targeting of corruption-related prosecutions. 
A lack of pattern would indicate that ‘big fish’ are indiscriminately prosecuted as 
soon as evidence of corruption emerges. Second, there are patterns in the timing of 
prosecutions. A pattern in the timing for anti-corruption raids may be evidence that 
prosecutions are politicised. If prosecutions are selective and used in order to 
eliminate certain types of ‘big fish’, we would expect a difference in the timing of 
prosecutions between the three categories of ‘big fish’. This is because the urgency 
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for getting rid of the ‘big fish’ differs slightly among the three categories, although 
the underlying reason for their dismissal appears to be to ensure a continued hold on 
power.   
 
From the analysis in the previous sub-section, some theoretical propositions can be 
derived with regard to the expected timing of prosecutions of the three categories ‘big 
fish’. The previous analysis showed that the first category, the ‘old big fish’, may 
constitute competing powerhouses and, in that capacity, deny the new leader 
extensive political autonomy, as was the case in Malawi and Zambia. The rational 
incumbent is likely to want to eliminate such competition as soon as possible and we 
could therefore expect prosecutions of this category ‘big fish’ to occur shortly after 
the inauguration of a new political leader. Those ‘big fish’ belonging to the second 
category, the ‘upcoming big fish’, constitute political insiders who have risen in 
hierarchy and become rivals to the incumbents. The rational incumbent would likely 
want to deal with this rivalry before having to directly face the rival in the party’s 
election of presidential candidate or later in the national elections. Therefore, we 
could expect to find prosecutions of this category ‘big fish’ to occur from the middle 
of the election cycle and onwards as the incumbent prepares for the next election. 
Finally, as the name indicates, the ‘recycled presidents’ are former leaders who have 
chosen to directly challenge the incumbent in national elections. In order to avoid 
being challenged and risk losing an election we could expect the rational incumbent to 
support prosecution of this category ‘big fish’ close to the upcoming election when 
presidential candidates are known.  
 
I have divided the 39 assembled cases of corruption-related prosecutions at the level 
of ministers into these three categories. Fifteen cases have been placed in the first 
category, the ‘old big fish’ lingering on the political scene after a change of president. 
These cases are linked by the fact that the prosecuted individuals held ministerial 
positions in the previous government. Seventeen cases belong to the second category, 
the ‘upcoming big fish’. These are all the cases in which the minister charged for 
corruption did not hold a ministerial position in the previous government. Finally, 
three ex-presidents can be put in the third category ‘recycled presidents’. Although 
these three are leaders of previous governments, because of the context of their 
prosecutions they deserve a category of their own. One of these ex-presidents, Pascal 
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Lissouba, was charged in absentia for the same crime and at the same time as four of 
his cronies, including two former prime ministers. These additional four ‘big fish’ 
have been included in this category, leaving it with seven ‘big fish’ in total.   
 
With this division in place, I have, for each case of prosecution in the database, 
divided the number of months into the election cycle that arrests took place with the 
total number of months of a country’s election cycle. For example, in the case of 
former Malawian Minister of Finance, Friday Jumbe: as he was arrested five months 
after the previous presidential election and there are 60 months in the Malawian 
election cycle, thus, his case gets a score of 5/60=0.08. In this case, the fraction of 
time when the arrest occurred was 0.08 or eight percent into the election cycle.  
 
The question of whether there is a difference between the three different categories of 
prosecuted ‘big fish’ can be statistically analysed. The dependent variable is a 
continuous variable and constitutes the fractions of time into the election cycle when 
arrests occurred in the 39 cases and the independent variable constitutes a categorical 
variable based on the three categories of prosecuted ‘big fish’ discussed above. Using 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), I find statistically significant differences in 
timing of prosecution between the three groups of ‘big fish’. The results are presented 
in table 5.4 below. 
 
Table 5.4: Differences in timing across ‘big fish’ categories  
 
Dependent variable Old big fish Upcoming  
big fish 
Recycled  
presidents 
F-value  
 
 
Fraction into election cycle  
when arrests occurred 
Mean = 0.29  
Std. Dev. = 0.22 
Mean = 0.48 
Std. Dev. = 0.24 
Mean = 0.89 
Std. Dev. = 0.13 
18.60*** 
 
 
No. of obs. 15 17 7  
 
Note: The dependent variable constitutes the sum of the fractions of time into the election cycle when 
arrests occurred. *** signifies p<.001. 
The average fraction of time when arrests occurred for the ministers belonging to the 
category ‘old big fish’ was 29 percent into the election cycle; for ‘upcoming big fish’, 
the average was 48 percent, and for ‘recycled presidents’, the average time was 89 
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percent into the election cycle.
19
 Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 below show the three 
categories of ‘big fish’ on an election cycle continuum (see the annex for further 
information about the 39 cases).  
  
 
                                                 
19 
In certain countries multiple ‘big fish’ have been prosecuted as a result of larger raids, for example 
Cameroon’s ‘Operation Sparrowhawk’. The statistical analysis in table 5.4 is based on one observation 
per ‘big fish’. In an alternative calculation I have clustered such multiple entries as the average of 
timing of prosecution within the same raid. As such, for Cameroon the abovementioned raid (2006-
2008) gets one observation; and so do Congo (2001); Ghana (2001); Malawi (2004-2006); Tanzania 
(2008), and Zambia (2003). Following this alternative calculation, the ANOVA mean for ‘old big fish’ 
is 0.31; ‘upcoming big fish’ is 0.51, and ‘recycles presidents’ is 0.83 (F=5.31, p=0.01). In short, such 
clustering of observations does not alter the conclusion that the three categories differ in their timing of 
prosecution in a statistically significant way.     
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The statistically significant patterns found in the analysis of variance support the 
hypothesis above stating that there is a pattern in ‘big fish’ prosecutions in accordance 
with the propositions about the timing of each of the three categories of ‘big fish’ 
derived from the analysis of media articles. While these findings are silent with regard 
to whether the prosecuted ministers were guilty or not of corruption-related crimes, 
these patterns suggest that we cannot dismiss that a politicisation in this type of anti-
corruption effort may be occurring.  
 
5.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I focus on the issue of corruption-related prosecutions of high-level 
political figures, co-called ‘big fish’, across sub-Saharan Africa. First, I assess the 
hypothesis that highly visible punitive actions against ‘big fish’ for corruption-related 
offences decrease levels of corruption across government. I use survey-level data on 
people’s perceptions on levels of corruption among government officials in four 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and compare the data pre-and post the highly visible 
‘big fish’ prosecutions. The results from this empirical assessment do not lend much 
support to the posed hypothesis. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the 
hypothesis is faulty. Instead, it may be that the probability of being caught for 
corruption has not increased in a significant way, which in turn, may be a result of 
prosecutions being used for political reasons other than ending impunity across 
government.  
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Figure 5.3: Timing of arrests for ministers in the 'recycled presidents' category
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In the second part of the chapter, I look into the claims that ‘big fish’ prosecutions are 
used as political tools to eliminate certain individuals. I use politically contextualised 
data on ‘big fish’ prosecutions from news articles to discern hypotheses about who is 
likely to get prosecuted; when, and for what reason. Using 39 cases of corruption-
related prosecutions at the level of ministers, I then test the hypotheses about who gets 
prosecuted and when, using statistical analysis. The result shows patterns in the 
timing of prosecutions that supports the claim that corruption-related prosecutions are 
used in order to eliminate political rivals.  
 
The presence of such politicisation and targeting of corruption-related prosecutions 
are coupled with serious concerns. If prosecutions of ‘big fish’ are used as a means to 
target those who constitute political rivals, the use of prosecution, instead of 
increasing the personal cost of being corrupt and thereby inducing change across the 
political system, as the theories by Klitgaard et al (2000) and Collier (2002) propose, 
would increase the personal cost of letting go of power due to the risk of being 
prosecuted by the successor incumbent.  
 
While the majority of the new constitutions that came into force across sub-Saharan 
Africa following democratisation in the 1990s included rules about presidential term 
limits, 14 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have thus far gone through the process of 
having these rules amended. One reason for this may well be the fear of being 
prosecuted for corruption by the new government, as happened in Malawi and 
Zambia. In fact, even if the former president is granted immunity, his family and inner 
circle will in general not be which adds to the incentive of clinging onto power. 
According to Tangri (2006) this is one reason why Uganda’s President, Museveni, has 
refused to let go of power. “In Uganda there seems to be real fear within Museveni’s 
family and akazu (an inner ruling clique of six relatives, in-laws and friends) that a 
new government could follow them up on alleged corruption.” (Ibid: 194). 
 
A politicisation of corruption-related prosecutions would also increase the personal 
cost for high level political figures to stand up against a powerful executive and 
thereby decrease the space for horizontal accountability that high-level political actors 
may provide. In short, when prosecutions are deployed for political reasons, this type 
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of anti-corruption measure is not expected to bring about less corruption but, instead, 
it runs the risk of altering dynamics that are fundamental to a functioning democracy.  
 
The international donor community is a major stakeholder in African countries’ anti-
corruption efforts. On the one hand, development assistance is often coupled with 
some kind of anti-corruption strategy being in place. On the other hand, donors 
provide funding and expertise to various anti-corruption institutions, such as anti-
corruption agencies. They have also financially supported various ‘big fish’ 
investigations and corruption trials (BBC News online, 9 December 2003, retrieved 
on 20 August 2010; allAfrica.com, 18 April 2007, retrieved on 20 August 2010). 
Several voices have, however, expressed caution about donors’ lack of focus on the 
political environment in which their anti-corruption projects in Africa and elsewhere 
take place (Unsworth, 2009; Fjeldstad & Isaksen, 2008:17). For example, Rocha 
Menocal (2007) argues that “…donors tend to shy away from grappling with political 
factors more directly. They prefer to address challenges such as corruption and poor 
governance from a technical perspective…” By turning a blind eye on the effects their 
sponsored anti-corruption efforts have on internal politics, and in this case, how anti-
corruption measures can affect political dynamics, donors risk reinforcing the very 
institutional structures in which corruption flourishes. 
 
Fighting political rivals and opposition through judicial means is not a new 
phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa. In Zimbabwe, for example, it has been popular to 
charge high-level individuals with treason (Guardian online, 3 January 2010, retrieved 
26 September 2010) and in Rwanda, high-level politicians continue at present time to 
be accused for having taken part in the 1994 genocide. However, the official 
motivation for getting rid of someone for political reasons may have been altered by 
the advent of the international anti-corruption agenda. This point was stressed in an 
interview I conducted with a lawyer in Kigali in 2009 who argued that “especially the 
West, which is not overly sympathetic of genocide accusation, applauds a legal 
system that puts people in jail for corruption.” Whether the anti-corruption agenda has 
resulted in corruption-related ‘big fish’ prosecutions having merely substituted ‘big 
fish’ prosecutions for other types of crimes would be an interesting issue for future 
research.  
145 
 
Annex: Database on corruption-related prosecutions at the level of 
ministers across sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Country  Name; 
Date when arrested, 
or charged; 
Verdict if 
applicable 
Office held that was 
allegedly abused 
President and election 
cycle 
Cameroon Titus Edzoa 
 
July 1997  
 
Sentenced to 15 
years in prison 
Secretary General of the 
Presidency and Minister of 
Health  until 1997 
 
Paul Biya (November 
1982- present) 
 
October 1992- October 
1997 (60 months) 
Cameroon Mounchipou Seidou 
 
October 1999 
 
Sentenced to 20  
years in prison 
Minister of Post and 
Telecommunications until 
1999 
Paul Biya (November 
1982- present) 
 
October 1997- October 
2004 (84 months) 
Cameroon  
 
Alphonse Siyam 
Siwe 
 
February 2006 
 
Sentenced to 30 
years in prison 
Director-General of the 
Autonomous Port of 
Douala (1999-2005) 
Paul Biya (November 
1982- present) 
 
October 2004- October 
2011 (84 months) 
Cameroon  
 
Edouard Akame 
Mfoumou 
 
April  2008 
Minister of State for the 
Economy and Finance 
until 2001 
Paul Biya (November 
1982- present) 
 
October 2004- October 
2011 (84 months) 
Cameroon  
 
Polycarpe Abah 
Abah 
 
April 2008 
Minister of State for the 
Economy and Finance 
until 2007 
Paul Biya (November 
1982- present) 
 
October 2004- October 
2011 (84 months) 
Cameroon  
 
Urbain Olanguena 
 
April 2008 
 
Minister of Health until 
2007 
Paul Biya (November 
1982- present) 
 
October 2004- October 
2011 (84 months) 
Cameroon  
 
Jean-Marie Atangana 
Mebara 
 
April 2008 
Secretary-General of the 
Presidency (2002-2006) 
Paul Biya (November 
1982- present) 
 
October 2004- October 
2011 (84 months) 
Congo, Rep. Pascal Lissouba 
 
December 2001 
 
Sentenced to 30 
years of hard labour 
President (1992-1997) Denis Sassou-Nguesso 
(October 1997- present)  
 
October 1997 (no election 
was held)- March 2002 (53 
months) 
Congo, Rep. Claude Antoine 
Dacosta   
 
December 2001 
 
Sentenced to 20 
Prime Minister (1992-
1993) 
Denis Sassou-Nguesso 
(October 1997- present)  
 
October 1997 (no election 
was held)- March 2002 (53 
months) 
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years of hard labour 
Congo, Rep. Jacques Joachim 
Yhombi Opango 
 
December 2001 
 
Sentenced to 20 
years of hard labour 
Prime Minister (1993-
1996) 
Denis Sassou-Nguesso 
(October 1997- present)  
 
October 1997 (no election 
was held)- March 2002 (53 
months) 
Congo, Rep. Guila Mougounga 
Nkombo 
 
December 2001 
 
Sentenced to 20 
years of hard labour 
Finance Minister (1994-
1997) 
 
Denis Sassou-Nguesso 
(October 1997- present)  
 
October 1997 (no election 
was held)- March 2002 (53 
months) 
Congo, Rep. Benoit Koukebene 
 
December 2001 
 
Sentenced to 20 
years of hard labour 
Oil Minister (1993-1997) Denis Sassou-Nguesso 
(October 1997- present)  
 
October 1997 (no election 
was held)- March 2002 (53 
months) 
Ethiopia Tamirat Layne 
 
October 1996 
 
Sentenced to 18 
years in prison 
Prime Minister, (1991-
1995)  
  
Meles Zenawi (prime 
minister, August 1995- 
present) 
 
May 1995- May 2000 (60 
months) 
Ethiopia Siye Abraha 
 
May 2001 
 
Sentenced to 6 years 
in prison 
Minister of Defence until 
2000 
 
Meles Zenawi (prime 
minister, August 1995- 
present) 
 
May 2000- May 2005 (60 
months) 
Ghana Victor Selormey 
 
April 2001 
 
Sentenced to 8 years 
in prison  
Deputy Finance Minister 
(1992-2001) 
John Kufuor (January 
2001- January 2009) 
 
December 2000- 
December 2004 (48 
months) 
Ghana Richard Kwame 
Peprah 
 
May 2001 
 
Sentenced to 4 years 
in prison 
Finance Minister  
(1995-2001) 
John Kufuor (January 
2001- January 2009) 
 
December 2000- 
December 2004 (48 
months) 
Ghana Dan Abodakpi 
 
July 2001 
 
Sentenced to 10 
years in prison 
Minister for Trade and 
Industry until 2001 
John Kufuor (January 
2001- January 2009) 
 
December 2000- 
December 2004 (48 
months) 
Liberia Gyude Bryant 
 
February 2007 
 
Chairman of the 
Transitional Government 
of Liberia (2003-2006) 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf 
(January 2006- present) 
 
November 2005- October 
2011 (71 months) 
Madagascar Marc Ravalomanana 
 
June 2009  
President (2002- 2009) 
 
Andry Rajoelina (March 
2009-present) 
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Sentenced to 4 years 
in prison 
March 2009 (no election 
was held)- December 2011 
(33 months) 
Malawi Brown Mpinganjira 
 
December 2000 
 
Minister of Education 
1997-1999 
Bakili Muluzi (May 1994- 
May 2004) 
 
June 1999-May 2004 (47 
months) 
Malawi Friday Jumbe 
 
October 2004 
 
Finance Minister (2002-
2004) 
 
Bingu wa Mutharika (May 
2004- present) 
 
May 2004- May 2009 (60 
months) 
Malawi Yusuf Mwawa 
 
May 2005 
 
Sentenced to 5 years 
in prison 
Minister of Education until 
2005 
 
Bingu wa Mutharika (May 
2004- present) 
 
May 2004- May 2009 (60 
months)  
Malawi Sam Mpasu 
 
November 2005 
 
Sentenced to 6 years 
in prison 
Minister of Education 
(1994-1996) 
 
Bingu wa Mutharika (May 
2004- present) 
 
May 2004- May 2009 (60 
months) 
Malawi Bakili Muluzi 
 
July 2006 
 
Charges dropped 
President (1994-2004) 
 
Bingu wa Mutharika (May 
2004- present) 
 
May 2004- May 2009 (60 
months) 
Malawi Bakili Muluzi 
 
February 2009 
 
President (1994-2004)  Bingu wa Mutharika (May 
2004- present) 
 
May 2004- May 2009 (60 
months) 
Mozambique Almerino Manhenje 
 
September 2008  
 
Interior Minister (1996- 
2005) 
Armando Guebuza 
(February 2005- present) 
 
December 2004- October 
2009 (58 months) 
Mozambique Antonio Munguambe 
 
October 2008 
 
Sentenced to 20 
years in prison 
Minister of Transport and 
communication (2005- 
2008) 
Armando Guebuza 
(February 2005- present) 
 
December 2004- October 
2009 (58 months) 
Rwanda Pasteur Bizimungo 
 
April 2002  
 
Sentenced to 15 
years in prison 
President (1994- 2000) Paul Kagame (2000- 
present) 
 
March 2000- August 2003 
(41 months) 
Rwanda Patrick Habamenshi 
 
May 2005 
 
Acquitted after trial  
Minister of Agriculture 
(2003- 2005) 
Paul Kagame (2000- 
present) 
 
August 2003- August 2010 
(84 months) 
Rwanda Théoneste 
Mutsindashyaka 
 
Governor of the Eastern 
Province (2006-2008) 
Paul Kagame (2000- 
present) 
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July 2009 
 
Sentenced to one 
year in prison 
August 2003- August 2010 
(84 months) 
Senegal July 2005 
 
Idrissa Seck 
Prime Minister (2002- 
2004) 
Abdoulaye Wade (April 
2000- present) 
February 2000- February 
2007 (84 months) 
Sierra Leone August 1999 
 
Harry Will 
 
Acquitted in 2008  
Agricultural Minister 
(1996- 1999) 
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah 
(March 1996- September 
2007) 
 
February 1996- May 2002 
(75 months) 
Sierra Leone Sheiku Tejan 
Koroma 
 
November 2009 
 
Sentenced to 5 years 
in prison 
Health and Sanitation 
Minister (2007-2009) 
Ernest Bai Koroma 
(September 2007- present) 
 
August 2007- August 2012 
(60 months) 
South Africa Jacob Zuma 
 
June 2005 
 
Acquitted in 2009 
Deputy President (1999- 
2005) 
 
Thabo Mbeki (June 1999-
September 2008) 
 
April 2004- May 2009 (61 
months) 
Tanzania Daniel Ndhira Yona 
 
November 2008 
 
Minister for Energy and 
Minerals until 2006 
 
Jakaya Kikwete 
(December 2005- present) 
 
December 2005- October 
2010 (58 months) 
Tanzania Basil Pesambili 
Mramba 
 
November 2008 
 
Minister of Finance (2000-
2006) 
Jakaya Kikwete 
(December 2005- present) 
 
December 2005- October 
2010 (58 months) 
Uganda Jim Muhwezi 
 
May 2007 
 
Minister of Health (2001-
2006) 
Yoweri Museveni (January 
1986- present) 
 
February 2006- February 
2011 (60 months) 
 
Zambia 
Katele Kalumba  
 
January 2003  
 
Sentenced to 5 years 
in prison  
Minister of Finance (1999-
2002) 
Levy Mwanawasa 
(January 2002- August 
2008) 
 
December 2001- 
September 2006 (57 
months) 
Zambia Frederick Chiluba 
 
February 2003 
 
Acquitted in 2009 
 
President (1991-2002) Levy Mwanawasa 
(January 2002- August 
2008) 
 
December 2001- 
September 2006 (57 
months) 
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6. The Primacy of Politics: Some Lessons for Policy Makers 
Fifteen years have passed since the start of the international donor community’s 
heightened focus on corruption led by the World Bank. In this thesis I have critically 
assessed, from the political context of sub-Saharan African countries, the theoretical 
validity underpinning the international donor community’s fight against corruption. I 
have approached the overall research question, which concerned the effects of the 
anti-corruption policies induced by the international donor community, by assessing 
three distinct policies that are part of the international donor community’s anti-
corruption agenda: political liberalisation, economic liberalisation, and the use of ‘big 
fish’ prosecutions to curb corruption.  
 
The overarching conclusion from the three empirical chapters constituting the core of 
this thesis is that corruption in the sub-Saharan African context has a political 
function which makes the reforms prescribed by the donor community difficult, or 
illogical, to fully comply with. In particular, I argue that corruption in the sub-Saharan 
African context is linked to politically rational governance tools – i.e. prebendalism 
and the generation and distribution of resources on a personalised patron-client basis – 
which are used by the political leaders in power to buy elite loyalty and thereby 
ensure continued political control over the state. Political leaders thereby have few 
incentives to seriously buy into the anti-corruption prescriptions offered by the 
international donor community if these reforms jeopardise their use of these 
corruption-related governance tools. External pressure to prescribe to the anti-
corruption prescriptions may, rather than curbing corruption, produce unintended 
consequences. I predict that corruption, in one way or the other will continue 
flourishing regardless of reforms to the formal institutions as long as the informal 
institutions, characterised by ‘Big Man’ and winner-takes-all politics, continue to be 
the order of the day. I hope that the empirical findings in this thesis will contribute to 
setting realistic expectations of the likely effects of externally driven good governance 
and anti-corruption policies in sub-Saharan Africa and give support to a new 
generation of more politically sensitive and engaged development policy makers.   
 
This concluding chapter is organised as follows: In section 6.1, I summarise and 
discuss the methodological choices and contributions of this thesis. In section 6.2, I 
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discuss the substantive contributions of the thesis and in section 6.3, I discuss some 
policy implications. 
 
6.1 Methodological contributions  
Since the fight against corruption took centre stage in development policy, political 
pressure in the form of policy conditionalities to aid as well as direct governance and 
anti-corruption interventions through technical assistance have greatly helped 
transform formal institutions across sub-Saharan Africa towards becoming, at least on 
paper, liberal democracies. As I argue in chapter 1, the ideological foundation of the 
good governance and anti-corruption agendas are inherently liberal and so is the 
theoretical foundation for the subsequent donor policies. These are highly influenced 
by Klitgaard’s (1988) equation ‘corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability’. 
On this basis, I chose to focus the empirical research on assessing the impact, and 
thereby the theoretical validity, of three macro-level institutional changes brought 
about in coherence with the international donor community’s good governance and 
anti-corruption agendas. I chose democratisation and economic liberalisation, being 
institutional changes that would indirectly lead to less corruption through ending 
monopoly (political and economic), limit discretion, and augment accountability. I 
also chose to look into the use of judicial punishment for corruption-related crimes as 
one way of increasing accountability and directly fighting corruption.  
 
There are, of course, other areas of institutional change across sub-Saharan Africa that 
have been provoked and sponsored by the good governance and anti-corruption 
agendas: instead, I could have focused on public sector reform or de-centralisation. 
However, regardless of issue, I believe that I would have found the same general 
answers, i.e. that while formal institutions can be changed through donor pressure, it 
is the continuation of the informal institutions, such as ‘Big Man’ and winner-takes-
all politics, that enables corruption to flourish in the African political context. 
Regardless of research focus I would also have struggled with the same obstacles that 
are inherent in the empirical study of corruption. In chapter 2, I discussed some of 
these obstacles, such as the difficulty of measuring corruption, which result in 
conceptual uncertainty and incoherence with regard to the existing cross-country data 
on corruption.  
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I believe that one methodological contribution of this thesis to the literature on 
corruption is that it bridges an otherwise rather rigid academic disciplinary divide by 
putting politics-focused propositions, previously supported largely by anecdotal 
evidence, through rigorous empirical testing. This is done by mixing quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a way that produces context sensitive yet generalisable results. 
In short, I argue that corruption works differently in different types of countries. 
Africa’s underlying institutional characteristics or ‘Big Man’ and winner-takes-all 
politics produce different scale and types of corruption than do the institutional set-up 
found in, for example, Western liberal democracies. These institutional characteristics 
cannot easily be ‘controlled’ away in statistical analysis and, as a consequence, I 
argue that a too wide application of cross-country regression analysis on corruption 
produces faulty results. In addition, since the main characteristics of corruption are 
context sensitive, there is a risk that the widely used cross-country corruption indices 
become too conceptually stretched and vague in terms of what they actually measure.   
 
Instead, I argue that by focusing exclusively on the sub-Saharan African regions 
whose countries share similarities in terms of their institutional context, the statistical 
results produced by the empirical analyses are generalizable within the sub-Saharan 
African region. At the same time, I have, by using qualitative research methods, been 
able to offer explanations to relationships that would have been difficult to do merely 
using quantitative data. I have in particular made heavy use of journalistic accounts 
from across sub-Saharan Africa in the qualitative parts of the empirical analyses. For 
the analysis in chapter 5, in particular, I read approximately a decade’s worth of the 
bi-monthly journal Africa Confidential in order to derive hypotheses about the 
characteristics of those high-level political figures in Africa that have been subject to 
corruption-related judicial actions, and grasp the political contexts in which this action 
were taken.  
 
Apart from focusing exclusively on one region, another way I have controlled for data 
incoherencies connected to the composite cross-country corruption perception indices, 
such as conceptual stretching and conceptual uncertainty based on the variety of 
underlying data sources, is to use the Afrobarometer and Global Corruption 
Barometer survey data. Since these surveys ask the respondents to distinguish their 
perceptions of a country’s extent of corruption across specific public functions and 
152 
 
institutions, they enable a closer fit between corruption data and relevant theoretical 
propositions. In chapter 3, for example, the relevant protagonists are the political 
leaders across sub-Saharan Africa. How they act when faced with political 
competition, and how these actions are associated with grand corruption, is of crucial 
importance. Therefore, it made sense to use data on corruption in the countries’ 
executive offices rather than data that express levels of corruption elsewhere. For the 
same reason, I used data on perceived levels of corruption among government 
officials in chapter 5 since that was directly linked to the theoretical proposition I was 
testing.   
 
6.2 Theoretical contributions  
The empirical findings in chapters 3, 4, and 5 all show disagreements with popular 
theories found in the corruption literature and conventional wisdom on how 
corruption can be curbed. As such, each makes significant contributions to the 
corruption literature. Added together, the findings in these chapters touch on the 
important question about the applicability of universal laws, i.e. whether theories on 
corruption are valid regardless of the context in which they are applied. This is the 
same question as development economists raised in the 1950s with regard to the 
mono-economics debate. Hirschman (1981:5), for example, stated that “certain 
special features of the economic structure of the underdeveloped countries make an 
important portion of orthodox analysis inapplicable and misleading.”  
 
In the literature on corruption, there is a tendency to rely on conventional wisdom 
based on experiences from the richer part of the world, where most of the universities 
and research institutes are based. Many of the heavyweights in the corruption 
literature base their theoretical insights on institutions in Western liberalised 
democracies, Rose Ackerman’s influential book from 1978 titled Corruption: A Study 
in Political Economy being one example. The findings in this thesis propose that the 
conventional wisdoms derived from these types of theories may be of questionable 
use for understanding corruption in the sub-Saharan African context and therefore 
advocate for a more context sensitive approach to researching corruption.   
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In chapter 3, I assess the validity of the conventional wisdom that an opening up for 
political competition leads to a decrease in corruption. This is a powerful theory that 
few scholars have argued against. However, looking at data from across sub-Saharan 
Africa, I do not find that corruption decreases with competition for the executive 
office. I propose that this fails to occur as a result of political legitimacy and political 
survival being dependent on the incumbent’s ability to distribute personalised 
patronage, or prebends, which in turn are associated with corruption. I also find that 
such logic changes as countries reach a high degree of democratic consolidation when 
the informal institutions of ‘Big Men’ and winner-takes-all politics have lost their 
importance. As a suggestion for further research, it would be interesting to analyse, 
using in-depth country case study method, changes in this incumbent logic over time, 
as Lindberg (2003) does for members of parliaments in Ghana.  
 
In chapter 4, I assess the high standing conventional wisdom about the role of 
governments in domestic markets. According to theory, an end to state control and 
ownership means an end to corruption, apart from during privatisation when the risk 
of corruption is high. This theoretical insight has had large ramifications in terms of 
development policy in the last few decades. However, based on an in-depth case study 
analysis of Rwanda, I find instead that economic liberalisation has shifted the basis 
for personalised patronage from the public sector to the private market. Rather than 
ending corruption, changes in the formal economic institutions have transformed it, 
once again, pointing to the importance of corruption as a political feature. For future 
research, it would be interesting to compare the Rwandan experience in terms of large 
scale economic liberalisation with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as 
Mozambique, or Asian counties like Singapore, and further investigate the 
transformation of corruption using the theoretical lens of developmental states. 
 
Lastly, in chapter 5, I start the analysis with assessing the validity of a theoretical 
proposition that argues for using judicial measures to directly hold a corrupt elite to 
account, a proposition which has led the way for the establishment of anti-corruption 
agencies and their mandate to curb corruption through punishment. When I did not 
find any support for this theoretical proposition in the data, I sought a counter 
argument in the literature and found many voices highlighting the issue of 
politicisation of such anti-corruption interventions. However, no previous literature 
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existed that systematically analysed such claims about foul play. Using journalistic 
accounts as well as statistical analysis, I found that prosecutions for corruption-related 
crimes among high level political figures in sub-Saharan Africa are probably not as 
apolitical as they are portrayed to be, and that a focus on politics is as important in 
understanding anti-corruption as it is in understanding corruption.    
 
6.3  Policy implications 
Focusing on the political functionality of corruption naturally clashes with the 
apolitical focus of the international donors’ anti-corruption agenda discussed in 
chapter 1, especially its assumption about neutrality with regard to governance and 
anti-corruption reforms, i.e. reforms being positive-sum. To give an example, there is 
no question that corruption creates non-optimal allocation of resources and that 
curbing corruption would thus potentially result in better aggregate economic 
outcomes. If one disregards the association between corruption and the governance 
tools used to hold onto power in the sub-Saharan African political context, one would 
reach the conclusion that such reforms provide win-win situations. However, by 
accounting for the political functionality of corruption, we would instead see that any 
reform that would limit the incumbent regime’s ability to generate and distribute 
resources on a personalised patron-client basis would potentially have dire 
consequences for the survival of the incumbent regime. Therefore, by focusing on the 
political functionality of corruption, it is easy to see that such governance reforms 
would not result in win-win outcomes but provide situations where the political elite 
are on the losing side. In that sense, it is also understandable that reforms that have 
been intended to curb corruption have had certain unintended consequences.  
 
In chapter 3, the unintended consequence from electoral reform that opened up for 
increased political competition was that the extent of corruption (proxied by 
corruption perceptions), in fact, increased because it was directly linked to ensuring 
continued political power for the incumbent in the face of increased political 
competition. In the analysis on economic liberalisation in chapter 4, I found the 
unintended consequence of this type of corruption-curbing reform to be an 
increasingly covert relationship based on favouritism between the political top and the 
market which was needed in order to ensure political control and power. The most 
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severe unintended consequence, however, was found in chapter 5 and shows that anti-
corruption policies can be hijacked by the political leadership and used for the 
purpose of getting rid of political opponents, rather than curbing corruption by dealing 
with impunity. The assumption about an unproblematic win-win situation from 
governance reforms intended to curb corruption may, as argued in that chapter, lead to 
less accountability and worse governance outcomes. These findings support the 
argument by Leftwich (2008:5; 2010:101) that focus must be on understanding the 
‘thick politics’ – political interest, power struggles, patronage, socio-political 
compromises, legitimacy-building and security considerations – instead of limiting 
our analysis to finding missing links, e.g. institutional and policy reforms.  
 
The disregard for politics have reportedly led to frustration also in other governance 
and anti-corruption reform programmes, especially where donors have relied on the 
recipient governments to implement, or ‘own’, the reforms. During the last 15 years, 
governments have, in fact, received the largest share of donor funding for good 
governance (Bhargava et al., 2011: XI). As Mungiu-Pippidi (2006:86) puts it: “many 
anti-corruption initiatives fail because they are non-political in nature, whilst most of 
the corruption in developing and post-communist countries is inherently political.” 
For example, Doig et al. (2005:43), in their evaluation of government-based and donor-
financed anti-corruption agencies in five sub-Saharan African countries, find that results 
are lacking because of the “low level of political commitment to reduce corruption and 
more significantly the high level of political resistance to attempted anti-corruption 
initiatives.” The following quote from Cammack (2007:604), which also concerns 
anti-corruption agencies in Africa, shows the adverse effect from basing policy on the 
assumption that anti-corruption reforms are apolitical and offer win-win situations.  
“The regimes will often blame [the anti-corruption agencies’] poor 
functioning on national poverty; so donors step in and fund these 
agencies and train their members. But this strengthening is often 
wasted because some other means of undermining their operations 
will be devised, for example, the president will appoint a tame 
commissioner or get a law passed to ensure that no prosecutions are 
forthcoming without the permission of the attorney general. It is 
now well-recognised that the anti-corruption commissions started 
up in sub-Saharan Africa since the transition have rarely functioned 
as designed. Indeed, it would be illogical for their governments to 
have allowed them to do so”. (Cammack, 2007:604). 
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Having highlighted the importance of viewing corruption from a political lens, the 
question is how this approach stands vis-à-vis current thinking in development policy. 
It appears, at least on paper, that international aid donors have started exercising 
greater political awareness. In recent years, several donors have initiated political 
economy analyses into their country and sector programmes. According to Unsworth 
(2009:886), these analyses have intended to explore the underlying causes of poor 
governance, looking at factors that shape formal and informal relationships between 
the state and organised groups in society, and thus the incentives that drive politicians 
and policymakers. Or, as stated in the Department for International Development’s 
(2009:1) ‘how to note’ on political economy analysis, they get “beneath the formal 
structures to reveal the underlying interests, incentives and institutions that enable or 
frustrate change.” Among the pioneers of such political economy analysis on 
development in the donor community was the UK’s Department for International 
Development’s Drivers of Change initiative and the Swedish Sida’s Power Analysis 
series.  
 
In the World Bank’s most recently published strategy on fighting corruption from 
2007 titled “Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and 
Anticorruption”, one of the lessons learned is that governance reforms must be 
tailored to country context, recognising that “the trajectory of change will vary from 
one country to another, depending on both the initial political impetus and the longer-
term historical processes that can shape and constrain political and institutional 
reform.” While this lesson acknowledges the importance of conducting some kind of 
country analysis before developing anti-corruption strategies, there is no mention of 
the importance of taking into account the underlying political functionality of 
corruption. As argued by Unsworth (2009:885), the strategy contains no diagnosis of 
the underlying causes of weak governance or development performance, and hence no 
recognition of the scale of the challenges or the processes involved in creating more 
effective public authority.  
 
On the whole, despite donors’ recent interest in political analysis, Unsworth 
(2009:884) argues that their use remains fragmented, and donors’ default position and 
assumption about good governance and corruption remain technocratic. “While most 
donors readily acknowledge (when pressed) that development challenges are political, 
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not just financial and technical, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric about 
politics and the mainstream operational agenda”. Similarly, in a recent article 
published by the donor-funded research programme, Africa Power and Politics 
Programme, Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011:1) alludes to this policy disconnect.  
“Despite the frequently reported death of the Washington 
Consensus, international policy prescriptions for low-income Africa 
remain ideological, unimaginative and out of touch with reality. The 
intellectual capital and financial leverage Western donors and 
concessional lenders still exercise are dissipated on the promotion of 
a standard package of institutional ‘best practices’ which includes 
sound macroeconomic management, transparent public finances, 
free and fair elections, the rule of law, well-defined property rights 
and an arm’s length relationship between private enterprise and the 
state. There are increasing grounds for regarding this approach as 
bankrupt.” 
It is my wish that the findings in this thesis will be used to support a new generation 
of politically engaged international donor initiatives. 
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